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Preface 
This Occasional Paper presents discussions from the conference on Cultural 
Encounters in the Pacific War held at the East-West Center over four days, 
18-21 May 1988, and sponsored by the East-West Center, the University of 
Hawaii's Center for Pacific Islands Studies, and the Hawaii Committee for the 
Humanities. The conference provided an occasion for Islanders, scholars, and 
others interested in the Pacific region to discuss the meanings and impacts of 
the Pacific War from local points of view. Like the conference, this collection 
combines scholarly papers with the testimonies of Islanders from diverse 
regions. The aim is to review wartime experiences in terms of their signifi-
cance for the social and political history of island societies. Pacific historians 
have long noted the importance of the war as a moment of transition, 
whether toward independence or some new form of relationship with metro-
politan powers. The papers and narratives that follow pursue these local sig-
nificances by assessing the meanings of the war in a range of societies. Taken 
together they provide a wide-angle lens through which to assess the war's 
impact on the region as a whole. Given that World War II continues to be 
invoked in statements about current events, these papers also shed light on 
the relevance of that war to contemporary identity and political relations. 
The conference consisted of nineteen presentations, combining both 
written papers and oral testimony. These included a mix of seven Pacific 
Island "veterans" with scholars of various nationalities (five Americans, three 
Pacific Islanders, two Japanese, one Australian, and one New Zealander). 
Most of these presentations focus on Pacific Islanders' experiences and recol-
lections of the war, although three papers focus on American and Japanese 
perceptions as well. These latter add important complementary information 
to our understanding of the war's cross-cultural encounters. The participation 
by two Japanese researchers, Hisafumi Saito and Wakako Higuchi, was espe-
cially helpful in balancing the inevitable American or European bias in 
conference discussions. The reader should be aware that, even though our 
focus is on Islanders' recollections of the war, the American context of the 
conference probably leads participants to focus somewhat selectively on 
topics and events seen from an American or European vantage point. 
The papers encompass a wide geographic scope. Although certainly not 
exhaustive or comprehensive, they are grouped to reflect the broad sweep of 
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the war across the entire region. Following the order of presentations at the 
conference, the papers are organized by traditional culture areas--Melanesia, 
Micronesia, and Polynesia. The ordering parallels roughly the chronology of 
the Allied offensive, beginning in the Southwest Pacific and moving north-
ward and westward toward Japan. The first section focuses on Melanesian 
societies, followed by discussions of the war in Micronesia. The only Polyne-
sian case included here is that of American S~moa, which, like Hawai'i, 
figured importantly in the war as the site of a rear-area American base. The 
collection concludes with papers on American and Japanese perceptions of 
Melanesian Islanders. The most noticeable omission from this inventory of 
island war history is the absence of any accounts from New Caledonia or 
French Polynesia. 
Two major themes emerge from this collection's review of Islanders' 
experience of the war. The first, and one that is often minimized in mnitary 
histories, is the suffering, disruption, and destruction wrought by the war in 
island communities. The second theme pertains to the war's impact on social 
relations, particularly the manner in which the war led to a rethinking of 
relations with colonial powers. In some areas, such as the Solomon Islands 
and Papua New Guinea, this rethinking led to moves for greater autonomy, 
while in other areas it accelerated a process of integration, as in the case of 
American Samoans or Hawaiian Japanese. 
The war's toll on island communities will never be known adequately or 
tallied. In part this is because of the "invisible" nature of native populations, 
which were little known to most combatants. The numerous cases related, in 
which planes from both sides bombed and strafed villages where little or no 
evidence of enemy presence existed, testify to the casual military attitudes 
toward the safety and well-being of Islanders. One example is the bombing of 
the artificial island of Laulasi offshore from Malaita in the Solomon Islands. 
The residents of Laulasi, other Solomon Islanders, and even the British 
resident commissioner were baffled about why an American squadron of 
seven torpedo planes bombed Laulasi in an area far from any Japanese troop 
concentrations, resulting in the deaths of twenty-two men, women, and 
children (more than half children). Flight reports recently u~covered by Hugh 
Laraey with the assistance of John Lundstrom show that this bombing was 
nothing more than a matter of poor navigation, mistaken identity, and a lack 
of adequate cautions about the presence of local villagers. The tragic result at 
Laulasi was repeated many times over in Papua New Guinea where satura-
tion bombings of Japanese-held areas accounted for a large proportion of the 
estimated fifteen thousand Papua New Guineans killed in the war. 
Because Islanders were relatively powerless and lacked access to forums 
where they might voice their suffering, they often endured death, disease, and 
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destruction in obscurity. On the larger islands whole coastal communities 
could quietly disappear as they sought refuge in forested interior regions. 
Although this may have gotten villagers out of the way of battles and 
bombings, it often left them, unable to obtain adequate food supplies or 
medical care, to face stalVation and disease. The residents of small atolls that 
were the site of massive invasions may have experienced the most horrific 
calamities of war. Unable to leave their tiny habitats, residents of places such 
as Tarawa or Kwajalein recall cowering in bunkers as the earth shook around 
them for hours, only to emerge (if they were lucky enough to have surviVed) 
and see nothing but shattered palm trees, with every bit of vegetation stripped 
from the coral surface. Even other Pacific Islanders accustomed to the more 
robust and lush environment of high volcanic islands have difficulty imagining 
the completeness with which an atoll may be devastated. These differences 
emerged in the conference when Jonathan Fifi'i, from the large island of 
Malaita in the Solomons, asked quizzically why Sam Highland dwelt at length 
on the loss of plants and trees from Betio islet in Tarawa, saying 'The same 
thing happened in my home, but I don't worry about it in the bad times of 
war." However, unlike Malaita where people could always find and grow food 
in the interior, tiny Betio was stripped clean of vegetation by the Japanese 
occupiers intent on fortifying the place. The result was complete dependency 
on external food sources, with years of work required to regenerate taro pits 
and the like. Because atoll populations could not hide, they were also more 
wlnerable to vicitimization as forced labor. In one of the worst cases of 
suffering under forced labor, nearly half of the population of Nauru was 
taken by the Japanese to work in Truk and Kosrae. Of the eight hundred on 
this journey, more than half perished before returning. 
For the colonial powers, relations with "native" peoples during the war 
were often framed in terms of "loyalty," epitomized in images such as that of 
the Papua New Guinean "fuzzy wuzzy angel" who carried Australian supplies 
and wounded soldiers through rugged terrain. Although the issue of loyalty 
may crystallize the problem of native relations for colonial and military . 
regimes, the concept may have little or no relevance in rural island commu-
nities. Whereas loyalty was often presented by the warring powers as a c1ear-
cut matter of alignment with one side or the other, Islanders whose relations 
with colonial "m asters" were ambivalent at best prior to the war often did not 
regard the conflict as their war, While Jonathan Fifi'i's comment at the 
conference that lithe British were worse than the Japanese" may be somewhat 
extreme for many areas, his obselVation underlines the sentiments of many 
Islanders who suffered invasion and counterinvasion under conditions of 
immense confusion and uncertainty. For many who witnessed the collapse of 
prewar colonial regimes, approaching new military outsiders from Japan, 
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America, and elsewhere was fraught with danger. Many people adopted a 
kind of humane pragmatism that only translated into alignment with one side 
or the other once new or renewed colonial arrangements began to take 
shape. Those who misjudged often paid for their mistake with their lives or 
careers. One such person was the Solomon ~lander George Bogese discussed 
here by Hugh Laracy. 
From one island group to another the local meanings of the war 
frequently depended upon the prior history of colonial experience. The 
papers show the range of variation in local responses to the war, with some 
communities such as Palauans or indigenous Fijians seeking greater 
involvement and advancement in the colonial apparatus, and others building 
on wartime experiences to assert local autonomy and disengagement, as in the 
postwar Maasina Rule movement in the Solomons. In Japanese Micronesia, 
where the war was preceded by a growing militarization of the region, the 
outbreak of hostilities resulted in the recruitment of Micronesians into labor 
groups and quasi-military units under a rhetoric of coparticipation in the 
Japanese national cause. Whereas this sort of recruitment was undertaken as 
an expansion of opportunity and trust in many islands, it was just the opposite 
in those areas of Micronesia such as Guam, Kiribati, and Nauru that had been 
under American or British control. The indigenous populations of these 
places were subjected to harsh and regimented conditions aimed at putting 
them to work for the Japanese war effort and at preventing any possibility of 
sabotage or betrayal. As several of the papers in this collection show, these 
policies resulted in starvation, sickness, or death for many so affected. 
The formation oflabor and military units in Japanese Micronesia was 
paralleled in Allied Melanesia and Polynesia. In Papua New Guinea, where 
the Japanese occupation was longest, and the fight to expel them the most 
extensive, the need for local labor resulted in coerciv~ recruitment strategies 
that saw nearly fifty thousand people of Papua New Guinea volunteering or 
being pressed into service under dangerous and difficult ~onditions. Many of 
those who worked as carriers not only suffered extreme hardships on moun-
tain trails, but also left wives and families behind who found themselves 
struggling to survive without able-bodied men to assist with the requirements 
of subsistence. For the most part, Allied labor corps formed in the Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu, and elsewhere met their needs with volunteers who signed 
on for the opportunity to acquire new experiences, dollars, and surplus 
materiel from American troops generous with government-issue property. As 
several of the Melanesian papers in this collection show, the impressions 
created by these American "exchange partners" had similar effects throughout 
the South Pacific. Specifically, unregulated contacts and interactions with 
military personnel who had no interest in maintaining the guise of European 
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. superiority tended to rupture the prewar status quo, which was based on a 
Code of racial separation and superiority. Encounters with black American 
servicemen, often perceived as beneficiaries of Western education and 
economy, also served to challenge color-coded systems of colonial rule. 
The first section of this volume consists of six Melanesian presentations 
that deal with the war in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, and 
Vanuatu. Papua New Guinea is discussed in a paper by historian John Waiko 
based on the keynote speech he gave at the conference. Waiko summarizes 
the findings of his own and others' studies of New Guineans' experiences of 
the war, while also considering the problems of incorporating information 
from oral traditions in history writing. Given the size of Papua New Guinea, 
and the fact that many areas experienced long occupations by the Japanese, it 
is regrettabie that more material on that country could not be included in this 
volume. Another Papua New Guinean, Maclaren Hiari, was invited to the 
conference to present his work on the oral history of the Kokoda trail 
campaign, but was unable to attend at the last minute. Waiko's piece is 
followed by Brij Lal's discussion of the effects of the war in Fiji, particularly 
its relevance for this history of relations between indigenous and Indian 
Fijians. 
Of the remaining four Melanesian presentations, three deal with the 
Solomon Islands and one with Vanuatu. Anthropologist Lamont Lindstrom 
discusses Vanuatu, focusing on ni-Vanuatu labor corps experiences. Involve-
ment in local labor corps and contact with military base personnel is perhaps 
the central issue for many areas, such as New Caledonia or Tonga, which did 
not become the site of open combat but rather experienced another sort of 
invasion--that of construction battalions and support units that turned quiet 
south sea isles into citylike military bases. The Solomon Islands, lying between 
Bougainville and Vanuatu, experienced the effects of both kinds of invasion: 
the disruption of prolonged military struggle as well as the novel oppor-
tunities offered those working on rear-area bases. The war in the Solomons is 
discussed in three presentations--two by Solomon Islanders David Gegeo and 
Jonathan Fifi'i, and one by historian Hugh Laraey. Gegeo, a doctoral candi-
date in political science, gives an overall discussion of the cultural meanings 
and impacts of the war in the Solomons, and Fifi'i presents a firsthand 
account of his experiences as a leader of a section of labor corps recruits from 
Malaita working on Guadalcanal. 
The war in Micronesia is discussed in eight presentations, four by Micro-
nesians who experienced the war themselves, and four by researchers (three 
anthropologists and an oral historian). Lin Poyer opens the section on Micro-
nesia with an overview of the course of the war and its historical significance 
for the region. This is followed by discussions of the impacts of the war in 
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Nauru, Kiribati (Tarawa), Marshall Islands, Pohnpei, Guam, and Palau. This 
collection h~ benefited from a paper by Nancy Pollock on Nauru not given at 
the conference, but incorporated subsequently in order to detail some of the 
little-known history of Nauruans during the war. Like the people ofPohnpei 
discussed by Suzanne Falgout, Nauruans suffered extreme deprivations 
because of occupation and isolation, even though their island was never the 
site of a counterinvasion. The experiences of Micronesians whose islands 
were the site of major battles are graphically portrayed by Sam Highland for 
Tarawa, by John Heine for the Marshalls, by Tony Palomo for Guam, and by 
Ubal Tellei and Wakako Higuchi for Palau. Although contrasts in experience 
(eg, between those of American-oriented Guam and Japanese Palau) are 
dramatic, the dangers of alignment with one or the other of the metropolitan 
powers are brought home in all of these presentations. 
Following the section on Micronesia, wartime experiences in the 
American territories of Hawai'i and Samoa are discussed. Ted Tsukiyama, an 
American of Japanese ancestry (AlA), discusses the significance of his own 
recruitment and that of other Hawaiian nisei into the American war effort. As 
anyone familiar with modern Hawai'i knows, the heroic service of American. 
Japanese in both the European and Pacific theaters of World War II did 
more than any single event to validate the American identity of people of 
Japanese ancestry living in the islands. Ted Tsukiyama's presentation at the 
conference was but one instance of many occasions in which AlAs' World 
War II service has been cited as a symbol of national identity and loyalty. The 
contrast herewith the situation of Fiji Indians described by Brij Lal could 
hardly be greater. Both Hawaiian Japanese and Fiji Indians descend from 
groups brought to the Pacific to work on plantations as immigrant labor. Both 
now represent major segments of the states in which they reside and have 
moved into the full range of professional and business occupations. However, 
whereas the AlAs of Hawai'i have achieved substan~ial political power 
through elected government, Fiji's Indian population has not--a fact under-
scored dramatically by the 1987 military coups in that country. The different 
histories of these two groups' involvements in World War II can be read as an 
ominous precursor of their different fortunes in the modern Pacific. Whereas 
the wartime experiences of AlAs in Hawai'i helped them overcome skepti-
cism about their loyalty and ability to serve, the relegation of Fiji's Indian 
population to continued plantation labor during the war added yet another 
factor that differentiates their history from that of indigenous Fijians, who 
compiled an impressive record of wartime sacrifice and heroism. 
The involvement of American Samoans in the war is reviewed in a paper 
by anthropologist Robert Franco and an oral presentation by Tuala 
Sevaaetasi, a veteran of the Samoan Fitafita Guard. As in the case of the 
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Hawaiian Japanese, World War II opened up avenues of recruitment into the 
regular US military that marked a significant deepening of participation in 
mainstream US society. Franco's paper, based on documentary and interview 
data, is complemented nicely by Sevaaetasi's personal narrative of activities 
beginning during the war that gained him a military career and eventually 
brought him to Hawai'i. 
The final section contains three papers that step back and consider the 
war's cultural encounters from the point of view of American and Japanese 
military personnel. By considering the ways the combatants in the Pacific 
conflict perceived Islanders, these papers add an important complement to 
this volume's main focus on Islanders' experiences. Hisafumi Saito and Marty 
Zelenietz, both anthropologists who have worked on the island of New 
Britain in Papua New Guinea, use published materials to examine the ways 
Japanese and Americans regarded Melanesians. Their discussions suggest 
that, for both groups, "natives" were less significant for military personnel 
than military personnel were for many Islanders. However, whereas Zelenietz 
writes that Melanesians were "invisible" to many Americans, Saito cites 
Japanese comments about their friendship and good relations with local 
people. Note, however, that these attitudes were evident in the propaganda-
driven publicity of both sides that emphasized the "liberating" effects of 
freeing Islanders from oppressive occupation by the enemy. It is apparent 
that military perceptions of Islanders, as reported in journals and newspapers 
of the day, were extensively molded by wartime needs to find "loyal natives" 
and "brave allies." 
The conference on which this volume is based was supported by the East-
West Center's Institute of Culture and Communication, the University of 
Hawaii's Center for Pacific Islands Studies, and the Hawaii Committee for the 
Humanities. In addition the conference and this volume have benefited from 
support of the editor's research on island histories of the war by a grant from 
the Interpretive Research Program of the National Endowment for the 
Humanities. The assistance of all these organizations is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
For the Center for Pacific Islands Studies, the conference was the 
thirteenth annual Pacific Islands Studies conference. The organizational 
efforts of Director Robert Kiste and Outreach Coordinator Tisha Hickson 
made possible an event that reached a great many people in Hawai'i, contin-
uing a tradition of annual conferences that brings significant Pacific Islands 
issues to the attention of the community. Donald Rubinstein, formerly 
executive director of the School of Hawaiian, Asian, and Pacific Studies, 
played a central role in conceptualizing, conducting, and evaluating the 
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conference from the time of its inception. The quality of discussions owes 
much to his knowledge and understanding of island cultures. 
Conference discussions benefited greatly from the participation of several 
scholars from the University of Hawaii who acted as discussants and facili-
tators. In addition to Donald Rubinstein, ot~ers who contributed their consid-
erable knowledge and skill to the deliberations were Murray Chapman, David 
Hanlon, Leonard Mason, and Karen Watson-Gegeo. The discussions also 
benefited from comments by Roger Keesing, anthropologist at McGill 
University and long-time associate of the late'Jonathan Fifi'i. 
For the East-West Center the conference was an important part of a 
larger project on Pacific recollections of the war that involved a previous 
conference held in the Solomon Islands in 1987, research in the Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu, and several publications based on collaboration with 
colleagues in the region. Several people at the center worked tirelessiy to see 
the conference run smoothly, especially Nancy Taylor and Edith Yashiki. We 
would also like to thank Edith Yashiki and Joy Teraoka for their help with 
the preparation of this Occasional Paper. 
The East-West Center project on recollections of World War II in the 
Pacific Islands has already produced several publications. These include The 
Big Death: Solomon Islanders Remember World War II (University of the 
South Pacific, 1988); Taem Blong Faet: World War II in Melanesia (Solomon 
Islands USP Centre, 1988); The Pacific Theater: Island Representations of 
World War II (University of Hawaii Press, 1989); and the photo-essay Island 
Encounters: Black and White Memories of the Pacific War (Smithsonian Press, 
1990). The current volume complements these other publications in several 
respects. First, its cultural and geographic sweep is broader than most of the 
books, the first two of which focus solely on Melanesia. Second, our primary 
focus on indigenous recollections is here expanded with information on 
American and Japanese perceptions of Islanders, thus adding greater depth 
to the portrayal of the war as "cultural encounter." Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, this volume combines both research-based papers and firsthand 
accounts by Islanders telling about their own experiences. As the reader will 
find, this somewhat unusual mixture of voices adds to the immediacy and 
texture of the volume's portrait of wartime experiences. The contributors 
hope that these narratives and discussions will inspire further oral historical 
work with those Islanders who know and speak a different history from that 
which circulates most widely in the books and films of the metropolitan 
powers. 
GEOFFREY M. WHITE 
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1 
Oral History and the War: 
The View from Papua New Guinea 
John Waiko 
In this paper, prepared as the keynote address to the conference CultUral 
Encounters in the Pacific War, I wish to comment on some of the events of 
World War II in my country, Papua New Guinea, and to use that commentary 
to address more general questions pertaining to the uses of oral and 
documentary history in the representation of the past. I begin by drawing a 
parallel between the study of colonial history in Papua New Guinea and the 
place of peasant history in European historiography. The paper then reviews 
a range of Papua New Guinean experiences during the war, as seen through 
the lens of oral history, before concluding with further remarks about 
problems of historical method. 
Colonial History and Oral Traditions 
The attitude taken to history, especially colonial history, by Europeans stems 
from some of the same ideological positions taken in regard to documents of 
the European literate classes and the oral traditions of the peasants in 
continental Europe. The development of European historiography in the 
study of folklore makes it plain that many European historians, with very few 
exceptions, had built up a considerable indifference toward the oral traditions 
of the peasants. During the nineteenth century in particular, professional 
historians concentrated on documents, while folklorists studied contemporary 
oral testimonies. Both concluded that oral traditions were not of much use for 
historical purposes. These scholars were members of the ruling class, which 
included politicians, lawyers, and doctors. According to them history meant 
what happened in the activities and events that had to do with the people in 
power whose views and ideas were recorded in documents. Unlike the upper 
class the peasants did not have power and they could not make decisions. The 
masses did not affect the flow of history because they had no control over 
what happened. They could not make history. Only the elite made decisions 
and thereby contributed to history. For this reason many professional 
historians were more concerned with the records left behind by the leaders 
and the institutions they had created than with the oral histories of the 
peasants. 
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The folkloric study of peasant oral traditions did not locate events that 
appeared in documents researched by professional historians. These 
professionals concluded that oral traditions were useless. Amateur historians 
did not challenge this conclusion because they took oral testimony at face 
value, diminishing it because their work was not taken seriously. Historians, 
both professional and amateur, and folklorists were asking the wrong 
questions. Even though oral traditions could not be related to events as 
described in the documents, oral histories at least indicated peasant attitudes 
toward events and the actions of the elite. 
The general inteHectual climate among highly respected scholars in 
continental Europe questioned the validity of oral traditions as historical 
sources. And this indifference toward and bias against the oral cultures of the 
Western peasantry was to have a profound impact on European historians 
and anthropologists who went out from their respective countries to study 
cultures other than their own. Why should they trust oral narratives of non-
Western peoples? 
In Papua New Guinea the damage to oral history has not been as great as 
elsewhere; but what of the future? We may have escaped the work of 
amateur historians because professionals have taken the lead in studying 
Melanesian oral ttaditions seriously. I am a participant in events while 
wanting to record them as accurately as I can. This includes recording 
people;s knowledge of the recent past, including the events of World War II. 
Indeed, my interest in recording it grows stronger as changes among the 
Binandere erode knowledge of their past in many parts of the community. In 
this way, my research and writing is making me a major custodian of my 
people's traditions. 
Of course, in the role of custodian lies a real danger of augmenting live 
oral tradition with one person's viewpoint, however loyal and careful that one 
person may be. Live testimony depends in part on a lack of literacy for its 
continued existence. Literate historians often play at keeping their written 
documents alive but immutable by insuring that they are not easily acquired 
by informants, frequently people who have only recently become literate and 
who have too much respect for the written word. The ability or the right to 
criticite the written word is not established easily in oral societies once they 
come into contact with literate foreigners. It takes a long time for these 
societies to realize that the written word is no stronger than its spoken 
counterpart and can be just as wrong. 
The essence of live oral tradition is, I think, that there is no one "carrier" 
above all others. In most Melanesian societies, there are no specialists 
designated as carriers of traditions and directly responsible to the chief or 
king, to members of a higher class, or even to the state. The transmission 
forms and contents of another kind of oral tradition are supervised, guarded, 
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and controiled by someone higher than the carriers themselves. That is why 
formal oral traditions in highly structured or graded societies, such as found in 
Polynesia, are· not necessarily alive but bend toward the yoke of a ruler so that 
a specialist is the custodian of the chiefs, king's, or state's tradition. Similar 
situations existed in continental Europe where historians and folklorists were 
. under the influence of the state. Theirs was not a Jiving oral tradition because. 
once a ruler succeeds to the throne or chieftainship, his order of generations 
becomes established as the live one. 
In my view, the live spoken word in most parts of the Pacific and in Papua 
New Guinea is not controlled by one person or one carrier above all others. 
However, once the tradition is contained and shaped by one vessel, it is open 
to corruption. In short, being an active member of a community and at the 
same time an objective recorder of tradition is a very difficult dual role. J try 
to look carefully and honestly at the relations between myself and the society 
I am writing about and serve. I believe that any person who enters a 
community and writes about it must meet this double role seriously. The 
conflict is between writing for the people and writing for the university 
establishment. I have tried to ensure in my own case that the two are 
balanced as evenly as possible. 
World War n Encounters 
I wish now to deal directly with the Papua New Guinea encounter with the 
Japanese, Australians, and Americans during World War II. In order to 
appreciate the encounters in Papua New Guinea we look at three groups of 
people: ordinary villagers; laborers and carriers; and soldiers and police. 
In 1939, when the war broke out in Europe, it was too remote for Papua 
New Guinea. Sir John Guise wrote: 
I still remember the night of September 3, 1939, when there were a large 
group of Papuans including myself sitting beside a radio set belonging to 
another Papuan at Samarai. We listened with wonder, silence, and fear as 
Mr. Chamberlain declared war on Germany from London. We tried to make 
ourselves believe that the broadcast would not affect us at all in Papua but 
the feeling we had at the time was one of uneasiness. We were brought to 
the point where we had to recognize and accommodate our thoughts to the 
implications of this international broadcast from London. There was no 
other way. (1969, 562) 
By August ·1941, the European residents' propaganda against the 
Japanese had become widespread. The Papuan Villager, a monthly paper for 
Europeans and the few Papuans who could read English, had indicated dislike 
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of the Japanese. By October the prejudice spilled over, as this quotation 
shows: 
. The Japanese are not white men. Their skins have a J'lltber yellow color, 
sometimes pale brown. They are often small men, but well-made and strong. 
One strange thing about them is the way their eyes slant upwards at, slant 
upwards on the outer comers. 
In the early days, the Japanese soldiers were bow and arrow men like so 
many Papuans. But now they have warships, and cannons, and tanks, and 
airplanes. Perhaps this is a mistake as I do not think their warships and 
other fighting things are really as good as those of Europeans. And if they 
ever go to war against the Europeans they will soon find' this out. 
(Inglis 1969, 508) 
At the beginning of 1942 Papua and New Guinea remained a quiet 
colonial backwater. Despite war in Europe and the determined southward 
expansion of the Japanese, Europeans continued to live in Port Moresby, 
Rabaul, and on their plantations as if nothing was happening in the outside 
world. Most Papua New Guineans were not aware of the great war raging to 
their north. Some slight fortification and preparation for war had been made 
in Papua, but the League of Nations mandate forbade the construction of 
fortification in New Guinea. 
On 4 January 1942 peace ended when the Japanese bombed Rabaul. This 
was their first attack on the Australian territory. Until 1945 the islands of 
Papua New Guinea became a battlefield over which 1 million Americans, 
300,000 Japanese, and nearly 500,000 Australians fought. At the time thls was 
almost one foreigner for every Papua New Guinean. Between 3 and 5 
February 1942 the Japanese dropped two bombs on Port Moresby in the early 
bours of the morning. Numerous stores were hit. The Australian troops and 
the local people alike began to loot the stores. One eyewitness noted, 
"Looted Moresby was a blood-chilling example of how thin the veneer of 
white civilization is in times of great stress and danger." Chaos reigned in 
Moresby, Samarai, and Misima where the civil administration lost control. 
The Commonwealth of Australia suspended civilian authority and declared 
military control in both Papua and New Guinea. The whites suddenly 
deserted Papua New Guineans. The desertion damaged beyond repair the 
white prestige that had been established and jealously guarded by the 
European residents before January 1942. Peter Ryan (1969) put it aptly: "The 
pre-war relationships of white master and black servants were shaken. A 
different sort of white man was seen for the first time in the Australian 
soldiers whose humanity, informality, and willingness to labor in the sun and 
in the mud were in contrast to the rigid allowances of many of the pre-war 
residents. " 
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What about the villagers? An obvious effect of the war was the great 
damage done in areas where the fighting was heaviest. Practically everything 
Europeans had built before the war was destroyed. Almost all the solid 
buildings erected by the Germans disappeared. Government and mission 
stations were destroyed and valuable government and mission records dealing 
with the period before 1942 were lost. Allied bombing, ground fighting, the 
Japanese search for food, and, to a lesser extent, some looting by Allied and 
Japanese soldiers caused most of this destruction. Much Papua New Guinea 
property was also destroyed. Villages were burned and the people evacuated. 
Gardens were pillaged and left to the jungle. In the Madang area Allied 
bombing destroyed the great sea-going canoes of the people of the coast; and, 
because the old people with the skills to build them also died during the war, 
the destroyed canoes could not be replaced. 
People also suffered from the recruitment of the young men to work for 
the Japanese or the Allies. As a result gardens in the village were neglected. 
In some areas Papua New Guineans were shot by the Japanese, or the Allies, 
for disloyalty. Toward the end of the war hungry Japanese soldiers sometimes 
shot villagers and enemy prisoners for food. The ordinary people in the 
villages were deprived and lost their homes. First, the news and the terror of 
the fight made them move into their hunting grounds, caves, and swamps in· 
the nearby forests. The people left their villages in fear of both the Japanese 
and the European soldiers. A villager near Finschhafen had this to say: "How 
could we settle down to clear the bush and make gardens? We were always 
running away from the Japanese. When we were hiding, the Japanese caught 
up with us so we had to move on. We collected wild yams and fruits of all 
kinds in the bush and ate them to keep ourselves alive." Temporary absences 
from villages for hunting wild animals and collecting sago were a customary 
practice; the difference now was the length of the absence. Before the war it 
was a matter of days and weeks; during the war it was longer-in fact, one to 
three years. Second, in areas which the Allies and the Japanese soldiers used 
as battlefields, people were forced to evacuate their villages and flee to 
temporary camps. After the fighting ceased these people were allowed to 
return to their villages. 
One of the bloodiest battles fought during World War II was on the 
Kokoda trail. The Japanese attempt to capture Australia was diverted in May 
1942, after the battle of the Coral Sea. In July the Japanese aimed to occupy 
Port Moresby by first landing their forces between Gona and Buna in the 
northern province. Arthur Duna was an ordinary villager who witnessed the 
invasion and described it: 
The firing of the guns and the explosions of bombs brought all the clouds of 
the skies down and touched the earth and all the living things seemed to be 
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crushed to dust. All the clansmen who were brave, courageous, and strong in 
the previous day appeared to become like babies in their first day out of 
their mother's womb at the arrival of the Japanese. It was as if the landing, 
gun noises, and the actual terrifying sight of the ships that covered the wide 
horizon of the bay bad removed the bones of the people. They could not run 
even if they tried to, for it was a unique disaster beyond anyone's memory. 
(In Waiko 1988, 46) 
Arthur Duna, a young and daring man, would have been the first person 
to brandish a stone club or a steel axe in the air if a neighboring clan had 
invaded his viilage. But a Japanese invasion was physically and technologically 
beyond comparison: Clubs and axes were obviously inferior. Guns, bombs, 
ships, and phmes were so superior that the landing, with its thunder of . 
bombing, was like the lightning that strikes the tops of coconut trees. Arthur 
Duna describes vividly how women, men, and children felt the impact. of the 
nerve-racking attack and the suddenness of the sweeping thrust of the 
Japanese invasion: 
As if you had a dreamlike spirit chasing you and you want to run, [but] you 
cantlot run and the spirit catches you. It went just like that. There was a 
great panic. That afternoon, you could not run away from where you were at 
the time of the invasion. There was not time to go to your village to gather 
your family or collect your valuable belongings. Wife ran naked without her 
husband and children. Husband ran naked without his wife and children. A 
child ran without his parents. And even if he or she who was with his small 
ones, he or she deserted them. All ran in different directions into the bush. 
Some ran for cover like rats and bandicoots in the kunai grass. The night fell 
and each individual slept either in the grass or under the trees. The damp 
soil was your bed and the rotten logs your pillow. You went to sleep 
wherever you happened to run that night. (In Waiko 1988, 45) 
These quotations hardly exaggerate. And in the districts where the war 
was fought, the Japanese did not try to establish a system of native 
administration at all. They only moved along like army worms and ravaged the 
countryside about two miles on either side of the tracks. In one area of 
Morobe province, a man said of the Japanese behavior, "The Japanese 
finished the food in the gardens. They finished all our cattle. Defecating and 
urinating, they spoiled the church. CaI1ing out, 'hUla, hUla', or 'pig, pig', they 
killed and ate our pigs. " 
How about the Melanesian laborers? By May 1942, as part of the war 
effort, a standing order was issued that not more than 25 percent of the adult 
male population of a vi1lage could be recruited for laborers and carriers, and 
that the laborers were to be employed in their home districts (Ryan 1969). On 
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paper the conditions of indentured laborers were as follows. A minimum 
wage of 5 shillings per month, and 6 shillings per month for those who 
rendered a three-year contract of service. The maximum monthly wage was 10 
shillings, and 8 shillings was paid to the three-year contract laborers who 
carried out heavy duties. The plantation laborers were paid only 6 shillings a 
month as the work was relatively lighter. 
In reality, however, the carriers' ability to endure hardships was pushed 
to the limit. A so-called line of communication between Gona and Buna on 
the coast through Kokoda across the. Owen Stanley Range to Port Moresby 
on the other side of Papua New Guinea consisted of a series of camps. Each 
camp had a store, a rest house, and a guard house. The role of carriers was 
fivefold: to establish a camp and erect buildings, to construct traps or a road 
between one camp and another, to build a supply base at each camp, to carry 
packs and rations for troops, and, last but not least, to carry the wounded 
soldiers on stretchers from the front line to the base camps. 
I have said that an order was issued to recruit one quarter of the total 
adult male population as laborers, carriers, policemen; and soldiers. In order 
to appreciate the overall problem of recruitment in Papua New Guinea, I 
would like to look at the details of a small community, the Binandere people, 
with whose history and culture I am familiar. They were a population of about 
2500 adults and children, occupying twenty-one villages in the Oro province. 
The total adult male population was 354 of whom 21, or 6 percent, were 
recruited as soldiers in the Papuan Infantry Battalion. Of these, 35 men, 10 
percent, joined the Royal Papuan Constabulary as policemen, and 110 men, 
31 percent, were recruited as general laborers and carriers. This meant that 
188 males, 53 percent, were too old or too young to render any service to the 
war effort. These percentages are true for about two-thirds of the people of 
Papua New Guinea. One-third had little contact with the war. In fact, in the 
highlands of New Guinea, the people rarely saw even a plane. 
The exact total labor strength between 1942 and 1945 is difficult to 
obtain. Yet Peter Ryan (1969) provides the following figures, which increased 
rapidly during the Japanese occupation of Papua New Guinea. According to 
Ryan, by 31 October 1942 about 7000 laborers were recruited. By September 
1943, 30,000 had been recruited. By July 1945, 55,000 laborers were recruited. 
These figures do not include many people who served short engagements 
near their homes. However, many populous districts were Japanese held, so 
that less than half the population of the controlled areas was supplying the 
entire levy. According to Peter Ryan's calculation, 
recruitment in some villages was 100 % of fit male adults. I myself knew 
villages where, in 1944, recruitment exceeded 100%, since partly unfit men 
were impressed for lighter duties. The village suffered severely without men 
9 
JOHN WAlKO 
to clear gardens, hunt, maintain houses and canoes, etc. Diet was deficient, 
disease mounted, the women were strained from oveJWork, there was in 
some places near starvation and very high infant mortality, there was all the 
grief of separation and bereavement and that frightening apathy and loss 
of will to live. (1969,540-541) 
In 1943 Peter Ryan, walking up the Lakekamu River in the Papuan Gulf, 
crossed the Bulldog track to Wau in the Morobe province within seven days. 
There he observed the carrier's conditions: 
The carriers each had a load of about fifty pounds. Their daily ration was 
one meal of boiled rice which they cooked for themselves each night. They 
had each a packet of army biscuits in the mornings, usually eaten on the 
march, and they set out from Bulldog with a small tin of meat, a piece which 
they ate the first day so as not to have to carry it. Apart from his loincloth or 
G-string, each carrier had one 'trade' blanket .... [S]imple scientific 
measurement shows that this ration lacks protein, fats and vitamins, and 
even for ordinary work could be deficient in crude calories. For arduous 
labor in cold mountains it was quite inadequate. Sickness rates sometimes 
rose higher than 25%, 14% was accepted as reasonable. Beri-beri, New 
Guinea mouth, and tropical ulcer--all diet deficiency signs--were common. 
(1969,542) 
What about the soldiers? As the war progressed, police and other Papua 
New Guineans were taken into the army and trained as special fighting units--
first, the Papuan Infantry Battalion and then the two New Guinean Infantry 
Battalions, which were later all joined together as the Pacific Islands 
Regiment (Barrett 1969). Because of their knowledge of the environment, 
and their skills with local terrain, this small unit achieved much and produced 
some distinguished war heroes, some of whom are depicted in the film Angels 
o/War. In the battlefields, soldiers--Australians, Americans, and Papua New 
Guineans--had to face a common enemy, the Japanese Army. Abraham Pap 
of Wadokai said how all the soldiers faced the formidable enemy: "We saw 
the masta soldier dying and the Japanese dying, and we were very frightened. 
Blood was like water and we were completely soaked in it. We just laid on the 
ground and moved along on our stomachs. If we raised our heads, bullets 
would have got us in no time." Sir John Guise echoes the same sentiment of 
the bond between and among the soldiers who had to face the enemy at close 
range--on many occasions only a rifle-shot away. "The friendship was bound 
on the battlefield of blood. This is exactly what happened when Australians 
and Papua New Guineans fought together, suffered together, and no force in 
the world can smash the friendship" (in Nelson 1980, 172). 
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This quotation reflects the bond in hindsight, as there was distinct 
discrimination between European soldiers and Melanesians in the 
battlefields, and each was segregated in separate camps. For example, an 
anthropologist reported the following incident after the war at Madang: 
Two tanks were installed near the wharf for drinking. Both full of the same 
chlorinated water but labelled respectively "European personnel" and 
"Natives only." As I pass one morning, I heard the ANGAU officer in charge 
of the natives wrongly abusing a private who had gone to the wrong tap. 
"Have you no pride or grace?" he asked. "Don't you realize that this water is 
for coons?" (Inglis 1969, 514) 
The private may have been an innocent person who probably did not 
think of Papua New Guineans as coons. In spite of the segregation there were 
very close bonds between the soldiers of different races. Don Barrett reports 
of a toothless Australian being fed by a Melanesian private when a huge flood 
chased the soldiers up into the trees: 
After an uncomfortable and wet night there was a little cheer in the morning 
when a small wild pig was captured. Miraculously a fire was made and soon 
the tempting smell of cooking pork was causing mouths to water. Watering 
freely was the mouth of Lieutenant Harry Read who was also bemoaning the 
loss in the flurry of the previous day of his denture. Pig cooked, and Read's 
batman, Pte. Lalun produced a tasty meal assuring Read that the pork was 
tender enough to eat without teeth. It was. "How was it done?" queried 
Read. "Simple," said Lalun, "I chewed it first. " (1969, 501) 
The film Angels of War reveals glimpses of the dramatic theater of the 
war, and the traumatic, emotional impact it had in Papua New Guinea. The 
film shows the suffering and losses, as well as the recent and continuing 
demands for compensation, especially by the carriers, laborers, policemen, 
and soldiers. It is not possible to include a narration of every man and woman 
interviewed in the film, but I wish to highlight a few individuals, in order to 
put you in a position to appreciate their statements. 
The first person is Arthur Duna, whom I alluded to earlier. Duna was at 
Buna government station when the Japanese bombed it and describes how he 
and his relative escaped from the station: 
As the plane came very low, it started to fire its machine gun and went ta, ta, 
ta, ta, ta, ta, ta, ta, like coconuts falling from the trees, and everything was 
totally smashed. Wilfred and I were near a house with an iron roof and we 
felt that the machine gun was going to destroy the roof of the house and 
bring the house down to the ground. So Wilfred and I hid under some 
planks of timber that were laid on top of one another nearby. We were 
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hiding there when the plane came and fired its guns and then passed by. 
Then it returned and fired at the station again. I came out from under the 
planks first and pulled at Wilfred's legs saying, -Look, if we stay here the 
bombs will come and kill all of us, so let's run away." So I pulled him out and 
ran to the sea. Wilfred and I left all our loincloths and our waistbands, 
armbands, everything under the planks. We ju~t ran naked into the sea and 
dived under the water. All other parts of our bodies were under the water 
with mouths shut, though the noses to breathe and eyeS to watch the planes 
were in air. It was like lying in a grave, except we still breathed. Each time 
the plane came over, we dived under the water. And each time it went away, 
we came out of the sea and ran along the beach. lust ran, ran, and ran. 
(Waiko 1988, 46) 
In the film, Duna tells the story of how the Japanese captured him, of his 
escape, of his recruitment to work as a laborer for the US military forces,and 
9f the time he was innocently beaten as a result of his fellow villagers' desire 
to have sexual intercourse with the white female nurses. 
The second person is Raphael Oimbari from a village between Buna and 
Gona. He is an ordinary villager who meets a wounded soldier by the name of 
George Washington in a helpless situation: 
Geo(ge Washington received a mortal wound and I helped him to a nearby 
camp where a doctor treated him. After the bridge crossing, he asked for 
water and I fetched some for him. He had hardly finished drinking, drinking 
it, when it Japanese Bren gun burst out like thunder at us and we dived 
. under the Kimai grass. George on one side and I on the other side of the 
track. I crawled out first and picked him up slowly. We were walking again 
when he said, "I am hungry. " I gave him one hard biscuit, but he said, "Break 
it in half ~d let us share it. " So I broke it and gave him one half and I ate 
the other half. After sharing the biscuit, he began to limp instead of walking. 
The pain w~ too much and he was dizzy. I embraced the man and tried to 
carry him but he was too heavy,so I half-carried him to our camp. 
The third person is Japhet Jigede, who rose to the rank of sergeant major 
but was stripped of his rank just before the war ended. He explains that the 
war ended because Pacitic Islanders used their age-{)ld customary magical 
powers and not because of superior weapons, particularly the dropping of the 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima in August 1945. Jigede believes the ashes from 
the burning of a piece of bark, a leaf, a piece of animal or tish, and a portion 
of his father's hair saved the Melanesians under his command. He describes 
the process and the effective use of the magical power: 
I told all the members of the Papuan Infantry Battalion under my control to 
sit around the fire that I made to bum these things. They had to be there 
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when the power in these things evaporated into smoke so that they could 
inhal~ it. After the things were burned to ashes, I filled their tins with ashes. 
I ordered each soldier to come one by one and take a tin of ashes and my 
instructions followed. "This is not our war but we have entered into it and 
you may die at any moment. This staff is your protection, derived from our 
deep rooted customs established by our ancestors who used it against their 
enemies. Do not play with it. If you play with girls or lie with women, do not 
hide these deeds.· [Say], "I am sick, my head is aching and my body's heavy," 
or any kind of excuse that you can produce. The officers will allow you to 
return to the rear camps, away from the enemy front line, then you must boil 
some water with some traditional plant munitions and wash away the sexual 
odor before you can be allowed to return to the front line again. If you do 
not follow this, your sexual contact with women will spread from one man to 
the others among us. This would make us vulnerable and easy targets for the . 
Japanese bullets which would shoot through our bodies. The bathing and 
cleansing in hot·water with medicines will wash away the vulnerability and 
the enemy bullets will miss us. " To avoid bullets, I ordered the men to 
abstain from sexual intercourse if they wanted to return to see their families 
in the villages. I showed them how to use the asti. 
"Every morning, dip your middle fmger and smear it over your eyebrow, 
rub it over your rifle barrel and the remainder of it, keep inside the pouches 
where pistols or cartridges are kept. If you follow these instructions, your 
bullets will enter the bodies of the enemy, but the enemy bullets will not 
touch you. They will miss you. This is because the power embodied in the 
bones of my father will protect us all. We are going to war with him and he 
will guide our way and save us. " This power came down from my ancestors 
and it was passed on to me. I gave this power to soldiers under my 
command. We have defeated the enemy thrOugh these customs and no 
other. This was an overwhelming power which I never, ever, exposed to my 
white superiors. Not aware that our customs had provided the power to win, 
the fmal outcome of World War II, whitemen thought they had succeeded in 
defeating the Japanese through man and weapons alone. 
Conclusion 
Allow me to conclude with some remarks on historical method. Karl Popper, 
in his book Objective Knowledge, argues that the difference between 
metaphysical and scientific theories is that the scientific ones can, in principle, 
be disproved. Nobody ever proves that a theory is true, but someone can 
prove that a theory is false. The theory that has stood up to several attempts 
to disprove it is better than one that has not been tested. The real problem 
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with social sci~nce is that a theory that is in principle falsifiable may be one 
very hard to test in practice. 
This is especially true of history because it deals with surviving evidence. 
The European historians do not ordinarily ask what is the nature of historical 
explanation any more than a Melanesian sorcerer asks what is the nature of 
spiritual power. But both are continuing a trad'ition in which they are likely to 
receive and accept, often without questioning, somewhat vaguely formulated 
(even incoherent and contradictory) accounts of what history or sorcery is 
from those who trained them. The questions they are likely to ask are those of 
technique rather than of philosophical foundations. For instance, will it be 
useful to conduct a particular numerical analysis or will that type of sago palm 
produce more sago than the others? 
What then is the characteristic difference between the documents and the 
oral traditions on which history is based? It is not, I believe, that the 
document is possibly true while the oral narratives are not true. The 
difference is, I suggest, that the written and oral sources are embedded in 
different cultural traditions. They are meant to bejudged by quite different 
traditional standards in literate and oral cultures. The problem arises when 
literate historians try to fit oral testimony into the method, model, and time 
scale that accommodate history based on documentary sources. The reverse is 
also true in a situation. where oral narrators attempt to fix the written word 
into the complex ethos that is history derived from oral traditions. Yet the 
similarities of the approaches are striking and a good historical method is 
equally important for both. 
World War II was not of the Papua New Guineans' making and was 
beyond their understanding. The villagers experienced the terror of the 
explosive might of warplanes and battleships, of mortar and maChine-gun fire. 
They watched as their homes and gardens were destroyed. They were 
conscripted by both sides and sometimes they were refugees in their own 
land. Ethel May Pushon, an Australian, is said to have turned 105 years in 
April this year (1988). She has seen two world depressions and two world 
wars. According to her, when World War I broke out, "Women had a degree 
of independence never seen before because the menfolk were away." In 
Papua New Guinea, the independence of women, perhaps, went a bit too far. 
One observer put it this way: "If the sexual problems of the boys away at war 
are serious, so also are those of the sweethearts and wives they leave behind. 
Deprived of their lawful sexual partners, the women indulged in random love 
affairs with the men who remained in the village. " 
An extreme example of this type of maladjustment came to my attention 
on the lower Sepik River. A group of women of a village from which almost 
three-fourths of the able-bodied men had been recruited appeared before the 
assistant district officer at Angoram to make court. They accused the tultul of 
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neglecting his duties by refusing to have intercourse with them. They argued 
that since the government had sanctioned the recruitment of their men, it was 
up to this village official appointed by the government to keep them sexually 
satisfied. The tultuJ, speaking in his own behalf, wailed that he had done his 
best but that he had reached his limit. "Mi les long pus pus, "he cried, "baebae 
skin blong mi bae pinis" 'I am tired of intercourse, soon my skin will become 
completely loose and I will be completely wrecked as a result of too much 
orgasm.' 
The following is a cry from one of the women whose son was taken away. 
I'll translate the song poem in this manner: 
War has come 
The young men are leaving 
To defend alien land. 
The foreigners will be saved. 
What has called 
The young man away 
To become enemy victims? 
The conquerors will be happy. 
The mother is deserted 
Lonely without her son 
A barren beggar 
Abandoned to heartache. 
The mother who lost blood 
Has become a barren beggar. 
The one who bore him 
I am a lonely beggar. 
(Waiko 1986, 31) 
Here, this woman is telling in subtl~ points about the flow of war. She 
sees her son going to fight and laments that this will only be to the advantage 
of the foreigners: those who see him as a savior and those who will count him 
as a victim. The verses are strong statements of the grieving mother who feels 
deserted and impoverished. The poem is a clear indication that while the 
villagers knew little of the broad strategic flow of the war or the reasons that 
either side gave for their violence, they made perceptive statements about 
their own actions and attitudes. 
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For King and Country: 
A Talk on the Pacific War in Fiji 
Brij V. Lal 
On 1 July 1939 a very curious poem appeared in the pages of the Fiji Times, 
arguably the most loyal newspaper in the most loyal, dutiful colony in the 
British Empire. Titled "To Whom It May Concern, II it went like this: 
Please be kind to Britain, 
She isn't very strong, 
Her Navy is inefficient, 
Her Army's all gone wrong. 
Her ARP • is useless, 
Her Airforce is far too small, 
Her people so degenerate, 
She has no morale at all! 
She doesn't want to fight you, 
She's so convinced you'd win, 
She'lltet you take her Empire, 
If it will save her skin. 
She's old, decayed and senile, 
And you have strength and youth, 
So please be kind to Britain, 
Don't keep abusing Britain, 
Be nice to poor old Britain, 
Or, you may learn the truth. 
The truth about Great Britain was quite simple. It emerged from the war 
a devastated nation, diminished in international stature. Its once mighty, far-
flung empire began to crumble and creak around it. Soon, with India leading 
the way, the sun would set forever on waves that Britannia had ruled for well 
over a century. But the truth about the Pacific War in Fiji is not quite so 
• ARP: air raid precaution 
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simple. Except for a few brief months during the entire period of the Pacific 
War, Fiji was never in danger of invasion from any quarter. Not a single shot 
was fired, not a single life lost on Fijian soil itself for the defense of those 
islands. And yet the war became .. ~ powerful symbolic event in Fijian history, 
bequeathing a legacy of suspicion, division, distrust, and hostil ity among the 
different communities in Fiji. 
The Fiji war in its various aspects is too large a topic for me to cover in 
this paper so I'll be brief and confine myself to one or possibly two related 
questions. I The first is: How did the different ethnic groups in Fiji, the Fijians, 
the Indians, artd the Europeans, respond to the government-inspired war 
effort, and how did they perceive the war, it's importance and significance for 
their own communities and for the colony as a whole? Let us take the 
indigenous Fijian response first. Their response was quick, warm, and 
extremely generous. In 1943, .the peak period, there were 8513 men in 
uniform in Fiji, half of whom were in the labor corps. Of these 6371 were 
indigenous Fijians. Local and expatriate Europeans, particularly from New 
Zealand, contributed 1870, and Indians numbered a paltry 264. The Fijians 
justifiably emerged from the war as heroes, praised for their bravery and 
cunning in jungle warfare, their steadiness under fire, and their loyalty and 
dedication to the cause of the British Empire. Their record of 
accomplishment, as measured by the number of awards they won, is 
impressive. Altogether they received 29 decorations, including a posthumous 
Victoria Cross, and 25 mentions in dispatches. 
The question is: Why did the Fijian community respond so 
enthusiastically? It seems to me that there are at least four or five reasons 
which help us understand the quick Fijian response. First, culture had a role 
to play. Fijians were no strangers to war, which was a constant and important 
part of their life in precolonial times. Fighting was, as Charles Wilks described 
in the 1840s, "a noble employment of man and a path to honor and status for 
young men" (Ravuvu 1974, 1). This was also the case in many other Pacific 
Island societies. Courage and valor, prowess in war--these were values upon 
which Fijian culture placed a very high premium. Another important reason 
for the prompt Fijian response, I think, was the fact that the people who did 
the recruiting were high chiefs, in some cases paramount chiefs. Ratu Sir Lala 
Sukuna, only a couple of rungs below God in most Fijian eyes according to his 
biographer Deryck Scarr (1980), led the recruiting effort. He was Oxford 
educated, a member of the bar, and a distinguished high chief in the employ 
of the colonial civil service. He toured the villages, talked and advised, and 
enlisted young men with great success. Several other very high Fijian chiefs 
enlisted as officers in various platoons, and their presence was inspiring to 
young men willing to prove their loyalty to the Crown. "Fijians will never be 
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recognized unless our blood is shed first, " said Suiruna, to great effect. And 
coming from him, these words carried great weight. So, at one level, the active 
enlisting was seen as fulfilling a traditional obligation to the turaga 'chief, and 
to the vanua 'land' (see Ravuvu 1974). The principle of reciprocity was clearly 
at work here. 
Whatever we may think of the effects of colonialism in the Pacific or Fiji, 
most Fijian chiefs did not actively dislike the British or their policies. They 
saw the coming of the British to Fiji in a positive light. Gordon's policy of 
indirect rule had preserved Fijian traditions, institutions, and values, albeit in 
a significantly modified form (see France 1969). The Great Council of Chiefs 
was the body that was directly responsible for much of the government of 
indigenous Fijian society. The colonial government had acted to prevent la..nd 
alienation with a result that 83 percent of all land in Fiji today remains in 
Fijian hands. The Fijian chiefs saw the government of Fiji not as a one-way 
street but as a partnership involving themselves and the colonial government. 
And in things that mattered to them, the welfare of their own society, they 
had complete controL Given this situation it is not surprising to find that 
when one partner was under attack, the other felt obliged to come to its 
assistance. There were of course throughout Fijian history many Fijian voices 
of dissent. In the early part of this century there was Apolosi Nawai, and in 
the 1920s Fijians in southern Viti Levu youth organizations, such as the Viti 
Cauravou, at times advocated refusal to pay tax because they complained of 
neglect and isolation, of being treated like children. But they were suppressed 
by the combined power of chiefs and colonial officialdom. 
For the most part, though, trust characterized the relationship between 
chiefs and the government. Ratu Sukuna, the first Fijian to be knighted, had a 
certain undoubted love for British culture and British institutions. Opposing 
an Indian push for complete adult franchise in 1934, he said in the Legislative 
Council: "Fijians desire a form of government in which British culture, a sense 
of fair play and justice are going to preponderate. That, sir, " he said to the 
speaker, "is a desire we hold very strongly" (Scarr 1980). A year before, in 
1933, opposing Indian calls for political equality with Europeans, Sukuna had 
said in the Legislative Council: "The question of equality has been raised and 
I should like to say publicly that so far as the Fijians are concerned, we think 
we are very well treated, and for the next two, three, four generations we will 
look to European leadership and expect the Europeans to lead us until such 
times as we are able to guide ourselves" (Scarr 1980). Similar sentiments were 
expressed in 1961, 1965, 1969, and indeed today, right now as I speak, the 
paramount chiefs of Fiji are beseeching the Queen to keep the title of Tui 
Viti, despite unceremoniously severing links with the Crown. The fact was 
that many chiefs were educated in Britain; "going up" to Oxford, even for a 
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minor administrative course for a couple of months, was a source of great 
prestige and status in a community and colony that placed high premium on 
rituals, ceremonies, and protocol. And the fact that they shared the same 
religion and played "rugger" and cricket together helped to reinforce bonds 
of solidarity between the Fijians and the Europeans. So it was only natural for 
chiefs to come to the assistance of their mentors and protectors in a time of 
need. 
But while sentiment played apart in determining the quality and 
magnitude of Fijian response, political calculations were not far below the 
surface. These were clearly understood if not always publicly articulated. 
~ehapges ,that ,displeased Fijia!i chiefs were in the offing. Indians demanded 
. .', - ' 
full democracy, elected government, and equality with Europeans. And as we 
might guess, these were things that chiefs opposed because such things as 
democracy and elections posed direct and very real threats to their status and 
the basis of their power. Then there were the demands from the Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company (CSR), the monopoly sugar company in Fiji, which 
could not be ignored. The company led an attempt in the 1930s to get the 
Fijian landlords to open up land and to give more secure leases to Indian 
tenants. And that, too, threatened the Fijian hold on power. Ratu Sukuna saw 
very clearly indeed that if he was going to stop the tide of change threatening 
to undermine Fijian chiefly power (as he saw it), he needed to get the British 
government on his side. A strong show of loyalty would do the trick, and the 
war provided that opportunity. He was not disappointed. Changes after the 
war gave an expanded role for Fijian chiefs in a revitalized Fijian 
administration. It was reformed and revitalized in 1946. The government 
reaffirmed its pledge to uphold the promises of the Deed of Cession to 
maintain the paramountcy of Fijian interests in Fiji. The chiefs, thus, were 
able to kill two birds with one stone. They got what they wanted and, on the 
other hand, demonstrated their loyalty to the empire. 
The Indian response, in contrast, was, as I have said, paltry and indirect. 
They raised money through carnivals, games, and direct contributions--
enough, surprisingly, to buy a bomber, which was ,named the Fiji Indian, for 
the Royal Air Force. Some who couldn't put up with petty acts of racial 
discrimination in Fiji went to New Zealand and joined the Narrow Neck and 
Maori camps. Others with some European blood joined the part-European 
platoon in Fiji. Hundreds joined the Labour Corps and served in Fiji for the 
entire duration of the war. But as far as actual soldiering went, their response 
was unenthusiastic. They were labeled disloyal and seditious, and their 
descendants have been tainted with the supposed cowardly sins of their 
fathers and forefathers. 
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Why this paltry response? Were Indians actually actively disloyal? Let us 
consider several things. In the first place, what is not often realized is that the 
government did not want Indians to enroll as soldiers in the armed forces. An 
Indian platoon was created in 1934 but disbanded in 1941. Instead, the 
government wanted Indians as laborers and as workers. That was the way, the 
governor told the Indians, that they could make their valuable contributions 
to the war effort. Listen to the governor in a radio broadcast in 1941. He 
urged the Indians "To remember always that the best way to win a war is in 
the first place to increase the general level of production by working with 
increased effort in whatever may be the normal employment. And in the 
second, to fit themselves with any special responsibility for which they may be 
selected." The second part was a haIf-hearted afterdlought. No serious and 
sustained effort was ever made to recruit Indians to fight in the Fiji Defence 
Forces. 
The second reason for Indian reluctance was European insistence on 
maintaining double standards in the matter of pay. European soldiers 
received 3 shillings a day, wife separation allowance of 3 shillings per week, 
and child allowance of 1 shilling and 6 pence. Non-European soldiers 
received 2 shillings per day, half the European rate of wife separation 
allowance, and one-third the child allowance. The Indians simply, and quite 
understandably, insisted on equal pay, equal work, equal value, equal risk. 
The government refused. It refused because it knew that Fiji was never really 
under any imminent threat of attack. And Indians refused to concede that, on 
the battlefield, a white soldier's life was worth more than a non-white soldier's 
life. Today no one would seriously question the principle of equal pay for 
equal work. But in colonial Fiji it was seditious to even think of equality with 
Europeans. 
The third reason for the Indians' lukewarm response was that unlike the 
Fijians, the Indians did not have a warm recollection of their colonial 
experience in Fiji. Whereas the Fijians remembered protection and various 
safeguards, Indians remembered servitude, cultural deracination, violence, 
and an unaided, lonely struggle for survival after the end of indenture in 1920. 
The colonial government was rightly perceived as uncaring, unsympathetic, 
and working in collusion with the CSR. Indeed, in every dispute that farmers 
had with the company from the 1920s to the 1960s, the government always 
sided with the company, using on all occasions strong tactics to break up 
industrial strikes. The company was also a major landholder in Fiji. Those 
tenants who lived on its estates were bound by a contract that minutely 
regulated every aspect of the tenant's life. You couldn't even plant vegetables 
for your own use on CSR estate land without the company's permission. You 
couldn't keep a milk cow, a goat, poultry, or anything else without the 
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co.mpany's autho.rizatio.n. And CSR made it very clear that it didn't want 
Indians to enlist fo.r o.verseas s~rvice because that wo.uld mean lo.ss o.f income 
and lo.SS of labor fo.r its o.wn o.per<itio.n. Thus, when the time came fo.r Indians 
tpdecide who. to. listell to., they knew what to do.. They called the CSR a 
tyrannical mother-in-law andlbe go.vernment a dutiful daughter-in-law . I've 
seen no. record anywhere o.f the go.vernment ever leaning on the CSR to make 
it less painful fo.r its tenants tp leave for service in the Labour Co.rps or o.n the 
b<ittlefield. 
Membership in the British Empire was not the badge of hono.r for the 
In4ians that it obviously.was for the Europeans and Fijian chiefs. As o.ne 
official no.ted, the po.ssibility of th~ decline of the British Empire aroused in 
the Indian "no· emotion stro.nger than incredulity that the British should have 
allowed themselves to. be reduce<;l to this humiliating plight." He continued: 
"To the Indians we live among here, the Empire is no national heritage, no 
pro.ud monument tp the distinguished history o.f their race. It is something 
~xtraneous to. their culture and they could face with equanimity the prospect 
of it being shaken to pieCes by the· convulsions o.f this war." 
Two other things need to be m~ntioned. One is that the Indians did not 
sllare the dark view that the British painted of Japanese as monstrous human 
beings who.se brutality knew no. bounds. They listened to Radio Azad, 
bro.adcast from Tokyo at the crack o.f dawn every day, and heard Japan talk 
~bout a new c;>rder, freedom for the Asiatic races, and the end of British 
colonialism in 'Asia and the Pacific. The colo.nial government, of course, 
scoffed at these promises, but one Indian asked, "How can we know it is false 
when we haven't even given it a try? After all, there might be something in 
itl" When one prominent Fiji Indian leader was asked how he might respond 
if the Japanese came, he said: "Well, now that you (the Japanese) have come 
to live among us, yo.U must do. your very best for Dur sDcial welfare." The 
British thDught that seditious. 
The secon4 thing that ShDUld be borne in mind is tftat for many Indians at 
that time (1930s and 19408) India was still the emotional and spiritual 
hDmeland. Emerging frDm the shadows Df indenture they were trying to forge 
an identity for themselves in this periDd. Naturally, inevitably, they turned to 
India. It is only to. be expected that Indian political thought and pDlitical 
developments in this period would influence the attitude of people in Fiji. If 
the colonial gDvernment in Fiji had been more caring and mDre sympathetic 
to. the needs Df Indian farmers and workers, the Indians might have been less 
inclined to. IDDk fDr help outside the colony. But that was not the case. For all 
thes~ reasons then-culture, history, sentiment, and ideoIDgy--the Indian 
respo.nse remained lukewarm. Fiji Indians were not actively dislDyal Dr 
seditious; Fijicm exuberance Dnly made it seem so. 
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What about Europeans? Well, it was their war and, as was to be expected, 
they rallied behind the war effort with total dedication. They knew that 
without the British Empire, they would be reduced to nothing, without the 
jobs and status they enjoyed in the colony. Men joined the different regiments 
and went abroad, and women formed such societies as the Patriotic Knitting 
and Sewing Society to talk about the war and raise money. They put up with 
the inconvenience of rations, curfews, and other restrictions. But as they 
listened to Australian radio and heard terrible news about heavy casualties, 
especially among colonial regiments from Australia and New Zealand, anti-
English sentiment began to emerge slowly among the local Europeans. One 
example: "John Bull is sitting tight and secure in his little island, accepting 
heroic sacrifices in blood and treasure from his children overseas but 
unwilling to take any risks on tt':leir behalf in return. " They accused ;'the 
British lion of deserting its cubs and leaving them to be devoured by the 
Japanese tiger. " 
But it was the Americans, who came in large numbers, who caught the full 
brunt of Australasian andlocal European bitterness and frustration. One 
reason was the circulation of wild rumors. Noted one official, "The periodic 
flare-up of anti-American sentiment among Kiwi troops appears to have its 
origins in an emotional reaction to stories about American soldiers in New 
Zealand. Tales of desertion of wives and sweethearts for Americans do 
circulate freely and each man feels his girl is being stolen or seduced." And 
the Americans did not make it easy for themselves either. For example, they 
did not comport themselves to the prescribed norms of Anglo-Australasian 
social behavior in Fiji. They drank heavily in public, they womanized, talked 
freely, and generally "had a good time. " 
The Americans posed another kind of threat to the established order as 
well. In their dealings with non-Europeans they were often generous, open, 
and congenial, which was quite a contrast to the ritualized and closely 
regulated conduct between local Europeans and non-whites. For example, 
Americans didn't mind too much if Indian drivers went into the camps and 
walked or drove away with a few gallons of petrol for their trucks. And they 
didn't mind paying a few shillings to Fijians for horses stolen from the Sabeto 
Indian settlement. They shared their cigarettes and on occasion their whisky 
in return for a few favors. The colonial government called Americans 
"Strangers with novel viewpoints and unfamiliar ways causing a silent but far 
from painless upheaval in the lives of all the communities." It feared that 
American friendliness toward the local population might put the government 
into a "thoroughly uncomfortable fire. " 
But that was not to be. The Americans left, leaving behind memories of a 
different kind of sahib: efficient, impatient with rituals, and generous. And it 
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didn't take too long for old colonial ways of doing things to reassert 
themselves. Still, in many ways Fiji of 1945 was very different from Fiji of 
1939. Demobilized Fijian men went back to the villages. many broken by all 
kinds of diseases, such as tuberculosis, malaria, and smallpox. They went with 
strange and wonderful stories. One of my favorites is recounted by Asesela 
Ravuvu in his book Fijians at War. It is about Fijian soldiers not wanting to 
train when they had a hangover. or when it was wet and miserable outside. 
They would eat hot chillies, raise their body temperature, sweat, and then tell 
the doctors, "Look, I have a fever. I can't go out today. II Ravuvu also tells the 
story about the valiant Viliame Lomasalate of Platoon No.5 who, prevented 
from keeping his promise to eat the first enemy he killed in the Solomons, 
nevertheless managed to eat the eyeballs of a dead Japanese soldier which he 
had scooped out with his pocket knife. Such fierce patriotism . and loyalty to 
the cause of the war earned for the Fijian soldiers a glorious reputation as 
among the best jungle fighters in the world. 
At the end of the war the colonial government gave about five thousand 
sets of agricultural equipment to the demobilized Fijian soldiers to take back 
to their villages to replant their neglected gardens and reinvigorate the 
subsistence economy. A money economy entered the village after the war, 
and in the Fijian villages on the periphery of towns tinned goods (fish. 
mutton) began to replace some of the traditional items of exchange. Before 
the war European and Fijian leaders had, in their own ways, opposed Indian 
demands for political change and social equality. Their experiences during the 
war--the camaraderie of the battlefield and their common dedication to the 
cause of the empire--augmented their shared hostility toward Indians and 
forged a bond of friendship. which has endured ever since, between the two 
groups. The war also transformed the character and the role of the Fijian 
military: the Fiji Defence Forces, created solely for the defense of Fiji itself, 
were given a new role as the Fiji military forces, which could be sent out to 
any part of the British Empire needing soldiers. By design as well as default, 
then, the Fiji military force was necessarily Fijian dominated. An accident of 
history had given the Fijians a power more important, as we now know, than 
the ballot box. They jealously guarded the Fijian domination of the armed 
forces with what results I need not say. The truth about the Pacific War in 
Fiji, then, is not simple. 
Note 
1 This paper is an edited transcription of my talk given at the 1988 conference. A fully 
documented study is in preparation. 
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World War II in the Solomons: 
Its Impact on Society~ Politics, and World View 
David Welchman Gegeo 
The war ... was very intense. Evenings, mornings and nights we 
were dumbfounded by everything that was happening. Guns 
and bombs were constantly exploding .... We lived in constant 
fear. 
IsaacGafu 
[You] would see blue flames from the bombs dropped and 
shells fired. Day and night was just like that. And our ships at 
sea would also fire bullets like rain. Hey, I really don't know 
how to describe it. 
George Maelalo 
These two quotations--one from Isaac Gafu, who served in the Solomon 
Islands Labour Corps on Guadalcanal, and the other from George Maelalo, 
who was one of the first Solomon Islanders to be trained in the defense 
force--dramatize the impact of World War II experiences on the Islanders 
who were directly involved in it. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the war on Solomon 
Islands society, politics, and world view. First, I will introduce the Solomon 
Islands and briefly outline major events in the war there. Next, I will examine 
how the war affected Islanders, both those who were directly involved as 
soldiers, scouts, and members of the Labour Corps and those left behind in 
villages. Then I will discuss the influence of the war on political and social 
changes that occurred in the Solomons in the late 1940s. Finally, I will 
examine recent events in the Solomons to show the kind of long-term impact 
that the war had on Islanders' views of Americans. 
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The information I am presenting comes from in-depth interviews with 
twenty-seven World War IT veterans from Kwara'ae on the island of Malaita, 
whose oral histories I recorded in 1984 and 1987. Their stories are 
supplemented by several years' fieldwork carried out by myself and Karen 
. Watson-Gegeo, as well as my own recolJections as a Kwara'ae man who grew 
up listening to World War IT stories told by veterans living in. my community. 
The Solomon Islands and World War II 
Other than the plantation experience, most Solomon Islanders knew little 
about the outside world prior to World War n, and their experiences with 
Europeans were largely limited to the British, Australians, and New 
Zealanders who were coconut plantation owners, missionaries, teachers, or 
colonial officers. Given the colonial situation, relationships between Islanders 
and these Europeans in general were distant and demarked by clear lines of 
authority. . ; • 
Many Islanders heard rumors about World War II when it began in 
Europe in 1939, but they paid little attention to it becau$e it seemed remote 
and unlikely to affect them. Even when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 
Hawai'i in 1941, Islanders regarded the conflict as the white people's war, just 
as in their own traditional warfare system.two tribes could war with each 
other without affecting other tribes. Moreover, at the time, little information 
about the war actually got to most Islanders because there was as yet little 
access to radio broadcasts. 
Solomon Islanders were therefore very surprised when rumors about the 
Japanese advance on the Solomons were confirmed by the Japanese bombing 
of Gavutu, Nggela, on 22 January 1942. They saw their British rulers retreat 
as the Japanese rapidly took Nggela and then occupied Guadalcanal in May. 
During the ensuing months, before the Americans landed on Guadalcanal on 
7 August 1942 and gradually retook the island, most of the 800 Solomon 
Islanders involved in the Solomon Islands Defence Force worked as 
policemen, scouts and coastwatchers. A few were also trained as soldiers and 
later fought in the Solomons and in Bougainville. 
After the American invasion of Guadalcanal the British established the 
Solomon Islands Labour Corps in November 1942 and began recruiting 
Islanders to build airfields and roads, load and unload supplies and materiel 
from ships, and clear fields to set up camps. The majority of Islanders 
involved in the war actually served in the Labour Corps, on one-year 
contracts. (See recollections by Jonathan Fifi'i in chapter 4 about his 
experiences as the leader of a Labour Corps section from Kwaio, and Lamont 
Lindstrom's discussion of the Vanuatu Labour Corps.) 
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The Labour Corps was essential to the Allied war effort because it freed 
American soldiers to concentrate on fighting.and therefore played a major 
role in victory over the Japanese. At its peak membership in 1944 the 
Solomon Islands Labour Corps had over 3700 recruits. Recruiting was 
especially high from Malaita, where British officials actually argued over how 
many men they could extract without devastating the local subsistence 
economy. 
Iminediate Impact of War Experiences on Islanders 
The immediate impact of the war on Solomon Islanders included the shock of 
whatwas involved in modern warfare between nation states; a sudden, new 
perception of relationships with outsiders, especially with regard to "race"; 
and the social dislocation of communities when men went off to participate in 
the war in large numbers. 
Isaac Gafu and George Maelalo's descriptions of their fear and shock are 
typical of recollections by those who experienced the war firsthand as scouts, 
soldiers, or members of the Labour Corps. They had signed up with little 
knowledge of what they were getting into. They associated signing up for the 
war with signing up to go to the plantations--a chance for travel, adventure, 
and to make a little money. They did not realize that their own cultural 
conception of war was very different from the reality of war as fought by 
modern nation-states, which involves masses of soldiers; complex technology, 
equipment, and supplies; ships, airplanes, bombs, and machine guns; mass . 
killing; and fighting over long distances and large land areas. 
Not only did all of these characteristics of a world war shock Solomon 
Islanders, but they were amazed also that contending armies appeared to 
want to completely destroy each other. For the Kwara'ae, who were 
overwhelmed by seeing battlefields covered with dead bodies (too many even 
to bury), the high casualty rate of modern warfare left the deepest impression. 
This impression is reflected in the Kwara'ae name for World War II, mae doe 
'big death'. 
A second important experience during the war had to do with Islanders' 
relationships with white Europeans. For the first time Solomon Islanders 
began to distinguish among kinds of white people. Whereas the British 
continued the strict lines separating Islanders from their colonial masters, 
Americans treated Solomon Islanders with warmth and generosity. (See 
chapter 6, in which Hugh Laracy talks about a notorious case of animosity 
between a Solomon Islander and a British officer.) Islanders were struck by 
the huge amount of food and other supplies Americans brought with them. 
They were also struck by the willingness of Americans to share with Islanders, 
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even to the extent of passing around a single cigarette. As Gafu recalled, 
"they came with their cargo and you ate until you could not eat anymore so 
you threw the food away .... [The] Americans. said, 'Let's eat while we're all 
still alive and together. Because when the Japanese come, some of us may be 
killed. And then, even if we get together to eat again, it won't be the same' " 
(paraphrased). The unity Solomon Islanders felt with Americans is reflected 
in this statement. Together with its emphasis on sharing food, these relations 
could seem almost sacred to the Kwara'ae, for they represented a sharing 
even to the grave--"blood sharing," as it would be expressed among Kwara'ae 
warriors (Fox 1962, 125). 
The sense Islanders had that Americans treated them as equals was 
reinforced by the seeming equality that black American soldiers enjoyed with 
white soidiers--they wore the same clothes, ate the same food, received the 
same pay, and lived in the same tents. In fact, out of these experiences, 
Islanders developed a "mythic schema" about Americans in which Americans 
were depicted as enjoying unlimited wealth and racial equality. Americans 
were seen as proud, courageous, and strong. Moreover, the idea that the 
Solomon Islands could become independent was introduced to many 
Islanders by Americans during the war. In particular, Islanders felt a kinship 
with Americans because America, too, had been a colony of the British and 
had won its independence through a revolutionary war. 
Meanwhile back home in the villages on Malaita the people who had 
been left behind when large numbers of men were recruited into the defense 
force and Labour Corps struggled with major social dislocation. In traditional 
times, before men went off to fight a tribal war, everyone would meet to 
discuss who would fill leadership roles and what other arrangements needed 
to be made to ensure the safety and continuity of village life. Such 
preplanning was possible because tribal animosities built up over years, and 
people could anticipate when hostilities were likely to break out. But 
recruitment for World War II happened suddenly and unexpectedly, and 
people were confused about what was really happening or what the 
implications were for village life. 
In the early months of 1942, the British began ordering all coastal villages 
on Malaita to be abandoned and Islanders to flee into the interior as the 
Japanese advanced. People still talk about how women pulled their sleeping 
children from bed and fled into the forest with them, and how the men spent 
the rest of the night laboring to erect shelters in mosquito-infested swampy 
areas, using the dim light from burning dried bamboo and coconut leaves. For 
many months people were forced to live in the bush without fires at night 
because of the fear that the Japanese would locate their settlements. 
30 
World War II in the Solomons 
The Japanese did destroy some buildings on Malaita, but they never 
launched an invasion or occupied the island. Yet Malaita people experienced 
the terror of war, even if from a distance. They saw planes being shot down at 
night in the channel between Guadalcanal and Malaita, they heard the 
pounding of guns during the invasion of Guadalcanal by the Americans, and 
lived in fear of invasion themselves. 
In terms of local social organization, status relationships in the villages 
were disrupted, families were separated, people worried about their villages 
being looted, and domestic animals broke out of their pens and ran wild. With 
so many men absent, women became more active in village leadership, taking 
on new roles (see chapter 11 by Suzanne Falgout for similar effects on 
Pohnpei). In fact a group of women from villages in West Kwara'ae marched 
to the government headquarters to demand that the Kwara'ae men who had 
been recruited for war service be returned to Malaita. 
The overall immediate impact of the war on Solomon Islanders was a 
shattering of old beliefs about cosmology, that is, how the world works. The 
outside world--previously faraway and little known--suddenly was seen to be 
connected to them in a drastic way. Two gigantic, technologically 
sophisticated armies had appeared from nowhere to fight a war not on their 
own home grounds, but in the Solomons where Islanders were not even a 
party to the dispute (Zoleveke 1988). Moreover, Islanders came to a much 
more profound understanding that there are different kinds of people in the 
world, but especially, different kinds of white people. 
Impact of World War II: The Postwar Period 
One of the primary social and political outcomes of World War II was the rise 
of Maasina Rule, a Malaita movement to restructure traditional society and 
gain political independence from England (see Laracy 1983). Maasina, a 
word from the 'Are'Are language of Malaita, means "brotherhood." Jonathan 
Fifi'i, who was a Maasina Rule head chief for Kwaio district, talks about the 
movement in chapter 4. He also discusses his experiences in his chapter in the 
book The Big Death: Solomon Islanders Remember World War II (White et al. 
1988). 
To briefly summarize the movement, Maasina Rule was both a 
revitalization movement and an independence movement. The revitalization 
aspects involved the restructuring of traditional cosmology and the 
reestablishment of a Solomon Islands worldview, updated to incorporate 
Islanders' experiences with the outside world, through education, and during 
the war. It reestablished a traditional chiefdom system for Malaita, rebuilt 
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fortifications destroyed by the missionaries, and developed religious ideas that 
synthesized Christianity with traditional beliefs. 
As an independence movement Maasina Rule was concerned with getting 
rid of the foreign colonial government and establishing self-rule. Some 
commentators have seen Maasina Rule as a cargo cult because as the move~ 
ment progressed, a segment of members came to believe that if movement 
rules were followed the Americans would return and give Islanders masses of 
material goods. Salana Ga'a, one of the movement leaders for Kwara'ae, 
believes that the cargo idea was used by the British to undermine the 
legitimate aims of the movement. 
Hugh Laraey argues that "although Maasina Rule was sparked by World 
War II its roots can be traced far into the past .... There is no reason to 
suppose that Solomon Islanders have ever been less conscious of their worth 
than have any other people. Indeed ... the historical record clearly attests 
their abundant readiness to defend both themselves and that which they 
considered to be theirs" (1983,7). What Islanders' World War II experiences 
did was to itensify and legitimate their sense of identity, and their right to take 
charge of their own political destiny. They no longer saw the British as 
infallible, they were more conscious than ever of the capricious nature of 
colonial rule, and the Americans had legitimized their feelings that they 
should be independent and in control of their own country. 
An important result of World War II was that many island men returned 
home more experienced in dealing with outsiders, more fluent in English, and 
with more insight about how to oppose British rule. Many of the men who 
served in various capacities in the war, such as Jonathan Fifi'i, became leaders 
of, or active participants in, Maasina Rule. The British were able to suppress 
the Maasina Rule movement by force, arresting and imprisoning the leaders. 
Eventually, with continuing pressure from Islanders and continuing economic 
problems of their own, the British agreed to the islands becoming 
independent, which was realized in 1978. 
Long-term ElTects of the War on Islanders' Attitudes Toward Americans 
Among Islanders who experienced the war directly, some viewed their 
experiences negatively and others positively. For some the war was a 
traumatic experience, but for others war brought new ideas and, through 
movements like Maasina Rule, helped forge the beginnings of a national 
identity. 
Much could be said about the long-term effects of the war, but I will focus 
on Islanders' attitudes toward Americans. Islanders who served in the war 
returned home to their villages to tell and retell their experiences to their 
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children and grandchildren. A major theme in the stories they told and in the 
oral histories we collected was the mythic schema they had formed about 
Americans as generous, egalitarian, wealthy, audacious, and rescuers of the 
Solomon Islands. 
What has happened to this mythic schema since the war? Solomon 
Islanders like myself, who were born and grew up after the war, learned 
through the older generation's World War II stories to respect and admire 
Americans. The first doubt cast on this view occurred in 1968 when the 
Americans were successful in landing men on the moon as part of their space 
exploration program. The general feeling among rural Solomon Islanders 
about this exploit was that Americans were tampering with nature. Although 
Solomon Islanders saw the moon flight as further evidence of American 
audacity and technological superiority--similar to what they had witnessed in 
World War II--they couldn't understand what America had to gain from it, 
and they feared the moon and the atmosphere might be polluted or damaged 
by it. 
The second incident casting doubt on the mythic schema was the Vietnam 
War. Solomon Island villagers questioned why such a large power like the 
United States would invade such a small, poor country. People equated 
Vietnam with the Solomons and talked of how if a superpower invaded the 
Solomon Islands to take it over, the outcome was certainly obvious. Again 
they asked, what has America to gain from this? 
The third issue casting doubt on the mythic schema of Americans has 
been the growing consciousness among all Solomon Islanders of the dangers 
of nuclear testing and nuclear war. Older Islanders who remember the bombs 
of World War II talk of how, if nuclear bombs are bigger and more 
destructive, then whole islands would be blown out of the sea in a nuclear 
war. Islanders find it amazing that Americans, who they had previously seen 
as saviors and as protective of Islanders' rights; would be promoting nuclear 
development. As one villager commented tdme, "You don't even have to be 
educated to see the stupidity in it." 
Nevertheless, the landing on the moon, the Vietnam War, and the 
possibility of nuclear war seem remote to most villagers. But in 1984 an event 
occurred in the seas just offshore that brought the reality of contemporary 
American interests into conflict with the mythic schema developed about 
Americans in World War II. This event happened in 1984 when the American 
tuna fishing vessel, the Jeanette Diana, was caught fishing within the two-
hundred-mile zone of the Solomons, a violation of international law. The 
Solomon Islands' only small patrol boat chased the Jeanette Diana, fired over 
its bow, and brought it back to port a prisoner. 
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In court the ship's captain denied violating international law, but the 
court ordered heavy fines levied against the captain and also ordered the ship 
seized and sold. The Reagan administration threatened to boycott all tuna 
from the Solomon Islands and to take other measures. Eventually the dispute 
was resolved when the United States repurchased the ship at a price lower 
than its market value, and the Solomons government reduced fines. 
The Jeanette Diana episode came as a shock to Solomon Islanders. First, 
they were dismayed that Americans would willfully violate international law 
and fish in Solomons waters, giyen that tuna is one of the country's few 
natural resources. Second, they were elated by the audacity of the Solomons 
patrol boat crew, which took on and arrested a very large and technologically 
sophisticated ship. The deceptive testimony of the captain in court and the 
reaction of the Reagan administration--all of which was detailed in the local 
media--shocked Islanders and puzzled them. Again, what had America, with 
all its wealth and power, to gain by taking advantage of a small country like 
the Solomons? Were Americans no longer friends to Solomon Islanders? 
For the younger generation these events and a growing consciousness of 
world politics have weakened greatly the mythic schema about Americans 
passed on to them by World War II veterans. Even in the villages people over 
the past ten years have begun to reassess the long-held image of Americans as 
people to look up to, realizing that, like everyone else, Americans have 
strengths and weaknesses. 
In contrast with the Jeanette Diana incident, the events following the 
devastation of Cyclone Namu in 1986 renewed vjllag~rs' faith in Americans, 
at least on Malaita and Guadalcanal. Immediately ~fter the cyclone 
devastated many areas on these two islands, the US Navy sent construction 
battalion units (Seabees) to deliver food and supplies, repair roads and 
rebuild bridges, dig ditches to drain flood waters, and reconstruct buildings 
leveled by floods and wind. Their activities and their behavior received wide 
coverage in the newspapers and on the radio. Once again Americans were 
seen as coming to rescue Solomon Islanders, this time from a natural disaster. 
Many elements of what the Seabees did and how they behaved fit the mythic 
schema developed in World War II, including displaying physical strength and 
speed in work; treating Islanders in an egalitarian way; sharing food, clothing, 
and tobacco; and criticizing their officers behind their back. Story after story 
told to me and my wife in 1987 about the Sea bees , involvement reflect these 
elements. As for the older men who had served in World War II, they said 
"That's just the way those Joes behaved in the war." 
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Jonathan Fiji'; 
The Coming of the War 
The white people told us that a war would eventually come. But even though 
we listened, we didn't believe them. We couldn't think of any reason that 
fighting would come to the Solomons. Other people advised us that if fighting 
did come, we shouldn't be afraid. They said that even if a bomb fell, it would 
be five minutes before it exploded. All we had to do was pick it up and throw 
it to where it would explode away from us! 1 
In 1942 I was still at schooi at Kwailabesi, in northeast Malaita. One day 
we saw the Seventh Day Adventist ship Melanesia arrive. But there were no 
. Solomon Islanders aboard, only missionaries. They warned all of the students 
that fighting was coming soon. They said "We will be leaving tonight. We can't 
say if we will ever see you again. But though we are leaving, the Americans 
may come to evacuate you. You must not worry, because there are Seventh 
Day Adventists among the Americans too." 
Some of the other students and I prepared to see our teachers off. At 
dusk we boarded a small postal boat, and we and the Melanesia traveled along 
in the dark, without any lights. By daybreak we had reached Siota, on N ggela, 
and at Taroaniara we camouflaged the two boats with branches. We went in 
two dinghies to Tulagi, the capital at that time, to see what was happening 
there. Very few people remained in town. A Chinese child had been left 
behind in the evacuation so the police took him to Auki. 
We heard two warplanes approach and at first they flew over us, but then 
they turned back, and one flew off toward Savo Island. The second plane 
returned to Tulagi and bombed the wireless station. A second bomb hit the 
resident commissioner's house, and a third was dropped on the prison. That 
night all of the missionaries fled, and we ran away too. By the next morning 
we were back on Malaita again. When we arrived we spread the word that we 
wouldn't be able to pick up any bombs to throw them away! 
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The same day that we arrived back on Malaita the fighting grew stronger. 
Bombs were bursting all day long. The next day, and the next, no Americans 
had arrived. We were all alone at Kwailabesi. We ate all the ducks and 
chickens and the goat too. The missionaries had told us we should. 
Days later we saw the first American airplanes above. There were lots of 
small ones, and perhaps thirty big ones. The next day we saw a Japanese plane 
go over us flying very low. It came back past us and went down toward Ata'a. 
Mter it ditched the four Japanese aboard got their things, including a 
machine gun, and went to the Ata'a tax house, where they slept. People 
passed the news to Auki and the government sent six policemen, headed by 
Corporal Ben Ramo'alafa, to pick them up. When the police got to the head 
of the trail they took off their uniform sashes and guns and hid them. They 
tied up kabilato (loincloths) for themselves, and mussed up their hair so they 
would look like villagers when they went down to visit the Japanese. Then 
they went down to the tax house and greeted those four Japanese there, and 
rested with them, and got into a friendly conversation. Then they suddenly 
jumped up and wrestled the Japanese to the ground. 
The name of the fourth Japanese was Kawaiama and he had worked at 
Tulagi before, repairing ships. He recognized Ben Ramo'alafa. "It's Corporal 
Ben. You kill us. We have come here to die," he said. 
But Ramo'alafa said, "No. We have not been given orders to kill you. We 
were ordered to take you with us. We are to take you to Auki if possible." 
The Japanese agreed to go along with them. When they reached Feranagona 
they were being given food when one of the Japanese tried to commit suicide 
by pressing one hand down on top of his head and pressing the other one up 
under his chin, and biting down on his tongue. They had to tie his hands so he 
couldn't try that again. 
Meanwhile some Kwaio men had come to Kwailabesi to escort me and 
the other Kwaio students back home. They told us that on the way they had 
seen the Japanese and that the plane had crashed near the river at Ata'a.2 
The next morning we were all walking along the trail when we came upon 
those four Japanese and those six soldiers. We continued along the trail with 
them until we got to the big river at Fokanakafo, and the man who had tried 
to commit suicide before leaped into the water, with one of the others tied to 
him. Some of the soldiers jumped in after them and pulled them back to 
shore. When we parted with them there, they were still asking to be killed. 
But the soldiers didn't want to kill them, since there was no reason for it. 
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To Guadalcanal 
When we arrived back in Kwaio the two government headmen, my relatives 
Sirifa and Brown Kwarialaena, announced that the government had sent a 
paper saying they needed people. One of the headmen was my uncle. he said 
to me, "My boy, I want you to go to fight." He told me, "I want you to go 
because you've been to school, you speak some English and I want you to 
lead the group because the Americans don't speak Pijin English." I was only 
about twenty-one years old at the time, but they instructed me on how to look 
after the men, and I was willing. I said, "Oh, I would like that." I was made 
sergeant of our section on the spot. There were twenty-five of us, including 
myself. Altogether there were one hundred of us in four sections of twenty-
five people each. Some just joined because they were interested and curious 
about war. 
When we left for the fighting at Lungga the older people sacrificed pigs in 
the shrines to the spirits of our ancestors so they would guard us from injury. 
They asked them to make the Solomon Islanders strong so they could protect 
the islands from being spoiled. They sacrificed to the spirits to make the 
fighting be finished in one place and not spread to other areas. They were 
afraid that the war might spread to Malaita and spoil the ancestral shrines 
there. The spirits were asked to make the enemy dizzy and slow and to cause 
them to make mistakes, and for their rifles to misfire and miss their targets. 
Pigs were sacrificed for our minds to be strong and clear for whatever we had 
to do. 
You and I may not believe such sacrifices could work, but those people 
did. And it seems as if they did work for them. Notice that even though the 
enemy was strong, the fighting didn't spread to Malaita. And the war was 
finished quickly on Guadalcanal. The heavy fighting only lasted a few months. 
So only two days after I had arrived back home, a large group of us set out 
across the island. That night we slept in the bush at Duukwasi, and the next 
day we arrived in Auki where we were given food. The government officer 
Mr Trench said that after we had eaten, we should be brought back to him for 
inspection, and we would be leaving that night on the Mendana. We would 
arrive at Lungga the next morning. Trench told us, "If any of you are afraid to 
go to war, if you care too much about your family, care about your life, don't 
go." 
We said, "No, we're going to go. We don't mind. What's the difference? If 
we stay on Malaita we will probably be killed, too, by the Japanese. And if we 
go we'll be killed, so what's the difference?" 
39 
JONAlliAN FIFl'I 
Lungga 
When we approached Guadalcanal we saw miles and miles of tents, masses of 
people, and trucks of all kinds going back and forth. The sea was full of ships, 
there were planes above us, and we could hear gunshots in the bush. But 
there were no· Solomon Islanders there, the people were mostly American 
Marines. And there were no black Americans, or Australians, or New 
Zealanders there yet. There were not even any Guadalcanal people. The 
Fijians had just arrived. When we got there the place was just starting to fill 
up with people. 
Four more sections of Kwaio and other Malaitans went to Tulagi. While 
they were there a store of ammunition blew up and six men were killed. One 
Kwaio man, Takaaba'e, was badly injured in that explosion and he was in such 
chronic pain that he eventually hung himseif. Another Kwaio man, Sudaa, 
was blinded in one eye. At Tenaru there must have been three thousand of 
us. With us were several plantation managers [Labour Corps officers]. They 
were supposed to look after us. 
They organized us into groups. "This group over here. You go with that 
leader there. This group over here go with that leader over there." I was the 
interpreter at that time. Some people were left there to put up our tents. 
There were four tents [one for each section of twenty-five], and also one 
where our meals were prepared. 
During a war there's no time to waste. You just can't play around. We had 
just arrived but right away we were put to work. The water that we drank was 
polluted by dead bodies. But where else could you get water from? We just 
drank it. The Americans had brought along tablets that they put in the water 
to purify it. And so we got down to work. 
At Lungga we unloaded and stacked the American cargo, and chopped 
wood for building storehouses to put it all into. We served as porters carrying 
goods, guns, and ammunition for the soldiers patrolling in the bush. We also 
aided the wounded and carried and buried the dead. Americans were always 
well buried in the ground, but the Japanese bodies were just covered enough 
to stop the stench. You could see their legs sticking up out of the earth. 
It didn't appear then that the war would be over as soon as 1945. The 
fighting seemed too strong. During the daytime it was usually quiet because 
the American airplanes were flying around overhead, but one time Japanese 
airplanes attacked the Lungga airfield and dropped four bombs on it. 
Another time we were working at Lungga beach and a Japanese plane 
dropped two bombs in the middle of us there on the beach. The next day it 
bombed us again. There must have been fifty men killed during bombings. 
What would happen is that new recruits who had just arrived wouldn't obey 
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orders. If the air raid sounded then we would all jump into the fox holes, but 
the new arrivals would try to run away from the bombing instead. That's why 
so many died. 
One time [26 January 1943] we were camped there with those Labour 
Corps officers, and about four in the morning the air raid sounded, and we all 
dived into our foxholes. Then they told us it was all clear, to come out. When 
we had all climbed out of our foxholes, the enemy attacked again. Some 
people became confused and they panicked and dashed off in all directions, 
and many were killed by the bombs. We were angry about that and we asked 
to be taken back home to Malaita. Mr Widdy [Labour Corps commanding 
officer] tried to calm us down, but we wouldn't listen to what he said. Then 
two Americ;ln officers came and talked to us: "If you all go back, then this 
fighting will go on for a long time. What if we soldiers have to stop fighting in 
order to do the labor too? Because you are here to do the work, this fighting 
will be finished quickly. II 
And we answered: "We want you to tell those British officers you are 
going to put some Americans in our camps. Second, we want an American 
officer to be with them. And another thing, tell them they can't forbid us from 
visiting the Joes [Americans]." 
They told us: "We will go talk with them, and will tell you tomorrow if 
they agree or not." 
Then we added, ''There is something else we want. We want them to give 
us our pay. They have not paid us yet." 
The next day they came back and said it was all right. Then we were 
happy, and two hundred fifty of us went back to Lungga beach, and others 
went to Aribe'u, and some to Mataniko. 
We didn't get any days off from our work, not on Saturdays, Sundays, or 
even Christmas or the New Year. Some of our men complained and said, 
"Why didn't we celebrate these holidays?" And I said to them, "There's no 
time to celebrate anything. Get down to work." We did the same kind of work 
as the Americans and the British, but we weren't allowed to wear the same 
uniforms. We wore lava lavas, yardage. It was forbidden for us to wear 
trousers or shirts. We sergeants were given a piece of khaki that had three 
stripes painted on it. They tied strings onto the cloth, and each of us were to 
tie the cloth onto our arms. The white officers all wore their stripes sewn onto 
their shirts, but all we got were those pieces of khaki. I was ashamed to wear 
it like that, so I would just carry it around in my hand. 
We worked all day long until dark. Laborers were paid just $2 per month, 
and sergeants eight dollars. We thought that was a lot of money at that time. 
Before the war wages had been only 10 shillings per month, or £1 [US$2] if 
you had worked someplace for a long time. So we were very happy. There was 
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always enough food because the Americans fed us when we worked on their 
cargo. They told us to take anything that we wanted for ourselves. We took 
extra, thinking that, if we could find a way, we would send some of it back to 
our relatives on Malaita. When we were working with the Americans, we 
were never hungry, but no one grew fat eithC!r. That's because we never slept 
at night with the enemy planes always coming. 
We requested clothing for the women b~ck home. There on Malaita 
clothing was in such short supply that women were having to tear their pieces 
of cloth in half so there would be enough to go around. They couldn't cover 
their breasts; they only had enough to wrap a skirt around their waists. The 
Christians, that is. The bush women were all right, because they didn't mind 
going naked. I asked the Americans for cloth, and they told me that they 
hadn't brought any with them, only things for the fighting. But they did say 
they would look for old mattress covers, and if we washed them we could have 
them. So the Marines found some mattress covers and they brought them to 
us and said, "Here, send these to your women back on your island. This is the 
best we can do. It's not peacetime. We understand your need. Take these 
mattress covers for the time being and let the women use them." But there 
was a problem because our British officers were usually watching when our 
trucks arrived in the evening, bringing us back from work. I asked the advice 
of the Americans supervising us, and they told us that when we were carrying 
gifts we should jump down off the trucks before they reached the camp. and 
then we could slip in later. 
Our officers tried to forbid us from visiting Americans, but when we told 
the Americans of this they told us not to worry about it, so we kept going. 
When an American had finished eating he would wash his plate and give it to 
me and tell me to go stand in the line for food. One time a Labour Corps 
officer saw this and told me I couldn't eat that food. A man named Kirsh told 
him "Go fuck yourself!" 
While at Lungga we would collect things from the military dumps, wash 
them and store them in our tents. Whenever a Labour Corps section was 
ready to return to Malaita, the British officers would search through their 
possessions and confiscate forbidden things, like trousers. They gave out word 
that we were not supposed to take military items back home. But the 
Americans said that was a lie. They said the things we were taking were only 
rubbish, and anyone could just pick them up. Some of the American soldiers 
even scavenged at the dumps themselves. 
The Americans gave us lots and lots of sheets, shirts, trousers. They even 
gave guns away. Some men got pistols, others carbines. One time they gave 
one man a machine gun. We wanted to take all our cargo back home with us, 
but it was difficult. They said each man could take home only one box about 
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thirty inches long. Some men made special boxes. A relative of mine, Gwauni, 
made our boxes for us. These boxes had a false bottom, and when Officer 
Widdy would inspect them he would reach into the box and touch the wood 
and think that was the bottom. Some men hid cartridges, while others 
disassembled rifles to conceal inside. My, but.those boxes were heavy! 
But one day, when all the sections had gone off to work, the Labour 
Corps officers summoned together some police and they searched through all 
of our tents. They confIscated all of the things that the army had given to us. 
They put the clean clothes into a separate pile by themselves, and then they 
poured kerosene over all the old clothes and set them on fIre. They took 
those good things to their own quarters and later sold them in their store. 
When we arrived back at our camp we objected, but they said those things 
were not for us boys but were only for white men. We saved this episode in 
our memories. 
On the night of 15 Jamlary 1943 Ru'uboo,.Te'efu, 'Ui'aniaria, Tome 
Niuboo, and maybe fIfty Kwaio and other people met. These men said they 
were going to kill the British Labour Corps officers. But I forbade it. ''You 
cannot kill them, because we are in the midst of a war. It will be bad for all of 
us." They said "We can claim a bomb killed them." 
I told them, "But those of you who do the murders will still have to adhere 
to the strict religious taboos that a man must follow after killing someone, and 
people will see from that what is going on." I ordered them not to do it. 
I'm talking about these things because we were an oppressed people in 
the Solomon Islands. We had been oppressed for some time up to that point. 
Not only a single moment, it's something that happeried each day all the time. 
And then when we would complain the American Marines would listen to us. 
They didn't mind. They would listen to us complain about the situation in the 
Solomon Islands. And when we worked and the British people would come 
and say, "Get cracking. What ate you waiting for?" the American Marines 
would come and say, "Shut up, get out of here," in our defense. And they 
would tell us, "You have to struggle, you have to do something. If you just 
obey, obey all the time, nothing's going to be done for you." And then we got 
the idea from that time. They would encourage us and say, "Struggle. They 
may kill you, they may torture you, they may do all kinds of things to you but 
don't give up. Keep going." That was the beginning of Maasina Rule. 
After the war, when I went back to Malaita, I wanted to do what they had 
said. I wanted to start Maasina Rule, but my uncle who was the headman 
wouldn't allow it. He said, "Let other people start it and then you can join 
them, but don't start it yourself." That was because my uncle was a 
government headman. That was an important position in the British colonial 
system. He told me, "Let other people start it and then you can join them." 
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After the war we had courage, whereas prior to the war we would always just 
give in. 
The War Back Home on Malaita 
Americans bombed Laulasi, Gamuo, Uru Island [East Kwaio), and Fousaari'i, 
South Malaita. The Americans were just playing around, but it was bad for 
those places they bombed. 
I heard tWo explanations for why Laulasi was bombed. The first is that 
when the airplane was going over, men were putting thatch on the houses and 
they waved at the planes. The second is that when Japanese came to Auki in 
[July] 1942 a man named Sale 'Abakomu met them at the wharf, and he and 
some other Laulasi people led them to the government office. Also, a false 
rumor went around that they were hiding Japanese at Laulasi Island. At that 
time Mr Bengough, the district officer at Auki, had fled. Later, Sale 
'Abakomu and others who had assisted those Japanese were jailed for six 
weeks. 
Of the bombing of Gamuo they say a man had gone outside and was 
staring at that American plane and it just started bombing. Near Uru Island 
people had gotten into a big canoe and were paddling hard to flee to the . 
shore when they were bombed. At Fousaari'i, near Maramasike, they just 
. attacked a rock out by the reef in deep water. They dropped four bombs, but 
they were just messing around practicing and didn't get close to any houses. 
One American plane went down near the mouth of Sinalagu Harbour, in 
Kwaio. The pilot's name was Allen. His plane sank in the sea but he had a 
rubber raft, which he paddled along with his hands. The waves carried him to 
the edge of the reef at Ririsiana, and a man named Gi'u saw him and thought 
someone must have capsized their canoe. But then he noticed it must be 
something different because the man's skin was white. And that rubber raft 
was red, and too short to be a canoe. Pilot Allen saw Gi'u too and thought he 
was an enemy scout. So Allen jumped in the sea away from his raft and sunk 
into the water with just his face and nose showing. A wave carried him up to 
the shore. He moved toa place to land on the beach and tried to hide there, 
but he was ready to swim back out to sea if he spied trouble. Gi'u went to the 
point of the reef and saw that he was a white man and beckoned to him to 
come to him. Pilot Allen had also just realized that Gi'u was a black man and 
he swam over to him on shore. Gi'u asked him "Where are you from?" 
Pilot Allen told him, "I am an American, they shot my airplane'S fuel tank 
and when I reached here it was empty and so I fell down here, the plane sank, 
and the waves carried me and my rubber raft to shore. Are there any 
Japanese here?" 
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Gi'u told him "No, there are no Japanese here on Malaita." Gi'u said they 
should go to the place where I, Fifi'i, am from, and he told him "You musn't 
be afraid, I won't trick you." Pilot Allen said that first they should carry his raft 
onto shore, and then they let the air out of it. Gi'u and he took the raft and 
moved to the place Farisioa, a Seventh Day Adventist village. The only 
clothes Allen had left were his trousers. 
Many airplanes were searching for him afterward over on the 
Guadalcanal side, as they thought that he must have gone down near where 
his plane had been hit. But instead, he had taken a route that took him across 
land. 
They dried out his pants for him, and gave him a dry shirt, and he stayed 
there for five days. The Auki police came to escort him to Auki from which 
he would be sent back to Lungga. Pilot Allen was a young man. Maybe he is 
still alive, or perhaps he died in the fighting. People asked him and he said 
that if he survived the war he would come back to visit the place where he had 
been rescued. 
Guadalcanal Chapels 
During the war there must have been three thousand Malaitans working on 
Guadalcanal. There were also people from Makira, Ulawa, and U gi Island. 
These were the only people I saw working with the Americans at Lungga. We 
built a large chapel at the cemetery for the war dead. The people from Ulawa 
decorated the inside. When it was finished people from all the different 
Christian denominations gathered there every Sunday, or whenever their 
sabbath was, to pray. Only the Kwaio hill people didn't go there to pray. 
Where would they get pigs to sacrifice? And their people were already 
performing sacrifices for them back on Malaita for the fighting to be calm. 
Their chapels were their foxholes, because when the fighting began, they 
would pray to the spirits of their ancestors while inside them. That was the 
Melanesian way. 
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Notes 
1 Most of the paper was Written in the Kwaio language by Jonathan Fifi'i in May 1988, 
during his stay in Honolulu, and translated into English and edited by David Akin. In some 
places additional material has been added, as requested by Mr Fifi'i, from his 1988 conference 
talk and from a series of interviews taped by Akin in 1982, 1987, and 1988. The editor would like 
to thank Geoffrey White for help in the editing and production of this paper. 
2 The exact crash location was Manua, near Suanaga'i (Ben Burt, personal communication 
to editor, 1984). 
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The Vanuatu Labor Corps Experience 
Lamont Lindstrom 
It has been nearly fiftyyears since American forces occupied what was then 
the Franco-British colony of the New Hebrides. US military personnel first 
came ashore on Efate in March 1942. They stayed less than four years. The 
New Hebrides bases were rolled up by the end of 1945. Since the war 
Islanders have experienced the gamut of economic and pOlitical forces that 
have given shape to contemporary Pacific nations. The most important event 
of the postwar era was the achievement of national independence in 1980, 
celebrated by the renaming of the archipelago. James Cook's "New Hebrides" 
is now the Republic of Vanuatu. Still, fifty years beyond the outbreak of the 
Pacific War it remains impossible to overlook the decisive effects of those few 
years in the lives of the people who witnessed and took part in wartime 
events. And it is impossible to understand what has happened during the past 
half century in the Pacific without taking into account the transforming 
effects of the war upon island political and economic structures. 
This paper explores the residues of wartime encounters in the lives of 
men who live on Tanna, an island of southern Vanuatu. Nearly every man and 
boy who was able to work traveled north to Efate to join American military 
labor corps. In addition to the impact this experience had on individual lives, 
the war also gave shape and impetus to a postwar, anticolonialist movement 
on Tanna: the John From movement. This, in altered form, is still active on 
the island today. It is an important organization in the contemporary political 
arena. Many of the movement's rituals, symbols, and ideological goals were 
borrowed from the labor corps experience. To document the continuing 
effects of wartime encounters, I have been collecting war histories, stories, 
and songs from labor corps veterans on Tanna since 1982.1 
The War in the New Hebrides 
In early 1942 the American military command decided to occupy a number of 
South Pacific islands, including Bfate, in order to forestall the Japanese 
47 
LAMONT LINDSlROM 
advance southward, and to protect sea-lanes to Australia. A task force from 
New Caledonia landed on Efate in May 1942 to supplement units that had 
arrived earlier to begin construction of a major airfield. Military information 
about the New Hebrides and about Japanese movements in the region was 
sketchy. Servicemen landed at Port Vila in full battle dress, unsure whether 
the Japanese had already occupied the town. In Port Vila, also, residents were 
guessing which side would occupy Efate first. Islanders who observed the fleet 
approaching from over the horizon report that people said, "In an hour we'll 
know if we'll live or die." European colonials, at least, were relieved to see 
the occupation fleet displaying the Stars and Stripes, rather than the Rising 
Sun. 
On Efate the Americans developed installations at Port Vila and also at 
Port Havannah. Several months later they established a second advance base 
on Espiritu Santo, a hundred and forty miles closer to the fighting that 
developed on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. During the Solomon 
Islands campaign most of the men and materiel on the American side passed 
through these two advance bases. Many of the wounded were evacuated to 
Efate or Santo for medical treatment. During the first years of the war Santo 
was the largest American installation west of Pearl Harbor. Efate, at its peak, 
housed 15,000 service personnel. Santo was home for over 40,000. Hundreds 
of thousands more passed through the New Hebrides on the way to and from 
the front lines to the north. (Information about the American presence on 
Efate and Santo is provided by Garrison 1983; Geslin 1956; Heinl 1944; 
Kralovec n.d.; and Wallin 1967.) 
By 1943 the Americans had turned back the Japanese advance at 
GuadaIcanal and had begun to push northward up through the Solomon 
Islands. The advance bases in the New Hebrides were transformed into rear-
line support facilities for the remainder of the war. Efate was rolled up in late 
1944; Santo a year later. In 1942 the Japanese managed several times to bomb 
and shell (from submarines) these bases. Attacks ceased as the war turned 
against the Japanese in 1943. The war experience in Vanuatu, thus, was not 
one of battle. Rather, people experienced a brief but intense period in which 
their lands were overrun with thousands of new sorts of people, and heaped 
with tons of military cargo and materiel. At the height of the battle for 
GuadaIcanal, for example, three cargo ships a day arrived at Segond Canal on 
Santo, with men and cargo to unload. 
These wartime population and supply movements must be put into local 
context. In 1941 the entire population of the New Hebrides numbered only 
40,000. Port Vila and Santo were small, sleepy port towns serving an under-
developed plantation economy located on the fringes of the colonialist world. 
There were few roads, no airfields, and no municipal water supply or 
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telephone systems. Although some Islanders were engaged in plantation labor 
and in coconut cash cropping, subsistence agriculture remained the economic 
mainstay of village life, which retained, in general, its traditional character. 
Within a few months of the American occupation, however, Seabees and 
army construction units had built fighter and bomber airfields, port facilities, 
water supply systems, large encampments, acres of Quonset and Dallas huts 
for storage, movie theaters, new roads, restaurants, clubs, and bars--the whole 
apparatus of a large military base. 
Wartime Encounters 
Islanders first observed and then were drawn into this military activity and 
deveiopment. On the books, at least, a number of antifraternization orders 
existed to restrict contact between military personnel and the local populace. 
A curfew on Santo restricted Islanders and a community of Vietnamese plan-
tation workers to their villages and quarters from 7:00 PM to 7:00 AM. Restric-
tions existed also on visits by Islanders to military camps and on attendance at 
outdoor cinemas. Servicemen were restricted from visiting villages. Military 
Civil Affairs records, however, report that these regulations were widely 
ignored (see Kralovec n.d.). Islanders and servicemen encountered one 
another in various sorts of activities and contexts. 
These contexts included a lively trade in carvings, bows and arrows, pigs' 
tusks, and grass skirts. (Even men took up grass skirt manufacture--tradi-
tionally a female occupation.) In addition to artifact and food marketing, 
some Islanders went into the laundry business. The Americans established, at 
one point, eight coastwatchingstations scattered throughout the northern 
New Hebrides and the Santa Cruz Islands. Personnel at these camps recruited 
local assistance. The colonial government also created the New Hebrides 
Defence Force. Two hundred men, mostly from Malakula, joined this unit 
that coordinated its activities with the American military. 
Other Islanders encountered Americans in more informal activities. Pig 
hunting on Malakula, for example, was especially popular among American 
officers. The war's photographic record documents some of these expeditions 
in which Americans encountered inhabitants of remote mountain villages. 
Other encounters occurred at church services, at cinemas (Santo possessed 
forty-three indoor and outdoor movie screens), and at dances wherein local 
performers entertained American troops.2 Undoubtedly the most intensive 
kind of encounter between Islanders and Americans was the labor corps 
experience. Here, men left their homes, went to live on the US bases, and 
worked long and difficult days under direct American supervision. 
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The Labor Corps 
Both the Japanese and the Allied militaries recruited civilian labor to suppOrt 
their war efforts. In the New Hebrides the Americans almost immediately 
rounded up Islanders to help build the first airfield on Efate. Men from Efate 
and from the Shepherd Islands just to the north worked to build Bauer Field, 
named after a flyer shot down in the Solomons. This local labor pool was soon 
exhausted. More hands were required, and the military turned south to the 
island of Tanna, which had a relatively large population of 6000. By the end of 
1942, 1000 Tannese men were working on Efate--essentially the entire male 
able-bodied work force of the island. Recruits signed on for three-month 
tours of duty; many stayed longer. 
In most of the Pacific the American military recruited labor through 
colonial middlemen, such as the British-officered Solomon Islands Labour 
Corps or the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU). This per-
mitted prewar colonial powers to maintain some semblance of authority over 
local peoples. It also buffered the potential dangers of direct contacts 
between American seIVicemen and Islanders. In Vanuatu, however, although 
the British and French at first assumed responsibility for labor recruitment 
and supeIVision, this did not last long. The American military, in part spurred 
by workers' complaints about terrible food, soon took over both labor recruit-
ment and supervision; In part this abrogation of colonial authority followed 
from the locally peculiar situation in which the British and French jointly 
governed the "Condominium." The US military was annoyedbyfrequent dis-
putes between the two colonial powers that disrupted American plans. Also, 
the bases in the New Hebrides were among the first the United States 
established in the Pacific. Policy regarding civilian labor recruitment had not 
yet hardened into the form it would later assume, wherein the Americans 
were more concerned to respect colonial sensibilities. Later in the paper I will 
remark again the importance of this direct, unmediated contact between 
American supeIVisors and island workers. 
Workers on Efate were split into monolingual gangs of twenty-five or so 
men and divi"ed between the army and the navy. The principal American 
supervisor on the army side was Major George Riser. On the navy side, a 
Seabee named Thomas Beatty was in charge. These two men are still 
renowned today on Tanna as "Tom Army" and "Tom Navy." 
Work gangs built their own coconut-thatched housing in camps set aside 
for them. The military provided food, clothing (surplus army or navy issue), 
cots, blankets, cigarettes, and so on. A couple of men in each gang were 
appointed "boss boys" (selected primarily because of their knowledge of 
Bislama, the local Pidgin English). Other men were appointed company 
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cooks. The men received some medical care from both American and colonial 
doctors. A weekly dose of atabrine was a notal?le part of this care. The mili-
tary was concerned to protect its troops by shrinking the island's malarial 
pool. Each man was also issued a numbered dogtag. Workers were paid 
around US$O.25 a day (or about US$7.50 a month). Men today state that 
these wages were purposely kept low at the insistence of the British and the 
French. It is certainly true that both colonial powers feared postwar wage 
inflation. Many workers augmented their salaries by performing various sorts 
of casual services for the troops. 
Men today recount the difficulty of the work they performed. Ten-hour 
days were common with only one day off every two weeks. War work was in 
several ways similar to the sorts of prewar plantation labor some of these men 
had experienced. For example, workers were organized into all-male gangs, 
set joint tasks to perform, and housed in barracklike quarters. But the 
organization of labor during the war was in other ways very different from 
prewar plantation work. 
First, new sorts of tasks were assigned. One of the most common of these 
was stevedoring. Labor corps veterans tell stories of their ignorance when 
first boarding a military cargo ship. They did not know how to find the holds, 
how to move between the densely packed cargo, or how to struggle with bulky 
and heavy material. Other unfamiliar wartime tasks included working in 
mosquito abatement crews spraying diesel oil on standing water; working in 
military hospitals and having to burn up amputated American limbs; working 
on trucks delivering supplies to the various encampments; and so on. 
A second difference between the war's organization of work and prewar 
forms of labor was the American reliance on machinery and technology. 
Workers report the wonderful powers of tractors on the large vegetable farms 
the military established on Efate. They were impressed with the efficiency of 
bulldozers and graders in the construction of airfields and new roads. In 
addition the machines of battle itself were both impressive and fearsome: 
warplanes, artillery, bombs, jeeps, trucks, and radar (which the Tannese call 
by the Pidgin English word stil 'steel'). Prewar employers relied almost solely 
on cheap labor. As many of these labor corps recruits had themselves been 
that cheap labor, they Were deeply impressed with the efficiency of American 
technology. 
A third difference between wartime and plantation labor was the 
military's utilization of shift work. The fact that one team of laborers worked 
all day and then was replaced with a second team that worked all night under 
lights is a key point in many people's recollections of the labor corps 
experience. Never before, and never again, had Islanders worked nights. 
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A fourth difference that characterized war work was the prevalence of 
danger and dellth. Although there were only a few Japanese attacks on 
American installations in the New Hebrides, warning sirens howled 
frequently to signal suspectedsightings of Japanese planes or submarines, or 
to signal drills. Workers tell of the clutching fear they experienced when the 
sirens sounded. Although no workers died from military action, many became 
ill from disease, from injury, and from overwork. A significant number of 
Tannese men died on Efate and remain buried there today. Workers also 
pitied the American dead and wounded they observed return from the 
Solomon Islands. They tell of walking along the road to the airfield and seeing 
trails of blood that had dripped from passing ambulances. And they tell of 
hearing the moans of wounded servicemen as these ambulances passed by on 
the way from airfield to hospital. 
Finally, during the war the Tannese worked alongside a different kind of 
people from those ofthe prewar period. They worked for Americans, many of 
whom were black Americans. The segregated, black American 24th Infantry 
was a part of the main landing force on Efate. The army component of the 
task force from New Caledonia that landed on 4 May 1942 consisted of 4612 
men. Of these, approximately 3400 were black (Garrison 1983). Most of these 
black troops were in service units. Some, however, such as the 198th 
Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, were combat troops. The fact that blacks 
were isolated in quartermaster and transportation units reflected American 
racism of the times and military reluctance to use black troops in battle. From 
the Tannese perspective, however, these were the troops in control of 
American stores and supplies. I~ charge of the cargo, black Americans' lowly 
position within military society, ironically, was at least partly revalued by 
Tannese observers.3 
The two most salient features of the labor corps experience that are 
recalled and that continue to have an effect today are first, the war's cargo 
and the establishment of new sorts of exchange relations; and second, a new 
style of interpersonal relations between Islanders and Europeans. The bases 
in the New Hebrides were, for much of the war, supply bases. They were 
hoards of stores and military materiel. Islanders received food, clothing, 
cigarettes, and many other kinds of goods from American benefactors and 
employers. Islanders' war stories incorporate long lists of the things people 
enjoyed during those years. But these stories also stress that these goods were 
obtained within relations of exchange. People recall the many sorts of things 
they received from the Americans. They also point out, however, that they 
reciprocated with their labor and assistance with the American war effort. 
They stress the hardships they endured in return for the gifts they received. 
Wartime exchange, in peoples' accounts, thus recapitulates traditional 
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reciprocal exchange patterns, the goal of which is to ensure an essential 
equality and appreciation of each side. People also tell of more spiritual sorts 
of assistance rendered to the American effort. A number of local sorcerers, 
particularly from the island of Ambrym, loosed their magic powers to ensure 
that the Americans won Guadalcanal. 
The second enduring memory from the war concerns a new style of 
interpersonal relation with amiable outsiders. The colonialist prewar era in 
much of the Pacific was characterized by rigid sumptuary codes that 
maintained clear boundaries between Europeans and Islanders.4 These codes 
in particular regulated eating habits. Islanders, generally, ate certain kinds of 
food, while Europeans ate other kinds. The code prevented the two peoples 
from eating together. Dress was also regulated. Only Europeans could wear 
shoes, long trousers and, in some parts of the Pacific, shirts as well. 
Many Americans, whose interests in the Southwest Pacific were short-
term, were unconcerned to uphold these codes of interpersonal behavior, 
even if they realized they existed. War era photographs depict American 
troops dining with Pacific Islanders, sharing and lighting cigarettes for island 
"friends," giving away shirts, trousers, boots, hats, and so on. No doubt the 
tenor of interaction between American servicemen and Islanders was often 
paternalistic, but it was different in important ways from the quality of 
relationships Islanders had experienced with colonials before the war. 
Americans and Islanders also occasionally made common cause against 
Europeans. More than one worker from Tanna recalls being supported by 
American servicemen in disputes with French or British colonialists. More 
than anything, what people recall from the war is this new kind of 
interpersonal style, and the richness of wartime relations of exchange. 
The War and the John Frum Movement 
Besides recollections and war stories, not much was left behind when the 
Americans rolled up their bases and went home. There were, of course, the 
airfields, new roads, and a few Quonset huts and jeeps. Most of the supplies 
and stores the Americans did not want to ship back home were simply 
bulldozed into the sea.s The labor corps experience itself, though, has 
continued to have important effects on Tanna--first in Islanders' relations 
with the British and French and, more recently, in their relations with the 
independent government of Vanuatu. These war experiences have provided a 
new way to phrase Tannese opposition to alien control of island life. The war 
offered a new language of symbols to demonstrate this opposition. The most 
organized form of this opposition has been the John Frum movement. 
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Postwar "cargo cults" are well known, and among these is Tanna's John 
Frum movement. (For more detailed accounts of this movement, see Guiart 
1956; Worsley 1968; Lindstrom 1981.) Briefly, around 1939 a mysterious 
figure calling himself John Frum appeared in southwest Tanna. Unclear is 
exactly who or what this figure was. At the time some suspected a Japanese 
spy who was preparing the way for invasion by fomenting unrest. The 
condominium administration eventually concluded that a conspiracy of 
Tannese men had dressed themselves up as John Frum in order to con their 
fellows. The administration made a number of arrests and, in fact, continued 
to arrest and deport movement leaders until 1956. Whatever he might have 
been, John Frum fits easily within Tannese notions of the supernatural order. 
Apparitions of ancestral and other spirits who give advice to the living are still 
common on the island. 
Among his various pronouncements John Frum predicted the arrival of 
Americans who would help the Tannese in their struggle against the British 
and the French. The colonial administration, in fact, intercepted letters to this 
effect in 1941, several months before Pearl Harbor. And sure enough an 
American fleet soon landed in force at Port Vila. Tannese labor corps 
veterans explain that they were pleased, but not surprised, by the American 
occupation. Advised by John Frum, they were ready to recruit in large 
numbers to the American labor corps. This Tannese willingness to sign up 
contrasts with what occurred in other parts of the Pacific theater. In Papua 
New Guinea, for example, Islanders were understandably reluctant to 
volunteer for dangerous work at poor wages. ANGAU experienced significant 
difficulties in meeting its labor needs. In Vanuatu, however, where people 
expected Americans to arrive at any moment, men report that they were 
happy for the opportunity to help the war effort by joining the labor corps. 
When the Tannese went home from Efate they cat;ried along memories of 
their encounters with Americans that fed into John Frum prophecy. John 
Frum supporters organized a number of anticolonialist actions against 
European control of their island. Some of these, such as a boycott on copra 
production and on trade-store purchases, made sense to condominium 
officials. Others, such as the construction of an airfield for American planes in 
north Tanna, were perceived to be mystical and irrational. The colonial 
administration attempted to surpress the movement until 1956. Since that 
time the John Frum organization has gradually been institutionalized into a 
combination political party and church. 
Movement leaders, in this institutionalization process, have revised John 
Frum goals and ideology. They have also devised a set of movement symbols 
and rituals, borrowed to a large extent from their war experiences. Followers 
have constructed various John Frum ritual sites, decorated by symbolic 
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dogtags, model soldiers and airplanes, and red crosses (adopted from the 
doors of military ambulances and medic jackets). Every 15 February, the 
major movement holy day, a drill team of young men marches back and forth. 
They carry bamboo rifles and are commanded by a "sergeant" who barks out 
commands such as "to the right!" and "about face!" Each marcher has "USA" 
painted in red on his naked chest and back. John From leaders, on ritual 
occasions, dress themselves in American military uniforms. They have 
preserved bits and pieces of these uniforms from the 1940s; they also obtain 
new supplies from occasional tourists and yachtsmen. In 1978 people raised 
the American flag at cult headquarters. They continued to raise US flags until 
1982, when the independent national government confiscated some of the 
movement's ritual paraphernalia, including its American flags. Recently they 
have raised the Stars and Stripes again. 
Conclusion 
The war experience in this way has continued into the present in the form of 
the sacred objects, ritual forms, and messages of the John Frum movement. 
The core of John Frum's message has been a demand for island autonomy 
and for unmediated relations with the outside world. The labor corps 
experience of seemingly unlimited cargo, obtained through reciprocal 
relations of exchange, and of new kinds of direct, interpersonal relations with 
outsiders provided a new code in which to phrase the message. During the 
war Tannese relations with a powerful outside force--with America--were 
unmediated by meddlesome third parties. Also during the war Tannese 
relations of exchange were vastly enriched, yet, from an island point of view, 
still retained a traditionally important reciprocal character. 
Many John From prophecies speak of the return of the Americans. 
People hint darkly of hidden ammunition and supply dumps dug into the 
earth, awaiting a new American army. Yet, Islanders do not wish to go back to 
war, nor do they really want Americans of the 1980s actually to come to 
Tanna. Rather, the plea for an American return bespeaks a desire to 
reconstitute the kinds of exchange relations and the unmediated contact with 
the outside world that people enjoyed during the war. The war's experiences, 
in sum, matched traditional Tannese expectations of autonomy, of sociability, 
and of exchange. 
Island demands for autonomy, for richer relations of exchange, and for 
unmediated "roads" to outside powers, phrased in John Frum's wartime 
images, were a constant irritant to the colonial administration. John Frum 
continues to trouble the independent national government in Port Vila. 
Recollections of wartime relations of exchange, and of direct contacts with 
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world powers that bypass centralized national authorities, for many Tannese, 
have shaped an image and an expectation of what "true" independence and 
autonomy should be like. Although a half-century old, war recollections and 
images continue to have powerful effects in the present. 
Notes 
1 These texts are analyzed in Lindstrom (1989). 
2 Workers at the end of a day, or after successfully emptying out a cargo ship, would 
sometimes perform a traditional dance on deck. Traditional Tannese dance utilizes no 
instruments. Rather, dancers clap their hands and stomp their feet to accompany their songs. 
Tanna's soil is volcanic in nature and booms when stomped. No doubt workers appreciated the 
similar accoustical properties of the decks of cargo Ships. Kralovec (n.d.) reports that an 
American, unfamiliar with this practice, shot and wounded a worker on Santo. The sight of a 
work crew beginning a dance apparently evoked common American images of South Seas 
cannibals. 
3 The Tannese reading of black Americans is ambiguous. On the one hand blacks 
appeared to have many of the rights of white servicemen. They drove trucks, controlled cargo, 
wore uniforms, and so on. On the other hand the Tannese also perceived blacks to be 
dangerous, terse, and under white control. They undoubtedly picked up some of the more 
obvious features of American racism and the subordinate position of blacks in the US military. 
4 The situation in Vanuatu is made complex by the presence of French as well as British 
colonialists. My impression is that relations between French settlers and Islanders were often less 
rigidly structured. 
5 Million Dollar Point, where the Americans dumped most of their excess supplies on 
Santo, is now a popular scuba diving site. 
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George Bogese: "Just a Bloody Traitor"? 
Hugh Laracy 
Although World War II, especially the battle for Guadalcanal, brought the 
Solomon Islands to international prominence, few of the Islanders emerged 
from the war with significantly enhanced reputations. Of those who did, 
probably only three became well known outside the group. Of these, two, 
Jacob Vouza and Bill Bennett, have been honored as heroes for their service 
on the side of the victorious Allies: Vouza for an act of bravery in refusing to 
tell his Japanese captors about American defense positions and then 
providing useful information to the US Marines; Bennett for sustained 
bravery while serving behind Japanese lines with the coastwatcher and 
guerrilla leader Donald Kennedy.l Other Solomon Islanders who also served 
the Allies faithfully, though less dramatically, were left in obscurity.2 But it is 
in the nature of things for honors to be acquired selectively and sparingly.-
and somewhat fortuitously. George Bogese, the third of the trio, discovered 
that those who do not find favor with the victors are distinctly vulnerable. Not 
all Solomon Islanders, especially in the areas that were longest under 
Japanese occupation, as in parts of Choiseul and Australian-ruled 
Bougainville, were immovably staunch supporters of the Allies. Indeed, some 
of them were subjected to summary punishment for "disloyalty." But only two 
individuals, John McDonald from the Shortland Islands and George Bogese 
from Santa Isabel, were subjected to the indignity of a trial and the ignominy 
of a conviction.3 And of these two it was the fate of Bogese, partly because of 
a close, if hostile, involvement with the well· publicized heroics of Kennedy 
and Bennett, to become the more notorious. 
In Bill Bennett's crisply stated opinion, Bogese was "just a bloody traitor," 
and as such deserved nothing but reprobation and lasting ill repute. Bennett 
had some not unreasonable grounds for his view.4 Unlike Vouza, Bogese had 
chosen not to risk his life by resisting the Japanese after he, too, had been 
captured by them. Moreover he was involved in an incident in which Bennett 
received severe burns from exploding petrol. Besides, in 1946 a court found 
him guilty on a charge of assisting the enemy and sentenced him to four years 
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imprisonment. From a position more detached than Bennett's, however, and 
at a remove of almost half a century, during which Solomon Islanders have 
outgrown their subordination to foreign rule, Bogese's actions seem more 
understandable, and possibly less reprehensible, than they were to his 
contemporary critics. 
Most of the Solomons group had been a British protectorate since the 
1890s, but the government had brought few benefits to the Islanders, as many 
people from Bogese's home island of Isabel complained during the Chair and 
Rule movement of the 1930s, and as others from the southern islands were to 
complain during the Maasina Rule movement of the 1940s.5 Solomon 
Islanders, then, in their own estimation owed the colonial government little. 
As an institution it was remote yet threatening and was represented among 
them only by a few sparsely scattered officials with extensive powers whose 
primary tasks were to collect the annual head tax and to discourage breaches 
of the peace. If the Islanders in 1940 had feelings of gratitude and affection 
for Europeans, they were for missionaries rather than for the government. 
Even so they generally remained very loyal during the war, although this is 
easily explained. Whatever their grievances against their colonial "masters," 
the Islanders did not find in the Japanese an appealing alternative to the 
existing regime ("better the devil you know!"). And the Japanese, given that 
. they were on the defensive during most of their occupation of the Solomons, 
had little chance to make themselves particularly agreeable. Besides, the 
missionaries backed the officials in urging the Islanders to support Britain and 
its Allies. In Bogese's case, however, there were additional and acutely 
personal strains on his loyalty: he was captured at a time when it seemed as if 
the British had abandoned the protectorate to the Japanese, and at a time 
when, although he was in government employment, there was ill-feeling 
between him and his superior, Donald Gilbert Kennedy. Vouza, in contrast, 
was captured after the American forces had arrived to challenge the Japanese 
and was, moreover, encouraged to resist by the memory that years before, as a 
policeman, he had once failed notably in his duty. In being captured he 
accepted a chance to make reparation for that embarrassing lapse.6 Bogese 
had no such spur to heroism. 
Bogese's problems began in May 1942 on the island of Savo. He was 
there, on Kennedy's orders, in his capacity as native medical practitioner 
conducting a medical survey. On 5 May he encountered two Japanese 
survivors from the destroyer Kitsutsuki that had been sunk the day before, 
during the Japanese occupation of the protectorate headquarters at Tulagi. 
They were suffering from wounds and burns. After getting approval from Leif 
Schroeder, a former trader working as an Allied coastwatcher who sent some 
food down from his bush hideaway for the Japanese, Bogese dressed their 
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wounds. Three days later a Catholic missionary, Desmond Scanlon from 
Visale on Guadalcanal, visited Savo and gave food and clothing to the pair. 
He also advised Bogese and others to look after them properly, "otherwise 
there will be a row with the Japanese authorities," and before leaving wrote 
his name and address on a piece of paper, which he gave to the Japanese. For 
his part Bogese--as he later recounted in an affidavit--attempted to conceal 
his occupation and identity from the Japanese, but the deception was soon 
revealed. On 9 May two barges carrying fifty soldiers and guided by a man 
named Tolia arrived at Savo, near Panuel village where Bogese was living, to 
collect their compatriots. When they had landed one of the soldiers addressed 
the watching villagers in English: "The rule of Great Britain is finished. You 
are now under the Japanese military rule. Anybody who disobeys Japanese 
orders must be shot. We now proclaim martial law. All natives must cooperate 
with the Japanese." The party then proceeded tathe village where Tolia 
identified Bogese: "This is Dr George we talk along you before." The 
Japanese who had spoken on the beach then said to Bogese: "My name is 
Sima. I was in Fiji for nine years. I know the names of all the Native Medical 
Practitioners who were trained in Suva. You must be one of them. You must 
tell me the truth, and you must cooperate with the Japanese, or you will be 
shot .... You must come with us to Tulagi. ... All Native Medical 
Practitioners must work for the Japanese government." 
"I was," admitted Bogese, "frightened to disobey," and he proceeded to 
work for a new "master" as an interpreter. On 11 May, Sima (who was 
probably the man more commonly known as Ishimoto) had him write a notice 
in the Nggela language urging the people of that island to return to their 
homes and not to hide in the bush.7 On 12 May, Bogese went with Sima to 
the village ofVoloa on Nggela to recruit men to help unload a ship at Tulagi. 
On 13 May, he and one of those men, Kuini Gee, were directed by Sima to 
translate from English to Nggela another notice "To all the Island People," 
informing them: "The Japanese Army came to protect the Natives. You must 
return to your villages and do your work in peace and remain calm. You must 
give information to the Japanese Military Authorities."8 
On 15 May he had to translate a similar message into the Bugotu 
language of southern Isabel for distribution among his own people: "Will you 
return to your respective villages and perform your ordinary occupations and 
be safe. The Japanese army respect all people in these islands, they didn't 
come to [do] you any harm or to burn your houses and destroy your property, 
they came to protect all your people in these islands.''9 The Bugotu version, 
however, as Bennett later pointed out, contained an instruction not included 
in the English original: "If any natives know of any Europeans hidden around 
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the Islands, who possess rifles, ammunition, etc, they are to report them 
immediately to the Japanese authorities in Tulagi."lO 
Meanwhile Bogese had also been told that he was to go to RabauI, where 
the chief medical officer of the Japanese wished to ask him about tropical 
diseases. Before leaving he was taken with two barge loads of Japanese, about 
fifty soldiers, to Kolare on Isabel to visit his wife and children, whom he had 
not seen since 27 February, when he was sent to Savo.ll 
From that point events took a more dramatic turn, although the truth 
about Bogese's activities becomes more difficult to ascertain. On the 
afternoon of 17 May, with Bogese and his wife and family aboard, the 
Japanese set off in search of Kennedy's vessel, the Wai-a~ which was hidden 
with camouflage not far away at Sigana. According to Bogese he had not told 
the Japanese where the vessel was. Rather he claimed it had already been 
spotted by a Japanese aircraft. Nor, he said, had he told them where Kennedy 
was hiding. According to a Kolare man namedlasper Rutu, however, Bogese 
had asked him where the Wai-ai was hidden; and Rutu, for fear of the 
Japanese, had told him. Rutu also said that Bogese had instructed him to lead 
the Japanese to Kennedy's base at Mahaga, in an attack planned for 4 PM on 
17 May; and had further advised him that a vessel, the Joan, hidden in the 
mangroves by a departed trader, should be found and handed over to the 
Japanese. According to another witness, Joseph Supa, Bogese's wife's cousin, 
who went with them on the barge and who had helped hide the Wai-a~ "from 
the time we left Kolare, Bogese stood with the Japanese on the stern, at the 
place where they steered." Bogese's father-in-law, Maaki Hathavu, 
meanwhile, on his own initiative had sent a message to Kennedy, warning him 
of the intended attack. The unfortunate Bennett, however, received no such 
warning.12 According to him he was on the Wai-ai when he saw the barges 
approaching, "and I saw George Bogese talking to the Japanese and pointing 
to the Wai-ai." Then, to prevent the ship falling into Japanese hands, Bennett 
ordered his crew to pour petrol about, but the Japanese saved him the bother 
of igniting it: "After Bogese pointed out the Wai-a~ somebody on board the 
Barge shouted, but receiving no reply from the Wai-a~ the Barge immediately 
opened fire, the second shot hitting a store of benzine aboard and setting fire 
to the Wai-ai. I dived overboard when the vessel caught fire and managed to 
swim ashore, but was badly burned."l3 
In the light of these testimonies it is clear that Bogese was working closely 
with the Japanese on 17 May. In his defense, however, Bogese denied that he 
had been a willing participant and, while not denying the facts reported by 
prosecution witnesses, offered explanations calculated to minimize his 
responsibility. Thus, regarding the proposed attack on Kennedy'S post, 
Bogese claimed that it was only after the Japanese told him they had already 
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detected it by radio direction finding and threatened to shoot him if he did 
not help them locate it that he told Rutu to lead them to Mahaga. Besides, he 
said, he did not think Kennedy was there at the time. As for the attack on the 
Wai-a~ he said that 
an aircraft had already spotted the vessel. ... The Japs told me that they had 
found a ship. I said I knew nothing of any Ship. The Japs then said I should 
ask somebody to say exactly where the ship was, that the aeroplane had 
spotted one. I asked Rutu. I admit this. I asked Rutu and Rutu said at 
Sigana .... [On the way there] I was sitting on the stem of the ship. Supa 
and Gee were forward. As soon as we arrived at Sigana, I pointed out and we 
came to the harbour. We could not find the ship. I asked Supa where the 
ship was, and he said it was somewhere here. Then we heard a bang, saw the 
ship burning and the crew diving overboard. 
With that the Japanese turned for Tulagi. The attack on Mahaga had 
been called off shortly before they left Kolare, in response to a message that 
there was a ship waiting at Tulagi to take Bogese and Kuini Gee to Rabaul. 
The pair left in it on 18 May, arrived in Rabaul two days later, and for the 
next two months worked in the native hospital there. In that time Bogese had 
one brief discussion with Japanese doctors, about tropical diseases. 
Then on 1 August, after repeated requests, he and Kuini were returned to 
Tulagi. He was immediately given leave briefly to visit his family at Voloa on 
Nggela where they were staying. Although tempted to stay there with them he 
did not dare, he said, for fear "of Mr. Kennedy, from the Japanese having 
captured me at Savo and the burning of the ship Wai-ai. And the fear of the 
Japanese coming round and looking for me!" On 5 August, therefore, 
accompanied by his wife and children, he returned to Tulagi. He was there 
when the Americans invaded two days later. Although he told them what he 
knew about the Japanese forces on the island, he was shortly afterward sent 
to Australia for internment at the insistence of British officials. There he and 
his family remained, at Taturu in Victoria, until October 1945, when he was 
returned to the Solomons to face charges of having collaborated with the 
enemy. 14 
It was a sad prospect for a man who, in his educational attainments, in his 
high competence in the English language, and through widespread recog-
nition of his professional abilities, was one of the outstanding Solomon 
Islanders of his generation--and probably the best known. He was forty-one 
years old at the time. He had known and enjoyed success. But he had also felt 
the hurt of rejection, commonly experienced by educated Islanders in colonial 
society, and that well before the events in which, as he put it "1 lost my 
profession and my reputation ... and everything that was important to me."IS 
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Although concern for his personal survival prompted the actions for which 
Bogese was to be tried, his behavior between May and August 1942--and his 
sense of injustice at what it cost him--cannot properly be understood in 
isolation from his prewar history. 
George Bogese was born at Vulavu in Isabel in 1904, the son of Margaret 
Semo and Philip U'U, and was baptized into the Church of England by the 
missionary doctor Henry Welchman. He attended a village school until the 
age of ten, then went to the Melanesian Mission School at Norfolk Island 
from 1914 to 1917. After that he returned to Isabel where he became a 
teacher. In 1922 he joined the government service. He worked first as a clerk, 
one of the first 'solomon Islanders to do so, for five years. Then in 1928, on 
the recommendation of J. C. Barley, district officer at Giza, he became the 
first Soiomon Islander to be sent to study medicine at the Central Medical 
School in Fiji. 
He completed the course in 1930, winning the Barker Gold Medal for 
attainment, and returned to the Solomons in 1931 as a native medical 
practitioner.16 In this capacity--visiting villages, inspecting laborers on 
plantations, holding clinics at government stations--"Dr George," as he was 
called, traveled widely throughout the Solomons, becoming well known to 
brown and white residents alike. Well known, but not always well liked, and 
persistently suspected of misbehavior. 
Bogese's professional competence seems never to have been questioned. 
In 1934 his district officer said he was "keen and efficient, and takes a 
thorough interest in his work," an opinion endorsed by the senior medical 
officerP But objections against his character, especially rumors reported by 
missionaries of sexual misconduct with his female patients, flourished. They 
were not totally unfounded, although they were taken more seriously by the 
authorities than they would have been if he were a white man. Thus in 1934 
he was found guilty on a charge of adultery and fined £4. On more serious 
charges, however, he was acquitted. In 1936, on Malaita, a preliminary 
investigation cleared him of a charge of rape, but did commit him for trial on 
a charge of incest with his daughter by Anna Kovaga, the first of his three 
wives. On that charge, too, he was acquitted (but only after the girl had been 
medically examined), as he also was acquitted on a lesser charge of indecent 
assault against the same girl.l8 It was a decision that must surely have brought 
acute relief to a man who already had another daughter by his second wife, a 
Fijian named Anna Seini, and who was to have ten children by his third and 
current wife, Susanna Riko, daughter of Maaki Hathevu of Kolare.19 
Regardless of alleged sexual delinquencies, Bogese was guilty of another 
"failing" which was even more reprehensible in colonial society. He did not 
regard himself as being inferior to Europeans. One official wrote that "Owing 
64 
George Bogese 
to his unfortunate manner he is not liked by the white residents of the 
District, with whom he is in frequent contact through their labour." Another 
identified the "fault" succinctly, "he is very self-confident.''20 Evidence of this, 
although as a trait rather than a fault, was given in 1939 when Bogese 
complained to his superiors about what he saw as "the unfair treatment 
accorded to us, whether native officers or ordinary natives, by some European 
Officers on many matters," and had the temerity to ask "is this treatment due 
to the rules [being] set aside for the natives ... or due to carelessness?''21 
Many other Solomon Islanders were, in fact, concerned about the matter yet 
few of the European residents would have disagreed with Kennedy's opinion 
about the kind of person who would openly ask such a question, or how he 
ought to be treated: 
Bogese is a person of a type well known to all who have had to deal with the 
educated native at loose, without adequate social control, in a primitive 
community. The type is characterised by limitless presumption combined 
with that kind of humility which has been aptly described as arrogant. In the 
course of some 24 years service in the Pacific Islands I have had more than a 
little experience of this sort of native. I strongly deprecate any suspicion of 
harshness or impatient treatment of unsophisticated natives in any 
environment, and have found that the less one raises one's voice the more 
co-operation one receives from them. But I have found, to the contrary, that 
abruptness and direct speech is the only method of achieving satisfactory 
official relations with those of the Bogese type.22 
Given the clarity of Kennedy's views and the vigor with which he 
customarily acted, it is hardly surprising that in late 1941, amid the stress of 
encroaching war, when Bogese and Kennedy were both appointed to Isabel, 
the two should fall out badly. Unfortunately for the historian, their mutual 
hostility means that neither is to be fully relied on as a witness concerning the 
other. The trouble began in January over food stocks, when, contrary to 
Kennedy's orders, Bogese gave rice from government stores to patients at the 
local hospital. He said he did so because they needed it; Kennedy maintained 
that the patients were young women who were not ill but whom Bogese was 
merely encouraging to stay at the hospital. Another dispute occurred later 
that month, after Bogese supervised the carrying of supplies from the 
government post at Tataba inland to Mahaga. Kennedy accused him of 
stealing some of the supplies; Bogese claimed that far from stealing, he had 
given some of his own food to the carriers, and that Kennedy had rebuked 
him for this, saying "You think you are a big chief, to share the food. You are 
only trying to show off." Whatever the truth of these matters, one thing at 
least is clear. Kennedy distrusted Bogese. Moreover, he cites alleged 
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difficulties in recruiting carriers for the shift from Tataba to Mahaga as 
leading him to suspect that Bogese was influencing the people of southern 
Isabel not to cooperate with the government. 
To test this theory Kennedy sent Bogese on a tour of the island in 
February to do medical work and to advise the people to avoid the Japanese 
when they came, and then sent a patrol after him to check on the instructions 
he was issuing. Predictably Bogese claims to have done as he was told, but 
Kennedy remained unconvinced of his loyalty. After three weeks he recalled 
Bogese from his tour and, without offering any explanation, took him to Savo. 
There he left him in the charge of the headman Johnson Soro, with orders 
not to leave the island and with the warning "be very careful, or you will be 
shot, or whipped, the same as the others." It was the last time the two met.23 
Kennedy went on to become a hero, while just over two months later Bogese 
was in Japanese hands. By September 1942, through another sudden change 
of fate, if not of fortune, he was interned in Australia with his wife and three 
children. 
It was not a fate he accepted easily. Over the next three years Bogese 
wrote a number of letters--consistently fluent, logically resourceful, and 
occasionally disingenuous--urging his innocence. He blamed Kennedy for his 
woes, stating that his appointment to Savo was due to "persecution and ill 
treatment" of him by Kennedy "for purely personal reasons," and arguing that 
had he not been sent there he would not have fallen in with the Japanese, and 
so could not have been forced to cooperate with them. He also compared his 
case with that of others and pleaded unfair treatment: there had been rumors 
about him, but there had also been rumors--and even complaints--about 
Kennedy in regard to brutality and improper dealings with women, and 
Kennedy had never been punished. Then there was the case of the Catholic 
missionaries of Visale: Father Scanlon had introduced himself to the 
Japanese, and Father Aloysius Brugmans had accompanied a Japanese patrol 
to Lungga for two days in July, yet they had not been treated as collaborators. 
And, he asked with plaintive rhetoric, though not unreasonably, how could 
he, "a poor defenseless native," be expected not to cooperate.24 As he put it 
to John Curtin, the Australian prime minister: 
It is well known all over the world how the Japanese committed atrocities in 
the Solomons, New Guinea, the Philippines, or Netherlands East Indies. 
Civilians were murdered in masses, captured soldier, both European or 
natives were ill treated, murdered or forced to do this and that, air pilots 
were executed as in the case of nine pilots at Rabaul. Filipino citizens were 
burned to death for disobeying them, etc. etc. How could I, being a 
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defenseless native, resist such a horde of Japanese who proclaimed martial 
law and death sentences in the Solomons?2S 
Unbeknown to Bogese, he was not alone in pleading his case. In October 
1945 the Anglican bishop, although admitting to a personal dislike of Bogese, 
wrote to the resident commissioner expounding excuses for his actions and 
asking that no charges be laid against him: 
Bogese is a Solomon Islander who perhaps prematurely was "educated 
above his station." ... But it is unreasonable to think that Bogese may well 
have thought that through a Japanese regime here, the Solomon Islander 
might get a better crack of the whip. After all there has been a British 
Administration in these islands for 50 years now ... are you proud, or even 
satisfied with what has been done for the peoples here by the British Raj? 
Your two predecessors have told me that the great contribution of the 
British ... has been ... "security of tenure" and ... the "Pax Britannica." 
Neither of these has been very apparent since December 1941. Is it treason 
for a native of these islands to think that the progress of his people is bound 
up with an Asiatic race rather than with the British regime of which after all, 
he is only a "protected" subject. 
I have no doubt that Bogese will plead that he acted "under constraint." 
If he so pleaded and I were an Assessor on the Bench ... he would get my 
vote for "acquittal." There were absolutely blood-curdling stories going the 
rounds in the Solomons in the first half of '42 as to what the Japanese had 
done on Bougainville to extract information. If Bogese had heard these 
stories ... I am not surprised ifhe gave such information as was aSked.26 
The administration, however, was unmoved. There was wide public 
interest in the affair, not least because of the crucial role played by the 
coastwatchers in the Solomons campaign and because of their dependence on 
the "cooperation of the natives" in operating behind enemy lines. Possibly to 
have threatened their security was, therefore, seen as a particularly serious 
matter, and one that required nothing less than a formal court hearingP 
Accordingly, after a preliminary enquiry, five charges were laid against 
Bogese; to wit, that he did "with intent to assist the enemy:" 
1 try to induce Rutu to lead the Japanese to the coastwatch base at Mahaga; 
2 induce Nicholas Gee to go with the Japanese to Rabaul; 
3 induce Rutu to tell him the whereabouts of the Wai-ai; 
4 assist the Japanese to locate the Wai-ai,~ and 
5 "voluntarily join himself with the enemy Japanese" between 1 May and 8 
August 1942.28 
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Unfortunately for Bogese the bishop was not on the bench when the case 
was heard. In May 1946 he appeared before the Chief Justice of Fiji, Sir 
Claude Seton, sitting in Honiara as a judicial commissioner, with two former 
planters as assessors, J. M. Clift and H. A Mar~am. On the first four 
charges, which related to specific acts and which called for factually precise 
evidence to prove that he had freely and materially assisted the Japanese, he 
was acquitted. But on the fifth, which was a more general charge and one 
where the prosecution was relying on its own perception and not on the 
testimony of indigenous witnesses who had been intimately involved in the 
events, it was a different matter. It was held against Bogese that "after he 
returned from Rabaul, he brought his wife and family in from a country place 
and they lived with him in Tulagi in apparently close association with the 
Japanese." On this charge he was found guilty and sentenced to four years 
imprisonment, of which he served three. Released from Rove Prison in 1949 
he returned to the obscurity of village life.29 Not for him would there be an 
obituary in the BSIP Newssheet. 
Bogese paid dearly for his association with the Japanese. He lost his job 
and spent seven years in custody. Moreover, the colonial administration, 
unforgiving and ever distrustful--as its records abundantly show--would never 
risk allowing him an opportunity to regain a position of any standing or 
influence in the Solomon Islands, or to live down the reputation of traitor 
that he had acquired, if not earned. He had not been represented by a lawyer 
at his trial, he was refused leave to appeal against his sentence, and from 
prison he was prevented from contributing to a political discussion then 
flourishing among his compatriots.30 In December 1946 he wrote an open 
letter to the people of southern Isabel, urging them to cooperate with the 
government if they wished to prosper and not to join the Maasina Rule 
nationalist movement. That in his exhortation he also touched on Solomon 
Islanders' entitlement to the "Freedoms" listed in the Atlantic Charter of 1940 
and to the conditions of life prescribed by the UN Charter was unlikely to 
make the letter any more acceptable in the eyes of authorities who were 
already prejudiced against its author, because such claims were also being 
made by Maasina Rule.31 If anything, the letter was likely to strengthen rather 
than dilute the distrust they had for him. Contemplating Bogese's eventual 
release from prison, one official even saw risks in encouraging him "to do a 
certain amount of anthropological work. ... Bogese as an Assistant Medical 
Practitioner was always apt to use his position to his own advantage, and 
might magnify his association with the University [of Sydney] to suit his own 
ends in some way."32 
In a similar vein, following his release, the high commissioner ordered 
that "[Bogese] should not be given any form of public employment,"33 while in 
68 
George Bogese 
June 1951 the resident commissioner, after meeting Bogese briefly and for 
the first time during a visit to Isabel, denounced him as "one of the nastiest 
bits of native composition I have met."34 Presumably this was still his belief 
the following month when H. E. Maude, a former colonial official then living. 
in Sydney, informed him that two Australian professors, A P. Elkin of Sydney 
and S. F. Nadel of Canberra, were planning to bring Bogese ("who gave us so 
many headaches during the war") to Australia to assist them with their 
anthropological research.3s The resident commissioner declared himself to be 
"very apprehensive about the idea" and needed no persuading to accept a . 
recommendation that "Under no circumstances [should] Bogese be allowed to 
go to Australia for a year. He is a potential nuisance of the first order, and 
after a year in Australia he could wreck Ysabel in no time."36 Instead Bogese 
spent 1952 working in the less corrupting atmosphere of Lever's plantation at 
Yandina.37 He then returned to Isabel where, without profit to himself or 
danger to the government, he found some diversion in completing a Bugotu-
English dictionary.38 He died on Isabel. after a brief illness, on 18 June 1959, 
unlamented and unnoticed beyond his own district.39 
Both as the first Solomon Islands native medical practitioner, and as a 
reputed traitor, George Bogese has a firm claim to a place in Solomon Islands 
history. But he also has other grounds for that claim. He was the first 
Solomon Islander to have his writings published in a recognized academic 
journal. Already in 1940 he had published a brief article, "Notes on the Santa 
Cruz Group," in The Native Medical Practitioner, a journal published in Fiji, 
but during his internment he completed another and more ambitious project. 
This was an account of the traditional culture of Bugotu.40 In May 1945 
Bogese wrote to A P. Elkin, professor of anthropology at Sydney University 
and editor of the journal Oceania, introducing himself and describing the 
project. He had probably become aware of Elkin through the latter's 
involvement with the Society for the Protection of Native Races. In July he 
was to write to him again, enclosing a long affidavit about the events of 1942 
and requesting the society's help in obtaining "an official enquiry into the 
unfair treatment I received from Mr D. G. Kennedy, and my subsequent 
deportation and internment. "41 
Despite his reputation in official circles for self-seeking, there is, 
however, no reason to suspect Bogese of any duplicity in contacting Elkin. 
His first letter, and it was followed by seven others before his request for 
assistance, was one such as any editor of an anthropological journal would 
welcome, and does not suggest that he was seeking to ingratiate himself for 
personal advantage: 
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I am a native of the Solomon Islands and a Native Medical Practitioner by 
profession. I understand that you have some interest in natives' welfare and 
all that I wish to inform you [is] that at present I am writing, in very simple 
English, Anthropological work about my own District, BUGOTU, Santa 
Isabel, S.I. The subjects dealt with are: short history, clan totemism, 
sacrifices in altar, fables, tales, dances and songs, feasts and marriages, 
diseases and treatment of herbs and their methods, fishing house and canoe 
building, children's play and a tale of Mogo tribe (now extinct), Bugotu 
vocabulary in EngUsh, etc. If you think that this will be any use in your dept., 
please kindly inform me. After the war you may publish it if possible.42 
The work was eventually published in two parts in Oceania in 1948. With 
its appearance Bogese, the "educated native" rejected by the colonial regime 
for his lack of docility toward his "masters," and punished for being reluctant 
to risk his life for them, at last earned himself a measure of notability 
unsullied by scandal. At the same time he provided a legacy of knowledge for 
his people and set a precedent that other Solomon Islanders could honorably 
follow. And as time has passed and more information on the war has come to 
light even his unfortunate involvement with the Japanese can be seen in a 
more honorable light. At a conference in Honiara in 1987 numerous Solomon 
Islands war veterans publicly expressed misgivings at the readiness with which 
they had given their youthful loyalty to the Allies, and admitted to some 
bitterness at how little it had benefited them. Could he have been there 
Bogese would surely have smiled knowingly. He too had learned not to expect 
generosity from colonial rule, but well before they had. The most ironic and 
surprising revelation of the conference, however, came from Bill Bennett who 
admitted that while serving with Donald Kennedy he, like Bogese, had come 
to hate him. So much so that during a skirmish with the Japanese in 
September 1943 he had taken advantage of the confusion to try to kill 
Kennedy although only succeeded in wounding him. Yet Bennett finished the 
war a hero.43 
Such admissions indicate the complexity and subjectivity of the notion of 
loyalty, and of how it is to be assessed. Loyalty to whom? To what? Why? At 
. what cost? They also contribute to the rehabilitation of Bogese's reputation. 
He was no hero but he was more than "just a bloody traitor." Indeed, without 
stretching ingenuity too far it may be suggested that latter day Solomon 
Islanders might usefully find in Bogese a source of national pride. He was 
intelligent, self-assured, and pragmatic. And it was for displaying such 
qualities that he, more than other Solomon Islanders, attracted an 
opprobrium that reflected above all else the unwholesome fears, insecurities, 
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and pretensions inherent in the colonial regime--as in all colonial regimes--
from which the Solomon Islands became independent in 1978. 
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Micronesian Experiences of the War in the Pacific 
Lin Poyer 
Since the initial encounters of Micronesians and Europeans in the sixteenth 
century Micronesia has undergone colonial rule by four world powers: Spain 
(mid-1500s to 1899), Germany (1899-1914), Japan (1914-1944), and the 
United States (1944 to the current termination of United Nations trustee-
ship). The first three changes of control between colonial rulers were 
accomplished with little impact on Islanders. When the United States wrested 
control of the area from Japan, however, it was by some of the most 
destructive and bloodiest fighting of World War II. 
World War II was global warfare and Micronesians were caught in the 
middle of the Japanese and Allied contest for the central Pacific. Under 
Japanese military control Micronesians were subjected to harsh discipline, 
forced labor, relocation, and the confiscation of farm products. Some men 
were drafted into the military and took part in the fighting. Other men, 
women, and children worked on military construction and picked up the load 
of extra labor to provide food, clothing, and shelter for themselves and the 
Japanese soldiers and civilians living with them. Micronesians also suffered 
the danger and destruction of Allied military attack, and the material 
shortages and psychological pressures of the war years. 
As Allied forces achieved victory in the Pacific, wartime hardships were 
dramatically replaced by a massive influx of American goods and personnel, 
and Micronesians came under United States administration, which espoused 
democratic ideals and tolerance of native tradition, but had its own agenda for 
the islands' future. The brief, intense period of change during and after the 
war years provided Islanders with novel experiences and understandings of 
themselves and their relationships with foreigners. The results of the impact 
continue to shape Micronesian society. 
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Background 
In order to understand the impact of the war on Micronesia we must begin by 
outlining recent Micronesian history. Spanish colonial control had little direct 
impact on the islands (except for the Marianas); but during the nineteenth 
century traditional life was transformed by contact with European traders and 
missionaries. Most Micronesians became Christians, and mission schools 
operated on the larger islands. Cash was scarce, but people sold copra, crafts, 
and labor to buy cloth, iron tools, and a few other European goods. Still, 
when Germany purchased control of the islands from Spain in 1899 the 
lifestyle of mosl Micronesians centered on fIshing, cultivating taro, breadfruit, 
and other crops, and raising domestic animals. During the German era (1899-
1914) the government encouraged the development of trade and reorganized 
land tenure on·the European model. Health care, child education, and local 
government were for the most part handled by local people themselves, 
although the Germans enforced a legal code. But neither Spain nor Germany 
was a PacifIc power, and these governments were not iQterested in extensive 
change or development of the islands (again, excepting the Spanish in the 
Marianas). 
When Japan allied itself with Britain inWprld War I, the Japanese navy 
moved to take the islands from Germany in 1914. Micronesia was officially 
sanctioned as a League of Natioqs mandate under Japan in 1921. Unlike the 
German and Spanish governments Japan was vitally interested in its PacifIc 
empire; as a result the era of Japanese control saw enormous changes in 
Micronesian life. Japan's interest in the islands was primarily economic and, 
as time went by, strategic. It added the mandated islands to its "inner empire" 
(which included Taiwan, Korea, the Liaotong Peninsula, and the southern 
part of Sakhalin Island). Japan governed its colonial possessions closely, using 
tight bureaucratic control, an effIcient police force, and manipulation of local 
cultural instit'i1tions (such as traditional leaders) to manage the local 
populations (reattie 1988). And there was always strong military support, if 
the colonial administrators need~d it. 
The Japanese government eXpended enormous attention, energy, money, 
and personnel on their island empire, even before the war years (Yanaihara 
1940). The fIrst decades of Japanese control saw the establishment of public 
schools, health services, public works, and an elaborate administrative 
bureaucracy. In the mid-1930s, however, Japanese national interests began to 
supersede concern with the welfare of Islanders as the empire began to 
expand by military action. 
The nature of Japanese impact on Micronesia varied geographically. 
Major factors in social change were immigration by Japanese settlers, 
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economic development, and government control over local life. All of these 
increased throughout the period of Japanese colonial control. The greatest 
changes, significantly transforming local conditions, occurred in the Western 
Pacific, especially on Saipan and the Marianas, the largest islands, where tens 
of thousands of Japanese immigrants came to work on sugar plantations 
owned and run by Japanese. Palau also was much changed by Japan's 
influence. In the Caroline Islands, the high islands saw immigration, industrial 
development, urbanization, and extensive government control. Life on 
smaller atolls in the Caroline and Marshall islands was transformed least by 
the Japanese colonial presence, though even the smallest had a police 
detachment and a school, and were visited by Japanese traders, medical 
personnel, census-takers, and other administrators. 
Japanese traders had operated on a small scale throughout Micronesia 
even during the latter part of the German era. After Japanese takeover both 
trade and industry developed quickly. By 1920 the Japanese South Seas 
Trading Company had a monopoly of the ocean trade, and the South Seas 
Development Company was organizing sugar, marine products, copra 
production, and phosphate extraction throughout the islands. The expansion 
of industry, especially sugar production, increased immigration from Japan to 
the islands--first to Saipan and the Marianas, then to Palau, and eastward 
through Chuuk and the Central Carolines, to Pohnpei. By the mid-1930s 
Islanders were outnumbered by Japanese everywhere except in the Eastern 
Carolines and the Marshall Islands--in 1940, on the eve of the war, 81,000 
Japanese lived in the mandated islands compared with about 50,000 
Micronesians. 
The large-scale immigration of Japanese into the islands coincided with a 
change in Japan's colonial policy. Until the mid-1920s Japan managed its 
colonies based on simple segregation of local people and Japanese. 
Education, for example, consisted of a lower track for colonial people 
(Taiwanese, Koreans, or Micronesians), and a higher track for Japanese. But 
as the Japanese home government increasingly came to be influenced by 
military interests, colonial policy changed. By the late 1920s a theory of 
"Japanization" was introduced, which aimed to spread Japanese language and 
customs to local people, encouraging loyalty to Japan. Despite this policy of 
"assimilation," colonial administrators did not allow local people to expect 
equal rights with Japanese, or opportunities for self-government or Japanese 
citizenship. Promotion of "assimilation" was really a form of social control. By 
the 1930s--as waves of Japanese settlers were pouring into Micronesia--the 
colonial policy of assimilation was intensified in order to strengthen the 
empire. The policy increased in strength from then until the end of the war: 
civil and military administration were constantly emphasizing to Islanders 
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(and other Japanese colonial peoples) that they should be loyal Japanese 
citizens, that they had obligation to the Emperor, and that they should 
sacrifice and bear the burden. of the needs of Japan. 
The result of this thirty-year-Iong educational effort in Micronesia was to 
build up a store of loyalty toward Japanese. Islanders were aware of the 
benefits Japan introduced--including opportunities for wage labor, trade, and 
travel (including travel to Japan), sanitation and health facilities, widespread 
education, and so on. At the same time Islanders recognized the unequal 
treatment they received from Japanese; the colonial educational and police 
system made ~t 'clear that Islanders did not have full legal, political, or 
economic equality with Japanese. For example, Japanese men on Pohnpei 
could many iSland women, but not vice versa./Tbe colonial bureaucracy was 
strict in its administration of law and control of local life. Gradually, as the 
war increased pressure on the Japanese military government, the military's 
harshness toward Micronesians reduced Micronesian goodwill and caused 
~ost Islanders to welcome the American invasion. 
When the war in the Pacific began, the Japanese government in 
Micronesia was prepared psychologically and materially to support the 
advance of Japanese armies in Asia and to defend the empire if necessary. 
Historians disagree about how extensively the islands were fortified before 
war was declared. Mark Peattie, reviewing the question recently, argues that 
there is no good evidence that Japan was preparing for an island war far in 
advance (1988; 247-251). Instead, he says military construction of harbors, 
airstrips, and oil storage facilities began in Micronesia two years before Pearl 
Harbor, and the Fourth Fleet headquartered at Chuuk was only established 
late in 1939. The construction of military bases was not yet completed at the 
time of the first victorious Allied invasion in 1944. But Micronesians were 
affected by the international tension well before the first shots were fired. 
They lost land, jobs, and a sense of being in control of their islands as ever 
greater numbers of Japanese immigrants moved to Saipan, the Marianas, and 
Palau. The m~litary took an increasing interest in colonial administration. 
German and American Christian missionaries were replaced with Japanese 
counterparts. Young men worked in prewar construction projects, and 
everyone was subject to propaganda, economic pressure to help the empire, 
and the shutdown of contact with the rest of the world. 
On the eve of the war, then, we see the Japanese actively preparing for 
conflict and demanding additional efforts and loyalty from Micronesians. On 
their part, Islal;lders were ambivalent: they acknowledged the power and 
authority of the Japanese and recognized the improvements and 
opportunities of Japanese rule; but they also saw that they were losing control 
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of their own lands to Japanese immigrants, and they increasingly resented the 
harsh discipline and demands of the military presence on the islands. 
Prewar history is critical in comparing Micronesian and Melanesian 
wartime experiences. Of course, the two areas are geographically different, 
with peoples quite distinct in culture and political organization. Colonial 
histories also differ, though both populations were largely Christian, and were 
involved in trade, wage labor, and exposure to foreign ideas in the years 
before the war. Most notably, though, Micronesia was an integral part of the 
Japanese empire, and for thirty years Micronesians had been governed, 
educated, propagandized, and given orders by Japanese. This colonial 
experience was both positive and negative for Micronesians. Both feelings 
were expressed during the war. 
The War 
For most Micronesians the war began with small-scale, local increases in the 
military presence. Transportation and supply facilities were upgraded; 
construction of military bases began; the Japanese navy joined small trading 
ships on the ocean horizons; and Japanese soldiers were billeted on nearly 
every island. Aside from a few American attacks on the Marshall Islands in 
early 1942, Micronesia did not experience warfare directly during the first 
years of the war--until the American invasion came with a vengeance at the 
beginning of 1944. 
From Pearl Harbor in 1941 until 1944 Micronesia played the role of the 
rest of the "inner empire" surrounding Japan itself: as a support system for the 
fighting in Asia and in the Southwest Pacific. Chuuk became increasingly 
important as a base to support the Japanese navy in the Solomon Islands 
battles, even though the Japanese Navy's great battleships spent much of the 
war sitting in Chuuk Lagoon, waiting for the "decisive encounter" with the US 
Pacific Fleet that never came. This waiting period was important in building 
the American myth of Chuuk as an impregnable fortress, and the idea that 
Micronesia was fortified to the hilt and would be extremely difficult to attack. 
Many books have been written about Japanese and Allied strategy in the 
Pacific War. To state Micronesia's place in high-level military plans briefly is 
not simple. From the Japanese viewpoint the empire was a series of 
concentric circles, with the home islands of Japan at its center. As the war 
progressed, and the Japanese military shifted from an offensive to a defensive 
posture, high command continually redrew a "defensive perimeter" that all 
loyal subjects were commanded to defend. This perimeter was repeatedly 
narrowed, as Allied forces penetrated closer to the home islands from the 
east and the south. The Japanese military followed a deliberate policy of 
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"letting go" of outer perimeters as it became unfeasible to supply and support 
them. Japan h()arded its strength for the anticipated final defensive battles; 
the fighting became more intense as it drew nearer to Japan itself. 
On the Allied side, strategy was aimed at reaching Japan as swiftly as 
possible. By the spring of 1943 Allied resources were sufficient to open a 
fighting front in the Central Pacific, while continuing the Southwest Pacific 
offensive. A compromise between army and navy, and among the Allies, 
provided a plan to open a second "road to Tokyo" by a westward sweep 
through Micronesia~ eventually to link up with Allied forces moving north 
through the Solomons and New Guinea for the final assault on the 
Philippines a~d, if need be, on Japan itself. Itremained unclear for several 
months which Micronesian islands would be attacked, and in what order. 
Allied high command had little information about the extent and distribution 
of Japanese strength in the area, and little experience, at first, with 
amphibious warfare (Morison 1947-1962). 
By late 1943 the Japanese navy was short of supplies. Their losses in the 
defense of the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago meant that they 
could not effectively counter any large-scale central Pacific attack. The 
commander ofthe Japanese Fourth Fleet drew a new defensive perimeter, 
leaving the Gilberts and Marshalls outside of it. They would not be seriously 
defended, though troops already there were expected to fight to their deaths. 
Meanwhile Allied naval strategists were choosing their first point of attack on 
the new Pacific front. The Japanese fleet was based at Chuuk, which seemed 
well protected by its screen of islands; therefore, the Americans decided to 
attack the Marshall Islands first. To do that they needed an air base within 
bombing distance. The Gilbert Islands (now part of Kiribati) were chosen as 
their first Micronesian target. 
Chronology 
The first Allied landings in Micronesia took place in the Gilberts in 
November 1943, with a massively destructive bombardment and land invasion 
of Tarawa. The fighting war had come to Micronesia, and from this day on it 
increased in intensity without pause. After Tarawa, air and surface 
bombardment of the Marshall Islands began, and continued for two months. 
Kwajalein was invaded on 31 January .1944; the attack on critical Enewetak 
was planned for February. In support of these attacks Pohnpei, Kosrae, 
Wake, and other Marshall Islands were repeatedly shelled and bombed. 
In February 1944 the major American strike on Chuuk destroyed 200,000 
tons of Japanese shipping. But Admiral Koga had ordered his major warships 
out of Chuuk two weeks before, pulling them back to Palau, assuming that 
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eastern Micronesia was lost and intending to hold a new line of defense 
between the Marianas and the western Carolines. The attack on Chuuk blew 
up one of the Allies great myths of Japanese power in Micronesia; the 
Enewetak invasion on the same day cleared the way for the US takeover of 
the Marshalls. 
At that point the Allies decided to "bypass" Pohnpei and Chuuk--that is, 
to hit them by air and sea attack and "neutralize" them as military bases, but 
not to make a land invasion. See chapters 8 and 11 for what this meant to 
people on the islands that were "bypassed" or "neutralized." It did not mean 
they were out of the war. It did mean that they were cut off from supplies and 
. support from the remaining parts of the empire. Except for a few submarines, 
which could carry very little, the "bypassed" islands had no access to outside 
supplies; they were effectively incapable of either offensive or defensive 
.. military action; they were subject to air and surface bombardment; and, as the 
months went by, the people--J apanese and Micronesian--were increasingly 
concerned simply with staying alive. The military on some islands, it seems, 
simply abandoned Japanese and Micronesian civilians, leading to a general 
scramble to avoid starvation. 
By the end of February 1944 the United States had taken control of 
800,000 square miles of ocean, and forced the effective Japanese resistance 
back to the extreme western Pacific. Former Japanese bases in the Gilberts 
and Marshalls were turned into American bases; Japanese were killed or 
taken prisoner; Islanders were experiencing their first lengthy encounters 
with Americans (discussed elsewhere in this volume). The US Navy, prepared 
with civil affairs officers and plans for handling conquered populations, began 
to organize the next phase of Micronesia's history: the American era (Richard 
1957). 
Although the central Micronesian islands were not invaded by Americans 
after the conquest of the Marshalls, they were still in the war. Chuuk, 
Satawal, Pohnpei, and other islands were repeatedly attacked, and Japanese 
repeatedly tried to use them as air and submarine bases. Island men were 
conscripted as labor for the Japanese, sometimes working while bombs were 
falling. Men and women worked overtime to produce badly needed food ~nd 
tried to maintain community life under wartime stress. While these central 
Caroline Islands were "bypassed," the bulk of American military might in the 
central Pacific was converging on the Marianas, where Saipan had become 
the chief Japanese headquarters for the central Pacific. The desperate 
fighting on Saipan and the Marianas is well known to military history; it began 
on 15 June 1945 with the first attack on Saipan; the battle for Saipan lasted 
twenty-four days. Guam was invaded on 21 July; Tinian on 24 July. Fighting 
on nil these islands was long and bloody, with great devastation and death for 
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people on all sides. Islanders were vastly outnumbered on most of these 
islands, which had larger civilian Japanese populations. The final days of the 
war in the western Pacific were marked by horror for civilians, culminating in 
the mass suicides of Japanese civilians on Saipan. But the Allied conquest of 
the Marianas meant that American planes could now reach the Japanese 
mainland with their bombs, and the end of the war was in sight. 
The end of the war in the Micronesian islands came on 30 August 1945 
when Japan's South Sea Island forces made their official surrender in Chuuk. 
During the next months Japanese were repatriated, leaving Islanders with 
their new administrators, the American navy. The war in the Pacific was over. 
But for Micronesians the meaning and the memory of the war would never 
end. 
The Impacts of the War 
Although American, European, and Japanese historians have produced 
voluminous documentation of Western and Asian experiences of the Pacific 
theater of World War II, they seldom include information about the effects of 
wartime operations on local people. Most Micronesian memories of the war 
are preserved in songs and stories, which are only now being collected to give 
us detailed knowledge of daily life during the war, and the impact of Japanese 
colonial and military activity, large-scale conflict, and initial American 
occupation on Islanders. I can only outline some of the most significant and 
lasting impacts of the wartime era, and briefly compare Micronesian 
experiences with those of Melanesia. 
Wartime experiences varied considerably among the island groups of 
Micronesia. The Marshall Islands lay at the eastern periphery ofthe Japanese 
empire; they were the springboards for Japan's early attacks on the United 
States and were the site of the first American attacks on the Japanese. 
Marshall Islanders were also the first Micronesians to experience the new 
American colonial policies. Pohnpei, in the Eastern Carolines, held an 
important seaplane base and a large Japanese urban area. After Pohnpei was 
cut off from the Japanese empire by American forces, people there had to 
intensify local agricultural production, and they suffered shortages of 
imported manufactured goods such as cloth. On nearby Kosrae numerous 
Japanese and Islanders were relocated to a labor camp, where they had to 
remain when communication with the empire was cut off. The populations far 
exceeded Kosrae's agricultural capacity, so that starvation and sickness set in. 
Chuuk and Yap, which shared similar economic and social wartime stresses, 
were more prominent in Japanese military plans. Yap held a seaplane base; 
Chuuk Lagoon was a major naval base, home to the Japanese combined fleet 
86 
Micronesian Experiences of the War 
until the American conquest of the Marshall Islands. Japanese air and 
submarine attacks were launched from Chuuk and Yap as late as the US 
invasion of Saipan (June 1944). The central and eastern Caroline Islands 
were subject to American attack throughout this period. After the Japanese 
gave up the defense of the eastern islands, Palau, the Marianas, and Saipan 
were reinforced heavily with army and navy forces, making them the eye of 
the war hurricane: on these islands physical destruction and human suffering 
were most intense. 
Physically the war changed the face of all the islands. Japanese and 
Islanders had invested much effort and money in the construction of harbors, 
airports, cities, electricity-generating plants, and local industries--all were des-
troyed. Under the administration of the US Navy new systems of employment 
and trade had to be established. Medical care, education, and government 
services had to be built up again. 
Other aspects of life also changed as a result of the war. Women had a 
greater role in work and in leadership while men were away from home; they 
brought these wartime experiences back to their families and peacetime lives. 
Young men had traveled more widely than their fathers; they had met people 
from other parts of the Pacific; and they came home with new ideas and 
aspirations. The great material wealth displayed by both sides, especially by 
Americans, suggested to Islanders a new standard of economic and industrial 
potential. Unlike Melanesians, for whom encounters with American troops 
were a brief interlude, Micronesians were about to begin a lengthy relation-
ship with the United States. 
Comparisons with Melanesia 
Many of the impacts of the war affected Micronesians and Melanesians 
similarly. Both suffered the danger and destruction of bombardment from 
Allies (Micronesians were less subject to Japanese attack). Some Micronesian 
men, like Melanesians, served in combat, including volunteers who served in 
the Japanese Army far from home in Southeast Asia and New Guinea. Most 
adult men worked as conscripted labor for the Japanese, and some moved 
from island to island as they were ordered. Other men, women, and young 
people carried on at home, laboring overtime to produce food and other 
necessities not only for themselves, but also for Japanese. For all Pacific 
Islanders the major stresses of the war were danger, starvation, absence from 
or loss of family, social dislocation, and population movement. 
But though both Micronesia and Melanesia were key strategic areas in 
the Pacific War, people in the two regions experienced the war in very 
different ways. These differences are due to traditional cultural and social 
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distinctions, the degree of direct involvement with occupying forces, the 
nationality of occupying forces, and even differences between army and navy 
approaches to civilian populations. Micronesians had lived under Japanese 
rule for thirty years when the navy-led American invasion changed their world 
in a matter of months. Melanesians, who had been living under various 
European colonial governmnents, were caught in intense back-and-forth 
fighting between Japanese and Allied forces. After the war, control of many 
Micronesian islands was demanded and achieved by the US military for 
security reasons, with many islands placed under navy control. Melanesia, 
again divided among the colonial powers (who had economic, as well as 
strategic, uses for the region), experienced a diversity of postwar policy 
impacts. Micronesians saw the end of the war as a change to a new era; 
American administration changed almost every aspect of political and 
economic life. Melanesians found that the British, French, and Australians 
who returned to their colonies after the war wanted to return to "life as 
usual." These returning colonialists were met by Melanesians who had seen a 
wider world and developed new ideas, which they wanted to translate into 
new ways of life. Postwar political activity, then, was quite different in the two 
regions, although populations in both regions have achieved political 
independence. 
, Conclusion 
With the end of the war in the Pacific came the end of Japanese colonial 
administration in Micronesia. It was hard to predict what the future would 
hold. Americans had mixed feelings about their new island possessions. On 
the one hand they wanted firm control of military bases in Micronesia, and 
they wanted the loyalty of Micronesian people. On the other hand the United 
States believed in self-government and did not want to be seen as a colonial 
power. The administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands devel-
oped within this double set of American intentions. The modern outcome of 
the American military conquest of Micronesia, as we see today, is 
Micronesian independence, with a variety of special relationships with the 
United States. 
I have provided a very broad outline of the context of Micronesian 
experiences of the war years. Following chapters take up specifics of what life 
was like for people who lived through that time--people who have given us 
their memories, so that we too can learn about it. 
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Nauruans during World War II 
Nancy l Pollock 
Nauru was a small island of great interest to European powers during World 
War II. Phosphate had been mined there since 1906 by a consortium among 
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand to maintain agriculture in South Pacific 
colonies. But Japan was also eyeing it for its own agriculture. The central 
position of the island meant that it had strategic value for those nations as 
well as for the United States. With an airstrip the island provided a good base 
from which to make strikes against islands in the southwest Pacific. It thus 
became the center of an ongoing struggle that ultimately involved bombing 
and the relocation of two thirds of the Nauruan population. Following 
Japanese takeover of the island, 1200 Nauruans moved to Chuuk where more 
than 400 died. Of those who stayed on Nauru a significant number either died 
of medical complications or were beaten to death or executed for minor 
misdemeanors by the Japanese. And the Chinese on Nauru suffered even 
worse treatment than the Nauruans. 
In this paper I examine the main events of the war for Nauruans 
beginning with the Japanese takeover in December 1941 and continuing 
through the final return of Nauruans to their island in February 1946. I then 
consider some of the long-term effects of these involvements, particularly the 
consequences of evacuation and starvation. 
Nauru is mentioned only briefly in many accounts of the war in the 
Pacific. Dorothy Richard (1957) and Samuel Morison (1951) have provided 
some of the most complete documentation, which is supplemented by Wesley 
Craven and Frank Cate's formal history of the United States army and air 
forces in World War II (1950). But the focus of these accounts is winning the 
war, not its effects on the lives of Pacific Islanders. Sir Albert Ellis (1946) 
provides a good description of both the island and the disruption to Nauruan 
life from the vantage point of his longtime knowledge of the island as an 
administrator of the British Phosphate Commission. He was in the official 
party that arrived on Nauru in August 1945 to accept Japanese surrender. 
Patrick Cook (n.d.) has left a manuscript that he began as an eighteen-year-
91 
NANCY J. POLLOCK 
old Nauruan and maintained throughout the war. The exercise book with its 
pencil entries in English is preselVed in the Australian War Museum, 
Canberra. A Chinese resident of Nauru, Nai Fai Ma (n.d.), also recorded the 
events of the war on Nauru in a diary, noting particularly the effects on the 
Chinese population. In addition to these written sources I draw on my own 
interviews with Patrick Cook and three other Nauruans who stilI hold vivid 
memories of World War II. I have pieced together the following from these 
oral and written accounts. 
Background 
The British Phosphate Commission was the main administrative body on 
Nauru from 1919 when Britain, Australia, and New Zealand replaced 
Germany under a League of Nations mandate agreement. The Japanese 
seized the island from Australia in December 1941, just after .the bombing of 
Pearl Harbor, and proceeded to build airstrips and bring in a large military 
force. The US military command responded by bombing Nauru in an attempt 
to destroy the airstrips. Caught in the middle of this conflict were some 1800 
Nauruans and about 200 Chinese, as well as some Gilbertese who had been 
employed to work in the phosphate mine. Twelve hundred of the Nauruans 
were evacuated by the Japanese to Chuuk, while the others stayed home to 
suffer through the American bombing and the rigors of the Japanese regime. 
This paper examines the effects of this evacuation and bombing on the 
people of Nauru. 
Nauru is a small island with a ,circumference of 19 kilometers and is 
situated in the mid-Pacific 42 kilometers south of the equator. The land area 
consists of a narrow coastal rim and a raised interior plateau, which was found 
in 1902 to contain a rich source of the mineral phosphate. This has been 
mined since 1906 and sold as superphosphate to fertilize the farms of 
Australia and New Zealand. Money from the sale of phosphate provided 
some income to a few N auruan landholders, but they were paid below the 
international market price. The Japanese, who also needed to buy phosphate 
for their rice fields, had to rely on lower quality phosphate from Angaur, 
Makatea, and sources outside the Pacific. Part of their motive for seizing 
Nauru was to gain access to a cheap high quality source of phosphate. 
A second Japanese motive for seizing Nauru was to expand the large 
military bases they had established in the eastern Carolines and Marshalls 
during the 1930s--an activity about which the United States knew very little. 
These bases had been established while Japan was administering Micronesia 
under a League of Nations mandate after World War I, even though the 
mandate had an explicit clause forbidding the use of mandated territories for 
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military activity (Miwa 1988). Japanese expansion during 1940 and 1941 
necessitated the use of these bases as a supply line into islands such as Nauru 
and Tarawa in the Gilberts, which the Japanese took in 1942.· 
The Japanese expansion southward resulted in fierce battles at Tarawa in 
the Gilberts, in the Solomon Islands, and in New Guinea. Nauru was an 
important transit point in their push to control the islands of the southwest 
Pacific. It gave them a base for air sorties and for maintaining a military force. 
Even though there is no harbor on Nauru, a system of anchor buoys estab-
lished for phosphate shipments was used by the Japanese to moor troop ships. 
They built three airstrips during their first six months on Nauru to provide air 
protection for shipping. 
Japanese Seizure of Nauru 
In December 1941 the Japanese seized Nauru from the Australians, and 
evacuated their citizens and 570 Chinese on 23 February 1942. The Japanese 
formally took possession of the island on 26 August 1942, raised their flag in 
place of the Union Jack, began to build military installations, and attempted 
to reopen the phosphate mine. They brought in over 4000 Japanese, some of 
them marines, some laborers, and a small group of NTK (South Seas 
Development Company) personnel to run the phosphate mine. 
The population buildup on Nauru was accelerated further when the 
Japanese moved the Banabans from Ocean Island, which they had also seized. 
Several shipments of Banabans, amounting to about 900 people, arrived on 
Nauru during 1943. Most of these were relocated on Kosrae, Pohnpei, and 
Chuuk, but some remained on Nauru for the duration of the war (see Cook 
n.d.). 
This sudden increase of the population on Nauru brought over 6000 
people to an island where only 1800 Nauruans had existed previously 
(Richard 1957, 49). The raised reef had only a narrow band of fertile land 
around the coastal rim, while the rich vegetation in the interior was being 
ripped out to mine the phosphate between the coral pinnacles. Such a large 
population relied totally on outside supplies. In mid-1943 the Japanese 
administration made the decision to move some of the N auruans off their 
island. 
Evacuation to Chuuk 
To reduce the size of this population two forms of evacuation were imposed. 
In June and August 1943 two groups of 600 Nauruans each were moved a 
thousand miles north to the island of Chuuk where there was already a 
93 
NANCY J. POLLOCK 
considerable Japanese military force. The 600 Nauruans who remained on 
Nauru were evacuated from their homes and forced to live in designated 
areas of the island, away from their ancestral lands. 
Cook recorded in his diary that 29 June 1943 was "another historical 
moment" when the Nauruan leaders were called in by the Japanese adminis-
tration and told that 600 of their people were to go to Chuuk that day in a 
troop carrier that had arrived on Nauru bringing in more Japanese marines 
and laborers. "It was approved that a party of 600 natives under the 
supervision of Kaicho Detudamo and N.M.P. Joseph Harris will be the first." 
On 16 August 1943, "another order of the second Nauru evacuees was 
issued." This party was headed by Albert Harris. A total of 1200 Nauruans 
was evacuated to Chuuk (6). 
The Nauruans were told to organize their people to leave. They did not 
understand why they were being evacuated, nor where they were going. They 
could see the overcrowding problem but had little appreciation of the war and 
why the Japanese were there. Desire for their phosphate was obvious, but the 
military buildup made little sense. Nai Fai Ma suggests the Nauruan leaders 
were told that families with relatives in the leprosy asylum were to be sent 
away. Apparently Japanese had a fundamental fear of leprosy and thought 
that, confined on a sm~1I island, they too would catch the disease. 
On Chuuk the N aUruan evacuees were placed on the islands of Tal and 
Fefan, where they were expected to work on building airstrips and producing 
sweet potatoes and fishing to feed the Japanese garrison. Sweet potato 
cultivation, and indeed agriculture in general, were not familiar practices to 
Nauruans, as no root or grain crops grew on Nauru. They were expected to 
work alongside Chuukese who were used to growing root crops, although 
they had not cultivated sweet potato in earlier times. This workforce of 
Nauruans andChuukese was supervised by strict Japanese overseers who 
used brutal pr~ctices to keep up production. The aim was to provide food for 
the large military force garrisoned there, and to construct airstrips for their 
progressive conquest of the South Pacific. 
Little has been written about this part of the war and its effects on the 
lives of the Chuukese, the Nauruans, and other Micronesians. The Reverend 
Amram of Nauru still holds vivid memories of the privations of the two years 
he spent on Chuuk with his family. He described that period to me as the 
"turning point" in his life. Not only was the work in the fields unfamiliar and 
Japanese discipline extremely strict, but the Americans also bombed the area. 
The Japanese were liberal with their beatings. On one occasion, after a group 
of Nauruans had been beaten, they decided to swim to another island where 
their families were held. They went despite the threat of sharks. Reverend 
Amram recalls 
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swimming, swimming, swimming, until about 4 or s: AM, I reached the island 
exhausted. I went to find my family. I saw them huddled together. Near them 
some Nauruan houses were all destroyed by bombs. Some were dead. There 
were bodies everywhere. I asked • Are you alright?- They said "Take us away 
in case the planes come back.- It was about 7 or 8 o'clock, so I took them 
away some distance. Then I prayed to God -nank you for saving my family.-
I promised to devote my life to God. 
He became a pastor of the N auruan church, a position he still holds. 
When the Japanese questioned him about this episode, they wanted to 
know the whereabouts of the Australian submarine that had taken him from 
one island to another. When he denied there had been an Australian 
submarine, the Japanese interrogators tied his hands and beat him until he 
was unconscious. He had no broken bones, but other Nauruans took care of 
him and tended his wounds until he became strong enough to work again. 
After that he worked extremely hard to avoid the displeasure of the Japanese. 
Another Nauruan taken to Chuuk was Detudamo, an outstanding 
Nauruan leader who had been lobbying the British Phosphate Commission 
since 1927 for a greater share of phosphate profits for the Nauruan 
landowners. Before leaving Nauru he had been appointed governor of the 
Nauruans by the Japanese and had endeavored to plead the Nauruan cause 
with the military administrators. He did his best to keep morale high amongst 
the Nauruans on Chuuk and appealed to the Chuukese for food when 
supplies ran short in 1944 (but with little success, according to Amram). The 
Nauruans on Chuuk became despondent as they watched many oftheir family 
and friends die, with no way to find food or medicine to help them. 
One episode that illustrates Detudamo's shrewd perception of their 
situation on Chuuk was recorded by Reverend Amram. Just before the 
Americans arrived to liberate Chuuk, the Japanese offered Detudamo some 
Camel cigarettes, but he refused. They then offered him Sakura (Japanese) 
cigarettes. He took one and lit it and smoked. ("He must have used his head," 
Amram commented.).As a result of this wise choice the Japanese brought an 
American and a Japanese medicine kit. He refused the American kit, saying 
he preferred the Japanese one. Then they asked, "Suppose the war finished. 
What ship would you like to take you home--American, Australian or 
Japanese?" Detudamo replied "Nippon ship." They were all smiles. "We were. 
very happy that we were spared. So many Nauruans had died," concluded 
Amram. 
By October 1945, well after the American occupation, 410 of the 
expatriate Nauruans had died and most of the remaining 793 Nauruans were 
still working on a Japanese potato plantation on Tol Island. Apparently they 
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despaired of being discovered by the American inspection force because 
Detudamo, their chief, wrote a letter to the commander of the occupational 
force, delivered on 1 November 1945. The letter begged for food because 
they were subsisting on "only green leaves and toddy ... and if help is still 
delayed we shall all be perished .... We would be very grateful if you would 
be so kind as to send us foodstuffs such as rice, navy bread, etc., with your bill. 
On reaching home (Nauru)· arrangements wOl,lld be made through our 
government for payment" (Richard 1957, 49). Those remaining Nauruans 
were returned to Nauru in February 1946 aboard an Australian ship. Amram 
recalls both happiness and sorrow as the story of the hardships of life on 
Chuuk were shared with the much depleted families. 
Living on Nauru 1942·1946 
The 600 Nauruans who were left on Nauru after August 1943 were also 
subject to privations, including evacuation from their home districts (for 
details of Nauruan social arrangements in districts, see Pollock 1987). They 
were told to move out of their homes in the various districts around the island 
and to relocate to Nibok and Boe districts in the less frequented northwest 
comer of the island. Their houses were either pulled down to make room for 
the barracks of Japanese marines, or were commandeered by the Japanese, 
particularly those in the Menen district, for their officers. Also in Menen 
district, on the site of the tuberculosis sanitarium, large separate 
encampments were built for the Japanese military and the 700 laborers who 
were brought in to build the airstrips. 
Another group of N auruans who suffered at the hands of the Japanese 
were the leper patients who had been confined in the leper asylum in Menen 
district. All forty-nine of them were told that they would be taken to a place 
where they would be cared for. Instead they were crowded into three leaky 
boats, towed out to sea, and then fired on from the shore. The Japanese fear 
of leprosy is given as justification for this inhuman act (Ma n.d.). 
Between September 1943 and January 1944 the main activity on Nauru 
was building three airstrips, which the Japanese needed for their forays into 
the Solomons and Papua New Guinea. They also needed these as a backup 
for their position on Tarawa, Gilbert Islands, and for the defense of the 
Marshalls and Chuuk. In addition to the Japanese laborers 275 Nauruans 
were also required to work on the airstrips for the Japanese (Ellis 1946,27). 
They were expected to work from dawn to dusk and were beaten or denied 
food if they slacked at all. For people who had never had to do much physical 
work this was exacting enough, but the discipline and privations were 
additionally traumatic. 
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The total Japanese force on Nauru in May 1944 was 4178 (Ma n.d., 23). It 
consisted of'lS67 marines and 1311 laborers. Another 1463 "natives" were 
listed, as well as 179 Chinese. The "natives" included Nauruans as well as 
Gilbertese, Ellice Islanders, and one or two Marshallese. Thus the total 
population on Nauru at that time amounted to 5820 (Ellis 1946,27). This was 
the largest population by far ever to occupy this small island. 
During the occupation from August 1942 to September 1945, when the 
Japanese surrendered the island, those 5820 people lived under very crowded 
conditions. Even under normal circumstances resources would have been 
stretched. But with the island effectively blockaded by American air attacks, 
Japanese supply vessels were unable to bring in either provisions or ammu-
nition. In September 1943 a lOOO-ton Japanese vessel and a 6OOO-ton cargo 
vessel were sunk by American bombs or torpedoes. Despite the daily 
American bombing raids two Japanese cruisers and two transport submarines 
managed to get through bringing provisions and ammunition to Nauru during 
1944. The arrival of 75 tons of rice and 50 tons of ammunition in September 
1944 in the two Japanese submarines was extremely welcome (Ellis 1946). 
But that provided only a temporary respite from the starvation facing the 
Japanese as well as the Nauruans and Chinese. That was the last shipment of 
provisions to reach the island until the war ended in August 1945. Nai Fai Ma 
describes the deaths of the Chinese from starvation in bleak entries in his 
diary. 
In addition to the blockade against Japanese supply ships, the weather 
had added its own constrictions to the food supply. A severe drought set in 
during early 1943 and lasted into 1944, thereby reducing the productivity of 
the few pandanus and breadfruit trees that remained on the narrow coastal 
belt. The coconut trees produced fewer and smaller nuts. But their produc-
tion was already reduced by the practice of tapping the inflorescences to 
make sweet toddy--a practice used extensively when all other food sources 
were exhausted. The Japanese allotted coconut trees thus: "Three trees for a 
Japanese, two for a native, and one for a Chinaman" (Ellis 1946, 29). 
The calcareous soil of Nauru produced little besides the pandanus and 
coconuts on which Nauruans had based their traditional diet. But to keep 
such a large population alive the Japanese administration ordered the 
growing of pumpkins. When the group of Australian and New Zealand 
representatives of the British Phosphate Commission arrived on Nauru to 
accept Japanese surrender, they found pumpkins everywhere, both growing 
profusely and stored in sheds ready for use. The reason that Nauru had been 
turned so successfully into a pumpkin patch was the use of 40-gallon petrol 
drums full of sewage and excreta as the "soil" in which the pumpkins 
flourished. Ellis described the smell and the flies as "the Japanese's 
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unprecedented legacy" (1946:85). Dysentery was rife. The Australian 
occupation forces poured oil on the drums to bum them in order to restore 
Nauru "to its usual sanitary and healthy atmosphere" (Ellis 1946,83). 
Fish was more readily available. During the last two years of the occu-
pation Cook's diary entries consisted only of the number of fIsh he caught 
each day, and of the bombing raids. He still recalls this as the time when he 
learned to fIsh. He also noted, with some irony, that the bombing raids 
sometimes yielded a good supply of fIsh if the Americans missed their target 
and a bomb exploded close to shore killing many fIsh. Fishing became the 
work of manyNauruans for their Japanese captors, and all the fISh they 
landed had to be handed over, except for one for their families. The Japanese 
kept a close watch as each fisher came ashore; several Nauruans and Chinese 
and Gilbertese were beaten for concealing a fIsh to feed their families. 
The result of these lean times, however, was not as severe as one might 
expect. Although some Nauruans (and more Chinese) died from starvation 
and complications, the Australian occupation party that arrived in September 
1945 remarked that they had expected to fInd the inhabitants emaciated and 
in poor health, but instead they all looked "fairly well," though suffering from 
dysentery and other diseases (Ellis 1946,83). 
The physical conditions for Nauruans who remained on Nauru differed 
little from those that Nauruans suffered on Chuuk. Both groups had to work 
hard, were subject to harsh Japanese authority, and were close to starvation. 
The only consolation for those who stayed on Nauru was that they were on 
their home island, and so suffered a different form of psychological trauma 
than those who were physically separated from it. They developed a mistrust 
of anyone who was not Nauruan. The fIght for survival set Nauruans in 
opposition to Chuukese on Chuuk, and against Gilbertese and Chinese, as 
well as their Japanese captors on Nauru. Nai Fai Ma worked closely with the 
Japanese authorities during the occupation of Nauru, but the day the 
Japanese were evacuated after Victory in the PacifIc Day, August 1945, he 
attacked a Japanese with an iron bar and nearly killed him. His reason was 
that this was one way of retaliating for the hardships inflicted on himself and 
his fellow Chinese (25). No doubt ancient antagonisms between Japan and 
China surfaced at this emotional moment. 
Bombing of Nauru 
Bombing occurred daily on Nauru throughout 1943 and 1944 so the Nauruans 
became very used to the raids. But when the island was fIrst attacked on 27 
December 1940 to cripple the phosphate installations, Cook described the 
event as "a thing which I'll say most thrilling in History" (1). Two years later 
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he was still excited by the sight and sound of warfare: "It was a beautiful site 
[sic] to see the defense guns flashing upwards in fine groups of red balls, yet 
considerable damage was done to the airfields" (5). These are the words of a 
young man describing an exciting event. Later in his diary the entries are 
more prosaic and repetitious: "'Ibree of them [American bombers] visited us 
early at 8 AM dropping bombs for which we retaliated without effect" (31 July 
1944). The excitement was gone. During 1943 and 1944 Nauru was bombed 
by American planes almost every day. 
Americans began bombing the new airstrips and installations on 25 March 
1943 as part of their campaign to stop Japanese military expansion into the 
southwest Pacific. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff decided by the summer 
of 1943 that the Gilberts should be taken by Allied forces in an action code-
named Operation Galvanic. This was to be a quick thrust as the first step 
toward capturing Pohnpei and Chuuk in the Carolines. The newly 
constructed airbase on Nauru, which was finished in January 1943, was seen 
as a threat to the success of Operation Galvanic as the Japanese could use 
that island to cover an area between the Solomons and the Gilberts (Craven 
and Cate 1950, 300). On 19 November 1943 the US warships Saratoga and 
Princeton attacked Nauru and "neutralized" it, so that it was no longer able to 
support the Japanese campaign in the Gilberts (Morison 1951, 136). For 
some six weeks the island continued to be bombarded. On 8 December alone 
US bombers dropped 51 tons of bombs on Nauru and "tried to sink it" (Cant 
1945,163). 
These repeated attacks on Nauru's airstrips contributed to the success of 
the American attack on Tarawa by drawing off Japanese attacks on the 
American Marine landing force. The American aim was to overpower the 
3000-strong Japanese garrison on Betio, Tarawa, which was not quite ready 
for the American onslaught on D-day, 20 November 1943. As Cant 
commented: "The persistence of Japanese on Nauru was irritating during the 
Gilbertese campaign. The island was repeatedly bombed but the air base was 
regularly and repeatedly repaired by the enemy. Nauru did not sink, but never 
fully recovered from this onslaught" (Cant 1945, 163). The success of this 
campaign for American forces, albeit with losses of over 3000 men, was the 
beginning of a long period of isolation for the Japanese and Nauruans on 
Nauru. 
Following the success of Operation Galvanic in the Gilberts, American 
bombing of Nauru continued, but this time the aim was to divert Japanese 
energies away from defending the bases they had established in the southern 
Marshalls, such as the airstrips on Mille and Jaluit, and the significant bases 
on Kwajalein, Pohnpei, and Chuuk. From December 1943 through January 
1945 bombing of Nauru continued on most days. As Cook recorded for 
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9 December 1943, "Another memorable date; a formation of American 
fighter planes raided us early at 5:35 AM and destroyed most of the military 
objects, and warships were firing on the island." This raid resulted in four 
Nauruans killed and twelve Nauruans injured, as well as many more Gilbert-
ese killed and wounded. The church (newly built in 1940) and several British 
Phosphate Commission buildings were destroyed. 
Effects of Bombing 
Cook made little direct record of his or other Nauruan reactions to the events 
of the war. From the few comments he does make we can infer some of his 
emotional rea'ction. For example he refers to 25 December 1941 as "Our 
Black Day" when enemy planes returned "and smashed our old wireless 
station by diving very low using machine guns and bombs. From then a 
constant visitation of enemy bombers has taken place." And beside 22 August 
1942 he wrote, "We all went mad with fear when we saw them (American 
bombers) tearing the air like wild Indians on the war path." 
He also records that some ofthose bombing attacks resulted in fatalities 
or injuries either to Nauruans or Gilbertese. In his personal recollections to 
me he commented on his feelings when, as a young man, he watched his sister 
and cousins die as a result of a bombing thatblew apart the house in which 
they were living. He and a friend had been off fishing when the bombing 
occurred. In his diary he also recorded raids that damaged buildings such as 
the government office and store. 
Nai Fai Ma's record is also very factual, though less detailed than Cook's 
diary. Ma comments on the brutality of the Japanese and on the drastic 
shortage of food for the Chinese. We know that they were assigned only one 
coconut tree and can infer that their rations of rice were less than was needed 
to sustain them. The Chinese who had been left behind on Nauru at the time 
of the evacuation of the Australians in February 1941 were recorded then as 
being sickly ('ElliS 1946, 28). So it is less surprising that the number of Chinese 
who died during the Japanese occupation was high. 
The reaction of Nauruans to the Japanese occupation of their island is 
hard to judge, except in hindsight. For example Cook's comment on 25 
August 1942, the day when the Japanese occupation was established was: 
"Another warship arrived and officially announced the occupation of the 
island. Therefore we submittedly approved that day to be recorded as a very 
romantic conclusion to the Nauruan history. The Hinomaru (Japanese flag) 
instead of the Union Jack was not respected by every native on the island of 
Nauru. Detudamo was appointed Governor." This acceptance of a fait 
accompli was only slightly elaborated during our discussions of the war; Cook 
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recalls that as a young man he accepted what happened without too much 
resentment of the Japanese. The conflict of loyalties emerged with hindsight 
Cook's account shows a gradual change of loyalties, which I judge as only 
natural given the close proximity with which he and other Nauruans were 
living with the Japanese. He uses the terms enemy and raiders throughout the 
diary; in the first entries up to August 1942 those terms refer to the Germans 
and the Japanese, but gradually thereafter he records the bombing attacks by 
"American Boings [sic)" and American raids, and a "daily visitation of enemy 
planes" on 12 March 1944, which was clearly an American bombing raid. 
Not only were Cook and the other Nauruans under very strict military 
rule by the Japanese, and fearful of repercussions if they stepped out of line, 
but they also were suffering losses of relatives at the hands of American 
bombers. In 1987, as a result of hindsight, they felt no particular affection for 
the Japanese but judged that their only way of staying alive was to do what 
the Japanese commanded. Nauruans were in the minority and were easily 
picked off if they committed offenses. They also told me that they did not 
understand why the Americans kept up their bombing raids for so long (two 
years) after the island was rendered ineffective militarily. They of course were 
living with the dispirited and disarmed Japanese force and knew how short all 
supplies including ammunition were on the island, but the American forces 
had only indirect knowledge of their condition. As American raids shifted 
from the airstrips to the tuberculosis settlement where Japanese forces were 
housed and to the gasoline drums, they became a daily threat to the lives of 
the Nauruans. 
The ambivalence of one young Nauruan is recorded by Cook. On 15 
February 1943 he wrote: 
The 10-year-old,son of Detudamo (the Nauruan chief and Governor) was 
imprisoned today by his father's command. It's because an air officer asked 
him how he enjoyed the trip (on one of the Japanese planes) the other day 
the boy then said "I enjoyed it very much.· Then the officer said now which 
country did you like most the English or the Japanese, the boy said "I like 
both the English and Japanese.· The officer was very sorry as he expected 
the lad to praise Japan so he talked it over with Detudamo advising him to 
teach the boy to learn the good manner. So his father imprisoned him. (5) 
The total number of N auruans killed during these bombing raids was 
about forty, but no accurate record of their deaths was kept apart from 
Cook's diary entries. Many more were injured, as were Gilbertese and 
Chinese. For 4 May 1944 Cook wrote: "Nine or more dive bombers inflicted 
heavy casualties on soldiers and us and ruined many houses." A similar entry 
occurs for 8 May. But with the shortage of supplies, including medicines and 
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equipment for the hospitals, it is likely that many of those who suffered from 
what would normally have been minor injuries succumbed for lack of 
treatment. The rate of death was enhanced also by the poor physical 
condition of those who were wounded. 
The shortage of food is barely mentioned,by Cook, but Nai Fai Ma made 
more entries in his diary about the Chinese dying of starvation. On Saturday 
25 February 1944 Cook recorded that "Casual labourers ceased duty owing to 
lack of rice .... The Allied Blockage forced the soldiers to eat creepers and its 
kind, while we natives eat (DOBOIY) weeds DENENO, DOMO DURU. Later the 
Copra were ceased owing to that Copras were nowhere to be found" (8). On 
10 April 1944 he noted "Soldiers demanding toddies from us," referring to the 
coconut toddy made by catching the sap from a cut inflorescence on a 
coconut tree. On 21 April 1944 ''Two hundred native men were called up to 
collect toddies for the soldiers. Rice rationing among them was greatly 
reduced--they eat rice soup only for their morning breakfast. Some of the 
already collected toddy tree will be taken from us on the 26th." Among the 
strict orders issued to Nauruans were: "Don't give your toddy (to Japanese 
soldiers)--giveit as a present [and] Don't take coconut fruits. The punishment 
was - Nipon - Do - Kiro .... One soldier was shot while stealing native toddy. 
See list of names of others doing same. Elide (Giurour) and Deirog left home 
for Secretar's Hombu (Jap Collies; Hd Qrts) offering themselves for food-
stuffs. Soldiers and native constables were sent out to search for them" (Cook 
n.d.,l1). . 
Nai Fai Ma on the other hand has left us some graphic details of the 
increasing shortage of food from March 1944 to the end of the war. On 17 
March he recorded, "Food problem becoming serious. Coconut trees suitable 
for collecting 'toddy' numbered." On 20 March he wrote: "Coconut trees 
distributed among the people: Japanese 3 trees each; Native 2 trees each; 
Chinese 1 tree." And on 1 July, he noted "Rice gradually getting scarce. 
Pumpkins, sweet corns and sweet potatoes take the place of weed and wild 
grass growing in uncultivated tracts." On 13 September: "Ocean Gilbertese 
LUKA 'toddy' collector of Japanese after severely beaten and tied up for three 
days executed for defrauding by supplying Japanese with 'toddy' mixed with 
water." On 14 September a Japanese transport submarine surfaced and 
landed 75 tons of rice, 50 tons of ammunition and several tons of cargo (23). 
Ironically, Ma recorded the death of four Chinese from starvation between 
September and December 1944, and two Chinese who were working for the 
Japanese were beaten to death on separate occasions for stealing a pumpkin. 
The record for 6 July 1945 states: nCB 284 SEEK KOW suffering from paralysis 
and his body swollen up in all parts owing to malnutrition, passed away." One 
report gives a total of 22 Chinese deaths during the war out of the 190 who 
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remained on Nauru (Anonymous 1946, 17). These records indicate that the 
Chinese probably suffered more physically from the shortage of food than· the 
Nauruans themselves, though there were fewer of them. 
The physical destruction of Nauru was described in detail by an 
anonymous visitor in February 1946. Temporary houses lined the foreshore 
but did not distract from the vast destruction of the settlement by American 
bombing and shelling. In addition the Japanese had constructed an elaborate 
and strong system of defenses against a marine landing, leading the author "to 
the obvious conclusion that the Japanese in their own way hoped to conclude 
a sort of compromise peace with the Allies, and on terms favorable to both 
sides (some say saving face) would retain Nauru for its vast deposits of phos-
phate. 'What I have I hold' would doubtless have applied in this case." These 
defense works, which consisted of deep pits as tank traps, concrete pill boxes, 
and underground dugouts and radio stations, were all protected by many gun 
emplacements. A Japanese cemetery near Buada Lagoon contained more 
than five hundred Japanese burials (Anonymous 1946). 
Effects of the War on Nauruans 
The war brought total disruption to the lives of all Nauruans, whether they 
were evacuated to Chuuk or stayed on Nauru. In 1946 they had to begin to 
build a new society, based on new family structures and new status 
considerations. One persistent cultural phenomenon was Head Chief 
Detudamo, who had not only survived but had provided moral support during 
the trying times on Chuuk. 
Physical destruction of the island from eighteen months of almost daily 
bombing raids by the Americans, and from the Japanese installations, meant 
that houses had to be built in home districts, using whatever finance could be 
found. The British Phosphate Commissioners provided sixpence per ton 
export duty on phosphate and advanced £200,000 for a fund for 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of the island. The Australian administration, 
however, was slow to act, so that in 1948 Nauruans were still living in huts 
built from scrap materials salvaged from the war, and their schools and 
hospitals were inadequate. Phosphate mining resumed in July 1946. Ellis 
(1946) was very concerned about the damage to equipment, but the plant was 
repaired and set running again with seventy-six Europeans to direct its 
progress. 
The enforced work that the Japanese imposed on the Nauruans during 
the war also had a long-term effect. Nauruans had never worked so hard 
before, and the work they were expected to do was completely foreign to 
them, whether building airstrips on Nauru and Chuuk, planting sweet 
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potatoes, or digging Japanese defenses. After the war the attitude to work 
continued, and all able-bodied Nauruans were employed. 
One political outcome of these five traull}atic years was that Nauruans 
decided upon a more democratic system of government. Today they speak of 
abolition of the Temonibe class--a process w~ich began in 1927 when a new 
political body replaced the former Council of Chiefs, but which was hastened 
by the events of the war. In 1951 governing P9wer over affairs of the island 
was placed in the hands of a newly created body, the Nauru Local Govern-
ment Council. The council was a major step toward self government and the 
declaration of independence in 1968. Detudamo and Hammer de Roburt 
emerged from the war period as the primary leaders, not only as chiefs, but 
also in the broader more democratic postwar political structure (see Viviani 
1971 for discussion of the setting up ofthe Nauru Local Government 
Council). 
Social relationships also changed. Nauruans had never been very keen to 
travel on whaling ships or to become indentured labor in Queensland, as had 
other Pacific Islands people. But after World War II bonds between 
Nauruans became even tighter as a result of their shared losses of family 
members, and'their decrease in overall numbers. The harsh life that each 
group had suffered left its mark as a determination to build a strong society 
based on their own model, independent of outside influences. The Americans 
had bombed them, the Australians had apparently abandoned them, and the 
Japanese had beaten and starved them, so who could they trust but their 
fellow Nauruans. 
Their loyalties also became more clear. Control of their island by 
outsiders was not providing Nauruans with the kind of life they wanted. Their 
wartime associations of the label "enemy" first with the Japanese and then 
with the Americans, was later broadened, at least in Cook's diary, to include 
all Allies--that is the British, Australians, and New Zealanders who had been 
working their island for phosphate for forty years. 
The Banabans (from Ocean Island), who had been evacuated to Nauru, 
had no island to return to after the war, so accepted the island of Rabi off the 
northeast coast of Fiji as their future home. The Nauruans knew that they 
might also have to face such a possibility, though not as drastic as that faced 
by the Banabans. Watching the Banaban episode enabled Nauruans to con-
sider this possibility in their own future; they rejected an Australian offer for 
resettlement on an island off the north coast of Australia. 
The population of Nauruans had been severely reduced. In 1946 there 
were only 1369 N auruans, as well as 21 Gilbertese and Ocean Islanders, and 
778 Chinese, some of them newly arrived. Thus the Nauruan population was 
reduced by 439 over the three years of evacuation and occupation. Their 
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health also remained poor, with leprosy and tuberculosis as the most preva-
lent diseases, and yaws, venereal disease and beriberi also widespread. 
What interests me most in this whole wartime episode on Nauru is the 
effect of drastic food shortages on the current status of health. Nauruans have 
been described in the 19705 as having one of the highest incidences in the 
world of diabetes, with 40 percent of the population in 1981 diagnosed with 
noninsulin dependent diabetes mellitus. An important question that needs 
closer examination is the link between this wartime period on Nauruans' 
physical status and the recently documented high incidence of diabetes. 
Conclusion 
Older Nauruans remember clearly the drastic interventions in their lives 
brought about by Japanese evacuations to Chuuk; and by the bombings they 
suffered both on Nauru and on Chuuk. The three-year period from 1942 
through 1945 is imprinted indelibly into their memories. These memories 
have led to two long-term effects. 
First, determined to control their own lives after having been pawns in a 
major war, they rejected the British Phosphate Commission's offer to relocate 
them. Nauruans wanted to maintain ties to their island. After the war the. 
fight for phosphate royalties continued with renewed vigor, ending only when 
the Nauruans bought the phosphate industry from the commission for A$20 
million, a transaction entwined intimately with Nauru's declaration of 
independence in 1968. 
Second, their land became even more precious to them. Most Nauruans 
continue to live on Nauru. Those who do migrate do so either to seek 
education, to take positions in Nauruan diplomatic missions, or, in a few 
cases, to take jobs in Australia. But the bulk of the Nauruan population can 
be found living on the island of Nauru. In this they differ markedly from other 
Pacific Island nations where a growing proportion of the population is to be 
found in metropolitan countries (for further details see Pollock n.d.). 
Both short-term and long-term effects of the war resulted on Nauru. 
When we have drawn together war accounts from other islands in the Pacific 
we may see some similarities. We need to do this before people such as 
Patrick Cook and Reverend Amram can no longer share their memories 
with us. 
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World War II in Kiribati 
Sam Highland 
The Republic of Kiribati consists of three groups of islands, namely the 
Giibert Group, the Line Group, and the Phoenix Group, all scattered across 
the central part of the Pacific Ocean. The total land area of the country is 
about 719 square kilometers, most of which is about one meter above sea 
level. Because the soil is very poor, the planting of coconut trees is the only 
industry on land. On the other hand the vast waters surrounding the country 
are good fishing grounds. The national capital is located in Tarawa in the 
northern Gilberts, and the population of the country during the 1985 census 
was 64,000. 
World War IT in Kiribati was confined mainly to the important govern-
ment bases in Banaba, Tarawa, Abemama, and Butaritari. This paper is about 
the Tarawa campaign, one of the bloodiest battlegrounds in the entire war, 
and its impact on the Kiribati people, particularly the inhabitants of Betio 
village, which was the stage of the main conflict between the Japanese and 
the Americans. 
Betio village is an islet located at the southern extremity of Tarawa atoll. 
Until the ravages of the war, the Betio people engaged in a subsistence 
lifestyle with some affluence. The land abounded with tropical fruits and 
crops, mainly coconuts, breadfruit, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, pandanus, 
papaya, and traditional root crops. The surrounding sea teemed with marine 
life, fish and molluscs, readily available all year round. Life was easy, luxuri-
ous, and enjoyable before the threat of war came in the first week of 
December 1941. The population of Betio in 1941 was about four hundred, 
including a few expatriates. 
The Japanese Invasion of Tarawa Atoll 
The Japanese landed on the ocean side of the southwestern part of Betio at 
about 3 AM when the village was asleep. All the expatriates were captured, 
interrogated, and threatened unless they responded accurately to the 
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demands of the Japanese. Everybody was rounded up near the post office, 
and some of the captives were tied up with ropes to coconut trees. The only 
food store on Betio, that of Burns Philp, was taken over by the Japanese and 
later destroyed. The Betio villagers had depended on the Burns Philp store 
for their basic needs other than traditional food. Curfews were set, and most 
movements were restricted. At about 4 PM that same day, when everyone had 
been gathered at the post office, the Japanese flag was hoisted and the 
Japanese commander declared Tarawa to be under Japanese jurisdiction. The 
Japanese left Tarawa that same day, leaving behind the Betio people, who 
were scared and worried about their lands and lives. They could do nothing to 
escape a war they had nothing to do with. They were confused, distressed, and 
totally lost. 
Early in 1942 the Japanese returned to Tarawa. When they landed again 
on Betio, the villagers expected more calamity. This came true when the 
Japanese destroyed all sailing and fishing canoes to prevent the people from 
escaping. Crops such as baba~ taro (a prestigious root crop), and coconut 
trees were cut down and buried. Local houses and government staff quarters 
were destroyed. The whole islet was cleared of trees and houses in the first 
few weeks to make way for Japanese fortifications. People were forced to 
provide free labor and at times their personal belongings, such as clothing, 
were taken by the Japanese for their own use. Following several weeks of 
hard labor the local people were forced to leave their home village and find 
shelter in North Tarawa where the majority had no lands to stay on. As war 
refugees they had to depend on the goodwill and generosity of others for 
their maintenance. The move to North Tarawa was made more difficult 
because of the destruction of canoes. The Betio villagers had to walk and 
navigate the 2S-mile stretch of reefs and tidal passages, laden with whatever 
personal belongings they could carry. They believed it was the end of the 
world for them. 
Once the Betio people were evacuated, the Japanese recruited the men 
for hard labor to complete the fortification of the tiny islet--the construction 
of war bunkers, the laying of concrete structures crowned with sharpened 
metal on the reef around the islet, the construction of the airstrip, which 
covered almost a quarter of Betio, and the Japanese quarters. As most of the 
traditional crops had been destroyed, the laborers had to find extra food for 
themselves. 
A popular punishment for failure to carry out orders was to tie up a 
worker with ropes and place a stick of dynamite between his legs. Another 
was flogging. Two locals, both mental patients, were shot and killed by the 
Japanese for refusing to carry out orders. With these cruel and inhuman 
treatments the Japanese exploited the gentle character of the Tarawa people. 
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During those days of hard labor American bombers used to raid the islet 
of Betio. Usually occurring during the full moon when visibility was better, 
the raids caused great suffering. Where could the people hide from the 
shelling? The usual place became the hollows of the taro pits! Two I-Kiribati 
lost their lives during these raids. 
The Arrival of the Americans 
The Americans fmally landed on 20 November 1943. After seventy-seven 
hours of bitter fighting the Americans recaptured Tarawa from the Japanese. 
The British and American flags replaced the "flag of Nippon." 
A day after the Japanese surrendered, the Americans recruited over one 
hundred I-Kiribati to clear dead bodies and war debris on Tarawa. This time 
the local people experienced better working conditions. Heavy equipment 
was used, rations were issued in abundance, and those who were selected to 
work even earned wages. Free clothing was provided, and each laborer was 
paid about us$2 per day. The Americans established good relationships with 
the I-Kiribati, providing almost everything for their personal needs. Forced 
labor as experienced with the Japanese had ended. The Betio people's 
experience during the American occupation was the opposite of what was 
experienced under the Japanese. 
During the American and British joint administration a Labour Corps was 
set up. People were recruited not only from Tarawa but from the rest of the 
islands as well. The main tasks of this Labour Corps were to clear the island 
of Tarawa and to reestablish the administration of this, group of islands. Two 
companies from the Labour Corps were sent to the Solomon Islands to do 
similar work. Betio's traditional way of life was gradually restored, but with 
great difficulty because of the extensive war damage. When the Betio 
villagers returned to their islet they were unable to enjoy again the prewar 
subsistence lifestyle they had known because the islet had been ruined by the 
war. More corpses and war debris were evident than crops and trees on the 
tiny atoll, which was about three miles long and a quarter mile wide. The 
rehabilitation process was not easy. Lands Commissioner Harry Maude 
estimated that about 17,000 coconut trees had been destroyed on Betio to 
make way for the airstrip, and that about 14,000 square feet of taro pits were 
buried on Betio alone. Maude calculated that the financial compensation due 
the Betio landowners for their loss of traditional crops was £42,600. Note that 
these figures relate to the Betio damage alone and do not include the cost of 
damage to Butaritari, Abemama, Banaba, and other parts of Tarawa (Bairiki 
and North Tarawa). The rich inshore fisheries of Betio were destroyed and 
contaminated by the war. Local fish traps were destroyed and fishing activities 
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were disrupted for several decades. The lagoon and ocean areas were full of 
wreckage. Unexploded bombs and war debris of various decriptions made the 
marine life inedible. Instead, the Betio people had to depend on expensive, 
imported tinned foodstuffs for their survival. 
The Effects of World War II on Tarawa 
The war made a tremendous impact on the life and culture of the Betio 
people. It became clear to them that their splendid and serene isolation could 
not escape the ripples of international conflicts such as World War II. The 
Betio people never regained their traditional subsistence lifestyle. The 
ecological damage on the fragile atoll was so extensive and lasting that both 
land and marine productivity were affected severely. The people had to start 
life all over again. Taro pits took three years to develop before a crop could 
be harvested. Building materials had to be brought in across the lagoon from 
North Tarawa for the villagers to build their local dwellings. Countless 
material and psychological losses were sustained by the people of Betio. The 
restoration of the past is impossible, of course, but the development of their 
future appears also to have been set back by the impact of the war. The Betio 
people have struggled to remain a viable community against history and time. 
The lack of war reparations from the colonial administration and the urban-
ization process since the war have exacerbated the economic and social 
situation of the once happy and cohesive community of Betio. 
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Marshall Islanders' Experiences in World War II 
lohnHeine 
I recall the war vividly, although I was very young, a small child of barely nine 
years. One day stands out most in my mind. That was when I first saw and 
believed that the war would be a danger to all of us. All I knew about war was 
what I had learned from Japanese comics about how they were killing 
Chinese in Manchuria. But this time I was under the guns of American 
planes. It was early morning of 4 February. I was sitting outside my parents' 
house under a coconut tree trying to remember the beatitudes from the Bible 
in preparation for my Sunday school class when suddenly I heard the guns 
overhead. I saw two planes diving straight at the end of our island, J abwot. 
That was the beginning of World War II in the Marshalls. About one hundred 
Marshallese people died in that bombing. One Japanese was killed, not from 
a bullet, but when he bumped into a coconut tree while running away. 
After that we didn't see any more war for some time. We heard of it, but 
there was quiet as long as the Americans stopped coming to the island. We 
did know that the war started with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. As small 
children in the Japanese school, we had been asked to walk around the island 
with tiny flags and do some banzais. We didn't know why. All we knew was 
that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. Why it happened, we didn't know. And 
then, suddenly, we heard that Tarawa had fallen and we began to see 
American planes all over the place, dropping bombs everywhere. 
One afternoon as I was working with my father, we saw Japanese coming 
out of the bush. There were about ten of them, and they ordered my father to 
go with them, and I followed. We went to our house and there the Japanese 
started going through my father's belongings. In his old chest they found a 
typewriter and a red fishing line. So they started fumbling around with the 
typewriter. They were curious, wondering what it was, because these soldiers 
were not high rank and probably had never seen a typewriter before. After 
they did all this examination with my father's typewriter and his fishing line, 
they said, "Come with us," and they took my father. That was the last I saw of 
him for three months. 
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A few weeks later I saw the Japanese barge approaching our island again. 
This time the Japanese were accompanied by a Marshallese man who was 
their interpreter. They came straight to our house and ordered my mother to 
follow them. That was the last I saw of my mother for a month or so. Then 
one night, near dawn, I was awakened by the touch of a sharp object on my 
head. They took me to the barge and dumped me in. I landed on some guys 
underneath. They were elderly men who wef(~ captured by Japanese to be 
used at forced labor. I imagined I was one of them when they took us. Where 
we were going we didn't know because it was dark. Then the barge stopped. 
When I came out of the hole I saw an island like a picture I'd never seen 
before of a lot of coconut trees without fronds, their stumps sticking out of 
the ground and big concrete buildings crumbling down. I saw some airplanes 
broken on the field. This was going to be OUi home for the next two months. 
I was one of the laborers. There were twenty-nine of us. With these four 
men I had to stay in a place spending fourteen hours a day after ten-hour 
shifts, but I had the pleasure of visiting my parents. Another thing I 
remember is when I found myself able to run away. I guess I had to run 
because the Japanese were thinking of killing me. I got out of this hole and 
this air-raid shelter where they were keeping us imprisoned, and I ran as far 
and as fast as I could. I found myself standing by the edge of the water. The 
only thing that got into my mind was to jump and start swimming because I 
heard bullets going over my head. I swam for about four miles. When I 
arrived at another island, I saw three other Marshallese. They were my 
companions in the prison. They had escaped a couple of hours ahead of me. 
So will you join us, they asked. We stole a Japanese canoe and we paddled to 
the next island. We had to cross three different channels. Now, if you know 
what channel means in the islands, it means you had to swim against about a 
five-to-ten-miles-per-hour speed of water. So two guys were on this canoe 
paddling, and two were swimming alongside, because the canoe was not bi.g 
I 
enough to take all of us. But we made it anyway and then we split up. I didn't 
want to accompany them because I was afraid if they caught one of us, he 
might report the other. I knew if they caught me I might report on them. So 
we split up, we broke up our canoe and let it drift away, and then I went my 
way. 
Whatever happened to those three guys I didn't know until the end of the 
war. I found two of them still alive. But anyway, that was the beginning of my 
life for eleven months. For these eleven months I was hiding in the bush. And 
of course, being on flat land, not a beautiful mountain island where you have 
big trees, big boulders, caves to hide, it was very difficult to hide. But for some 
reason the Japanese were not smart enough, they didn't catch me. 
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I was hiding for eleven months until one day I saw an American LeI 
[landing craft, infantry] coming back to one of my islands where I was staying 
alone. I decided to swim to this ship, and sure enough I found five 
Marshallese scouts on board along with two Marines and navy people. They 
gladly picked me up and transported me to another island. I couldn't believe 
when I heard Marshallese being spoken on board. Because to me the war was 
not yet over. Where in the world was this Marshallese language coming from? 
It was quite strange. I didn't know that Kwajalein had already been secured, 
and that Majuro was secured. All I knew was that we were still at war in 
Jabwot. I did not even know that my brother, Dwight Heine, was on the other 
ship trying to pick up any Marshallese that they could repatriate from among 
the Japanese, or at least evacuate to the Aa-nencan side. 
To make the story short, I got to Arno and spent ten days there. I 
volunteered to join the Scout Force. They took me to Majuro and trained me 
in some very strange ways. And did I enjoy it. Indeed I enjoyed it because I 
thought I was going back to do something about the Japanese in Jabwot. 
Well, the training hadn't lasted long before I was asked to go back to Jabwot. 
This time I was going back with hand grenades and Tommy guns, ready to 
shoot. Instead, we found twenty-seven Marshallese on our way, right by the 
island next to where I had been hiding. So we picked them up and waited for 
night so we could go shore. That was our order, "You catch the commanding 
officer." But late in the evening we didn't see the message to proceed to Mili 
Island where about twenty Japanese had surrendered, showing a white flag 
over the island. So we proceeded that evening and we picked up the Japanese 
officer and turned back to Majuro. Later, after my second trip, my brother, 
who thought I was quite radical in using the guns, dumped me from that 
program. 
At the end of the war I was too old to get into school. The school system 
couldn't accept anyone of my age, so I went to see the principal of our school 
on Ebon. I asked him, "Can you please set up a program for old juveniles like 
us?" This man was good enough to set up a small program and put us in the 
back of the classroom. Because we were not young enough to be called fifth 
grade, he called us the "back table" because our table was in the back. 
We studied. Two years later I went to Majuro looking for a job but ended 
up in another school system where theywere teaching us how to teach young 
kids. So I spent six months in that school, but then they pulled me out and 
made me a storekeeper for the school. After two years they made me 
graduate and gave me a diploma, which qualified me as a teacher. 
I thought I was ready to teach, but discovered that I wasn't. So I went to 
Kwajalein and got a job with the US Navy and learned to speak English. 
When I had been picked up while I was swimming I could not answer any of 
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the English words spoken to me. I didn't speak one word of English. So I 
worked for the US Navy on Kwajalein for five years and then from there I 
proceeded to the Philippines on my own and was fortunate enough to get into 
a school there, a place called Solomon University. Without passes from high 
school it was not an easy task. In 1959 my brother became the first Mar-
shallese graduate of the University of Hawaii. In 1957 I became the first 
Marshallese graduate from Solomon University in the Philippines. 
Maybe I will add a word about my brother, why he did not graduate in 
1957 or before me. Perhaps you remember the testing of the atomic bomb in 
Bikini. Well, he spoke out, not really against the testing of the bomb, but he 
spoke and asked the United States to guarantee our life, the safety of our 
lives before any such test could be conducted. For that reason, and perhaps 
other reasons that I don't know, his scholarship just disappeared. He did not 
get back to school again until I had graduated from Solomon Unviersity in the 
Philippines. 
It's not easy to pick out the experiences that are most important in one's 
life. I can't speak for the entire population of the Marshall Islands, but at 
least many of my age are by-products of the Pacific War--a conflict that we 
were not part of. We had no business in it; but we were drawn into it. As a 
result it is not easy for any of us in the islands to predict our futures. We 
started out with the German government. They trained a bunch of us, giving 
us enough tools to learn what to do, what they expect of us, and how to build· 
our country. Then out went the Germans, and in came the Japanese. Those 
who were qualified to lead our country were no longer available, a new bunch 
had to be trained under the Japanese. And then when we were about to get 
on our feet and begin to think for ourselves, out go the Japanese. Then here 
come the Americans. And those leaders of the Japanese era were out, and a 
new bunch had to be trained. 
The question someone raised here yesterday is, "Who's next?" Well, 
perhaps that question is too late for the Marshall Islands, because we have 
our own government now. We have what we call the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands. But then when you examine that republic, and you think about how 
that republic was led into being what it is through the training of three 
different administrations, is that a republic, a product of our own desires, of 
our own making? Well, I will not pretend to have the answer to that question. 
All I'm saying is that our government today is spending gifts from the United 
States of $1.5 million dollars through our Compact of Free Association. Much 
of that money is designated into what we call eIP, capital improvement 
projects. But once that money is turned into nails and cement, airfields, and 
trucks, and none of it is invested by the time the fifteen years are up, what 
then? Again, I don't think I'm qualified to answer that question. But when 
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you try to separate our future and what we are today from what we were then, 
when other people were doing our thinking for us, you begin to wonder if that 
is exactly the type of government that we want. Perhaps it is, I don't know the 
answer. 
I remember not too long ago when I was in the Philippines and also when 
I was in the United States traveling, people always introduced me as Mr 
Heine from the Marshall Islands. And then after the end of our talk people 
would ask, "Where?" And I would say, "Marshall Islands." "Where is that?" 
And I answered, "Micronesia." "What's that?" I had a difficult time trying to 
tell them where I am from, unless I said, "You know Bikini?" Then they would 
say, "You mean, you are talking about that little thing?" I said, "No, I'm 
talking about that bigger thing." Then I said, ''Y ou remember the atomic 
bomb test?" "Oh, so you are from there? You mean you still have people 
living there?" I said, "Look at me, I'm alive." 
Now if people are trying to govern someone far away and trying to build 
the future of people far away not knowing where we are (I'm talking about 
the Germans and about the Americans), would they know where they want to 
take us to? I think it is a very important question to be answered from our 
own inner soul. 
I have a cousin who wrote a book, Micronesia at the Crossroads. His name 
is Carl Heine. He also went through this school (University of Hawaii). In 
that book he was talking about the crossroads. He became our first author. 
Whatever he said in that book, being the first author in my family, I'm really 
happy that he produced something that somebody can read. 
There is another thing that people don't quite understand. I was invited in 
Baltimore, Maryland, to speak in a Methodist church. My name was plastered 
all over the church bulletin that Mr Heine from the Marshall Islands, the 
missionary, is coming to talk to us. And of course the church was filled 
because they misunderstood my name. They thought Heine was someone 
from Germany and they wanted to come to hear the report on the money 
they had been spending on our small church. But they were kind of 
disappointed when they discovered that I was a native from a tiny island. So 
let me explain to you why I'm Heine and why my parents suffered during the 
war. If I was Heine from Germany, then why should the Japanese go after my 
parents? Well, actually, Heine is the name from Germany and we were from 
there sometime way back. But the Japanese were more concerned about my 
middle name, Russell, it's from England. My great-great-grandfather migrated 
to England, married a Britisher, and then went to Australia and married an 
Australian. Then two generations later my grandfather came to the island and 
married a native. So here I am, a mixed-up halohalo. Again, a by-product of 
foreign countries. 
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I can go on and name you numbers of experiences from numbers of 
people who were actually shot, who were actually killed, who were actually 
beheaded in front of my eyes. War is a horrible thing to happen to anyone. 
ICs even more horrible when you don't understand the meaning of it. I don't 
believe any nine-year-old kid can interpret the meanings of war. To the 
Marshallese, when we compare our age to the age of the United States and 
other countries, we are just infants, and it's very difficult for us to interpret 
the meaning of that war and relate it to our present experience. But we do 
know that we were tangled by it, that we were hit by it. 
Stories are being told over and over and over about what the war was. I 
repeatedly told my family. Perhaps now I am beginning to regret that I've 
been telling them that kind of story about the war, because I have a son who 
is in the US Marine Corps. I have a cousin, Cad Heine's brother, who has 
been out of the army serving in Vietnam. I have a nephew, here in Honolulu, 
in the army, and I have two grandchildren that have just been qualified last 
month to be in the army and the navy. So I don't know, I must have planted 
some kind of seed for revenge. That's why I feel kind of sorry about my 
stories. Maybe I shouldn't have talked to you and told you these kinds of 
stories. Because whoever we are, whether we believe in God or not, or a 
Supreme Being, there is always that little voice of danger in one's mind. 
Thank you. 
Appendix: Aud,ience Questions and Answers 
JH John Heine 
RF Robert Franco 
LM Leonard Mason 
AP Antonio Palomo 
LM The Marshall Islands is an area that I have worked with for over forty 
years. I know 'very much what John Heine has been talking about because I 
heard stories like that in 1946 when I was first out there. But I think there's 
something that John referred to only briefly that needs some emphasis, 
because it's part of the war story and yet it's not. In 1946 the US military 
began the atomic tests at Bikini and later at Enewetak. The communities that 
were relocated from those areas to other islands in the Marshalls had 
hardships of various kinds in making adjustments. Then in 1954 the first 
hydrogen bomb was exploded at Bikini. I'm sure you've all heard of the 
radioactive cloud that blew over Rongelap to the east and that exposed those 
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people. At least one has died and many have been in the hospital because of 
some of the effects of that. There are those kinds of difficulties that people 
are still experiencing in the Marshalls that come out of the war. If the 
Americans had not gone into the Marshalls as they did, they probably would 
not have selected Bikini and Enewetak for tests as soon as the war was over. 
There is still another side effect of this that is disturbing the culture 
greatly. It concerns the payment of money to these disturbed populations. 
We've introduced a kind of money economy to some of the populations to 
the point where they are really almost welfare people, like Bikini, Enewetak, 
and Rongelap. Then we took over Kwajalein and developed a missile-testing 
site which is now intended to be part of the Star Wars program. The United 
States is paying some $8 to $10 million a year to the Kwajalein landowners for 
the lease of that land. Distribution of that money has created untold problems 
because land is very important to the Marshallese, and when you get money 
for your land, how do you divide it up? By the traditional system? It's into the 
courts. And I just say now that John Heine, as a trial attorney in the Mar-
shalls, is right in the middle of that kind of result from World War II, and we 
shouldn't lose sight of that. What the future holds is even more complicated 
because of some of these events that arose out of the war. Thank you. 
AP I'd like to pose this question to John. You've mentioned two things. One 
was that you decided to attend college in the Philippines and the other had to 
do with your brother Dwight who had a scholarship to go to college, yet for 
some reason it was denied him. Do you know why? Why did you decide to go 
to the Philippines? You could have come here, you could have gone to the 
states, you could have gone to other places. 
JH I guess my brother was fortunate enough to receive a scholarship from 
the United States Navy. That's why he came to this school. I was working for 
the United States Navy as well, but I did not receive any scholarship. But I did 
receive free transportation to the Philippines .... Because my brother 
appeared in the United Nations and spoke against the tests of the bomb the 
scholarship was withdrawn. Then later on he continued his education through 
the John Hay Whitney Foundation of New York. 
LM I can add just a footnote to that, which might clarify things from my 
understanding. I know Dwight quite well. Dwight was one of the first 
Marshallese to become a public figure in the Marshalls under the American 
administration. At one point, after he'd been to college here for a couple of 
years and then had gone back and was working in the education program 
there, he was invited to New York to the Trusteeship Council meeting. At 
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that time they were considering a motion (this was before 1958) to terminate 
tests in the Marshalls. And he spoke in favor of that motion. He had not 
gotten authority from the high commissioner of the Trust Territory to make 
that trip. He also made speeches on the mainland on his way back, under 
private sponsorship. When he got back to the Marshalls his job was taken 
away from him and the scholarship which he had been promised lapsed. 
There were several people here in Hawai'i, in the education department, who 
knew him quite well, who spoke in his favor in high places in Washington, and 
Dwight Heine's name was finally cleared. Another high commissioner had 
come in and made another decision. But I think that's partly what explains the 
retraction of his scholarship. 
RF Has Marshallese enlistment in the US miiitary increased a great deal in 
recent years or has it been steady since the war? 
JH I thought two years ago Marshallese would get out of the Marshall 
Islands, find the opportunity outside the Marshalls to enlist. They did enlist 
outside, but right now there is an active program of recruiting inside the 
Marshall Islands itself. Since the signing of the Compact of Free Association 
there are few benefits that have been afforded to us in the Marshalls, and 
serving in the United States armed forces is one of the benefits made avail-
able to our young people. A lot of kids are taking the test, and it amazes me 
that over 60 percent are passing. Somehow we thought that it would not be 
that high. We all made a mistake, we thought maybe under 50 percent would 
pass. But it's over 50 percent of the kids passing, including girls. That's 
another thing that amazes me because women in our history have always been 
in the background, although they are the backbone of our country because we 
inherit our rights to the land through our mothers, through the female line. 
The women were expected to stay in the background, but today we are having 
numbers of girls signing up, taking the test, and passing the test. So something 
is going on, maybe that's another result of the war. 
RF The Marshallese and the other Compact states in Micronesia can 
voluntarily enlist but may not be drafted. Is that correct? 
JH Yes, they are not drafted. They are voluntarily enlisted. We have regular 
visits by army recruiters. 
Q There are economic benefits regarding military establishments, and 
Marshallese are finding opportunities through the American military for 
some advancement as well. But do you find that at all ambiguous? Do you 
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find that being inside the American military has an advantage? It gives you a 
leverage, perhaps, on the future of the Marshall Islands? Or is it also a 
danger? Or both? Because, of course, the Kwajalein military testing range will 
be a nuclear target. 
JH I think you are quite right that there is danger in what we are doing right 
now. But I guess the dangerous part of what's happening now is not that 
strong in our minds because we are economically so poor. We have no eco-
nomic base besides our coconuts, which is only about eight cents a pound, 
nine cents a pound, sometimes it's down to two cents a pound. So, in the 
absence of an economic base, we see that because of the Kwajalein testing 
ground we cannot really say no to the United States. While the taking is good, 
we are using it. And, speaking of leverage, yes, there is that leverage. I 
attended one of the prenegotiation meetings before the signing of the Com-
pact when one of our delegates told some big man from the Department of 
Defense, "Well, if you cannot accept our price in Kwajalein, there are others 
who want to pay." This man quickly pounded the table and got up and said, 
"Let's have a break for a while." So we had a coffee break for about five 
minutes. Whatever took place after that, I don't know whether there was a 
telephone call somewhere, but then we found the (payment) clause in our 
compact was a little bit jacked up. So, I mean, we can sense that we have 
some chips in our hand right now. But for how long, we don't know. If new 
places are selected, or if the atomic bomb becomes obsolete, then what? We 
have that question in our mind too. And believe me, our islands are not 
growing any bigger. Our population has grown from barely ten thousand after 
the war to forty-two thousand and we're still on the go. So I don't know when 
that will stop, the spiraling of our needs with the rising of our population, but 
something is bound to happen somewhere. 
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Lessons of War from Pohnpei 
Suzanne Falgout 
What exactly happened to the island ofPohnpei and its people during World 
War II? As Lin Poyer (chapter 7) has pointed out, written sources of the 
period are based primarily on Allied military documents, and the information 
they provide is limited to strategic plans, dates, and targets of attack plus 
some intelligence data on Japanese activities (Crowl 1960; Morison 1975; 
Richard 1957; Sherrod 1952). The limited nature of this information 
combined with the use of such seemingly innocuous labels as "neutralized" 
and "bypassed" tends to downplay wartime activities on the island. 
Furthermore, the reader is left to wonder if there were any native inhabitants 
on the island or how they were involved. 
Yet it is clear to all but the most casual visitor to the island that the 
people of Pohnpei were significantly involved in the war and that they 
consider World War II to be an important part of their own history. In 1980-
1981 I lived in the Wene area of the Kitti chiefdom located in the southern 
part of Pohnpei. During my stay World War II was a topic that was still 
discussed by older men and women in daily conversations around the 
household and at informal kava gatherings of neighbors and friends in the 
evenings, and warsongs continued to be broadcast over the local radio station. 
I returned in the summer of 1985 to ask women and men of Pohnpei to 
share their memories of the war with me. They recounted their wartime 
experiences vividly in songs, anecdotes, and personal narratives. These 
accounts provided detailed descriptions of the variety of wartime activities in 
which they participated and also revealed how they themselves understood, 
felt about, and coped with the war (see Falgout 1989). These accounts at 
times were filled with emotion. I was impressed that World War II was really 
a watershed event, a turning point in their lives and in Pohnpei history. I 
believe that the enormous scale of this foreign war, fought with advanced 
technology, and the rapid, dramatic social changes that accompanied it 
continue to shape the lives of those who experienced it. Let us look then at 
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what happened to the people of Pohnpei in World War n and at the 
important lessons these wartime experiences have held for them. 
Wartime Experiences in Pohnpei 
When Pearl Harbor was attacked on 7 December 1941 Pohnpei had been 
under Japanese colonial rule for twenty-seven years. Fertile Pohnpei had 
been well suited for Japan's initial goals of resettlement of its burgeoning 
population and for economic production for the homeland (Fischer 1957). 
Shortly before the war broke out, economic production on the island was 
stepped up, with a goal of furnishing supplies for war efforts on other islands 
(Bascom 1965). Military construction projects (such as land communication 
and radar installations, defensive gun empiacements, blockhouses, sheiters, a 
seaplane base, and two small airstrips) were also begun (Ashby 1983; Den-
field 1979). The people of Pohnpei were among those hired to work on 
various wartime projects. At first their participation was on a voluntary, wage 
labor basis. Men went to work on construction projects and on agricultural 
plantations. Some young women also went to work in the fields, hoping to 
earn a little money and to have a bit of adventure. 
No major battle would actually be fought on Pohnpei soil. However, some 
men were drafted into the Japanese military and were transported to other 
islands. In July 1942, 20 men from Pohnpei (5 from each of the four chief-
doms existing at that time) were drafted and sent to Rabaul to join the 
fighting (Higuchi 1984). Once they reached Rabaul these men were assigned 
to different units. In July 1943 another 179 Pohnpei men were drafted and 
sent to Kosrae. For reasons widely speculated about, but ultimately unknown, 
all of these men came from the chiefdom of Kitti and represented all 
remaining able-bodied men from that area. Kitti women had been left behind 
to care for their families, farmsteads, and community. 
Events in 1944 would change Pohnpei's role once again. Allied forces had 
decided to "neutralize" and then "bypass" Pohnpei before proceeding with the 
attack on Enewetak. This process of "neutralizing and bypassing" an island, 
however, was not as innocent an action as it sounded. The people of Pohnpei 
recalled seeing several Allied planes flying reconnaissance missions over the 
island in early February. A few days later the bombing began. According to 
Allied reports 42 B-24 Liberator bombers of the 7th Air Force based on 
Tarawa struck Pohnpei. Within two weeks 5 Allied raids dropped a total of 
118 tons of high explosives and over 6000 incendiary bombs. Then on 1 May, 
six US battleships (Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Alabama, North 
Carolina, South Carolina) shelled the northern portion of the island, 
including the port town and Japanese colonial headquarters of Kolonia. The 
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attack was halted after 70 minutes when it was determined that no worthwhile 
targets remained. Indeed, all air bases had been destroyed and of the 940 
buildings in Kolonia, an estimated 75 percent were leveled (Denfield 1979; 
Hanlon 1981). Furthermore, shipping was effectively blockad~. The new 
Japanese goal in Pohnpei necessarily became one of self-sufficiency. The 
people of Pohnpei were pressed into forced labor units, and the level and 
harshness of the Japanese demands increased. 
In Kitti all able-bodied women were now conscripted to work on various 
agricultural projects around the island. Young mothers were forced to leave 
their children in care of the aged or infirm now left behind. Those women 
who joined the workforce put in long hours from sunrise to sunset. Days off 
were reduced to alternate Sundays, then completely canceled. Toward the 
end of the war some workers were even locked in compounds and forbidden 
any visitors, not even their own children. Those who had been left behind had 
to fend for themselves. Farmsteads suffered from neglect, and consumption 
of farm products was carefully monitored by the Japanese. 
Many Kitti women went to work initially in the tapioca and rice fields in 
Sokehs chiefdom located in the drier, flatter northern end of the island; later 
some toiled in the tobacco fields established in the southern Madolenihmw 
chiefdom. Living conditions in agricultural compounds were poor, and the 
work was backbreaking. 
Allied forces repeatedly bombed the island in order to prevent the rapid 
rebuilding efforts of the Japanese. (Denfield [1979] estimates 250 airstrikes 
were mounted from February 1944 to August 1945.) One Kittiwoman who 
worked in the rice fields of Sokehs remembered being able to set a clock by 
the arrival of the planes. The crew began work at 5 AM. When the planes 
arrived at 8 AM workers hid in bunkers and ate their breakfast. When the 
alarm sounded again they went back to work. But sometimes the planes 
arrived unexpectedly. This woman vividly recalled shaking with fear as she 
tried to run for cover. She is a large and somewhat awkward woman. She 
stated that she started to give up trying to escape and would just lie down in 
the open field to accept her fate. After several near misses a kindly Japanese 
supervisor assigned her to kitchen detail. But even here, she pointed out, she 
was not safe. One morning a bullet struck the chair in which she had just been 
sitting. 
These extreme efforts on the parts of the Japanese and the people of 
Pohnpei were apparently effective. There was a severe shortage of cloth. 
Some people were forced to fashion clothing out of old handkerchiefs, 
stockings, or even hospital gauze; others stayed indoors, only venturing out 
under cover of darkness. However, they do not recall any serious lack of food 
during the war. 
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Those men who had been drafted and relocated to other Pacific arenas 
were not so fortunate, however. Of the twenty men sent to Rabaul, where 
fighting was intense, only three were returned (Watakabe 1972). Kitti men 
who had been relocated to work on construction projects in Kosrae (along 
with Japanese, Okinawan, and Korean soldiers, plus natives of Kiribati) also 
suffered extreme hardships after tl,te bombing began in 1944. In February 
1944 four American planes sunk the Japanese ship Sun Sang Maru and· 
destroyed the warehouse, airstrip, and other military buildings. After this 
incident three large ships carrying numerous Japanese reinforcements from 
Chuuk were dispatched to Kosrae. Allied bombing of Chuuk shortly after 
disrupte4 further transportation and effectively stranded these soldiers and 
cut off needed goods. Food was in very short supply, and an emphasis was 
now placed on establishing agdcultural plantations. But the number of people 
on the island was too great; strict rationing was begun and starvation soon set 
in. Other defensive military construction projects were initiated, with work 
continuing night and day with little rest. No one remained idle. Even the sick 
and dying were assigned tasks according to their remaining abilities. 
The Japanese assigned different foodstuffs to each of the different cul-
tural groups on Kosraeaccording to a hierarchial ranking. The best foods, 
including all large fish and most other sources of protein, went to the 
Japanese themselves. Kiribati men, because they were former British subjects 
and considered prisoners of war by the Japanese, were given last priority in 
obtaining food: The people of Pohnpei fell in between. At first Pohnpei men 
were given breadfruit and coconuts to eat, both important items in their 
traditional diet. Natives of Kiribati were given only less desirable swamp taro. 
As times got tougher the people of Pohnpei were given the Kiribati foods. 
Kiribati nativeS then subsisted on the few tiny potatoes that still grew and 
finally on just potato leaves cooked in a "soup." Anxiety over food ran high 
fed by rumors ;of widespread cannibalism in Tarawa and one suspected case in 
Kosrae. One informant reported his delight in finding a single coconut one 
morning; he believed this would insure his survival until evening. Many of the 
. Kiribati reportedly died from malnutrition. Japanese soldiers unaccustomed 
to the island foods and environment, did not fare well either. Kitti men 
describe in vivid detail Japanese soldiers who had degenerated into walking 
"stick men." It is a sight they cannot forget. 
Wartime Lessons for the People of Pohnpei 
"War is the greatest hardship," is the phrase Pohnpei men and women use 
over and over 'again to sum up their experiences in World War II. To the 
outsider wartime conditions in Pohnpei were certainly not as bad as in some 
126 
Lessons of War from Pohnpei 
other locations in the Pacific theater, and miraculously few people of Pohnpei 
died in the crossfire. Nevertheless, the nature and scale of the hardships they 
suffered exceeded anything previously known to them. Common themes 
running thoughout the war accounts I collected concern the miserable 
conditions, the poor treatment by Japanese and Allies alike, and the general 
question of why Pohnpei had been caught in the middle of this foreign war. 
Some people stated that they still find it difficult to discuss this period in their 
lives. At times a person would shudder at the memory of an event, ask for a 
break, or even halt the interview. I believe these World War n experiences 
have caused the people of Pohnpei to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses 
of their traditions and to reconsider their relationships with outsiders. Here I 
will limit my remarks to just two examples. 
First, I believe that as a result of their wartime experiences traditional 
Pohnpei gender distinctions became blurred and in need of revision. Pohnpei 
men, proud of their traditional roles as hard workers and fierce warriors, 
came to sense their limitations in this foreign war fought with advanced 
technology. For example Kitti men who had been relocated on Kosrae 
reported experiences of acute loneliness, fear, and nervousness after the 
bombing began. One young Kitti man observed the bombing of Kosrae as he 
lay flattened out among the roots of a breadfruit tree--the only shelter he 
could find. He recalled how hard the ground shook during the bombing and 
the scenes of death and destruction after the smoke cleared. Later he sat 
alone, his body still trembling violently with fear, trying to regain his 
composure. Some Kitti men were diagnosed as having a dread Pohnpei 
disease, "sickness of unhappiness," a debilitating disease affecting both body 
and mind (Ward 1979). Reportedly, several died from it. People living near 
the airstrips and agricultural plantations in Sokehs that were bombed 
repeatedly were afraid to go outside; some chose to forego eating for several 
days at a time rather than venture out into the fields. 
The impact of the war on Pohnpei women was no less profound. For 
example, Kitti women who had traditionally been unaccustomed to heavy 
work and scenes of combat, reported severe hemorrhaging toward the end of 
the war. Some women blamed their subsequent infertility on the wartime 
hardships they endured. Yet, the wartime experiences of these women helped 
them to realize they could overcome traditional limitations on their activities. 
After the war Kitti women did not completely revert to their traditional roles. 
These women also began to accompany men at their tasks. This generation of 
Kitti women, I am told, is renowned for overstepping traditional gender 
boundaries in both work and politics, and for helping to open the way for 
further changes in women's roles brought by the subsequent American 
administration of the island. 
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Under A.merican policies of universal education and affirmative action, 
Pohnpei women have been encouraged to pursue advanced education and to 
work in the modern sector (see Falgout 1988). While Pohnpei women remain 
statistically underrepresented in the workforce .and rarely hold high level 
positions, the people of Pohnpei do recognize a number of benefits in having 
educated and working women as members of their households. These women 
bring cash incOmes to their own natal families and to that of their husbands. 
An education is now considered an additional asset in women and bas become 
a consideration in marriage choice. Some Pohnpei employers prefer to hire 
women as workers in positions such as secretaries, teachers, nurses, and 
storekeepers. They believe that women are more open by nature and thus 'are 
less prone to shame others or become shamed themselves in business trans-
actions. Some families may even prefer that the women in the family are the 
ones to work in the modern sector. This will free the men to engage in tradi-
tionally important activities, such as agriculture or community service. In this 
way a family can get ahead in both worlds. 
Second, and more significantly, I believe World War II experiences have 
played a major role in Pohnpei's reassessment of its relations with foreigners 
and the nature and significance of its role in the world context. For the more 
than one hundred fifty years since contact, various foreigners have had their 
own agenda for the island of Pohnpei and its people. Early in the days of 
contact with whalers, traders, missionaries, and the like, foreigners were 
relatively few in number, often disorganized, and at times competed with each 
other in their efforts (Falgout 1987; Fischer 1957; Hanlon 1988). Under these 
circumstances the people of Pohnpei were able to bend foreign desires to fit 
traditional Pohnpei goals--to acquire new forms of wealth and to gain allies 
with technologically superior weapon systems, and by these means to enhance 
their prestige within the traditional chiefdom. But, increasingly over colonial 
times, the people of Pohnpei became dominated by and dependent on the 
foreign presence, a situation reinforced by threat of military force. Although 
Pohnpei people were able to retain many of their traditions to a remarkable 
degree, these were relegated to an evershrinking sphere of activities. Looking 
at the island context as a whole, the people of Pohnpei were becoming 
marginal figures in their own land. 
Foreign domination and dependency was clearly the case in Japanese 
colonial times. Japan ruled its Micronesian possessions with a firm hand and 
had achieved a good measure of success in ensuring Pohnpei loyalties. When 
the war broke out, the people of Pohnpei recalled. they were initially a bit 
excited to begin preparations. Warfare in traditional Pohnpei was the ·custom 
of men, " and many believed Japan was powerful enough to win the war. 
Furthermore, Japanese propaganda led the people of Pohnpei to believe that 
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the bumbling, stupid Americans would never pose a serious threat. The 
American inability to effectively use their sophisticated wartime technology 
was the butt of Pohnpei jokes. Indeed, when American planes initially 
reached the island, their gunfire was usually wide of the presumed target, 
often landing in the jungle or the ocean. When the bombing began, however, 
the people of Pohnpei began to sense the huge scale of the war and the 
possibility that Japan might lose. One man who worked as a native assistant 
and interpreter for the Japanese talked about the bombing of Kolonia: "It was 
only then that I realized Americans would actually fight in Pohnpei. The 
Japanese had given us instructions on how to protect ourselves if we were 
bombed. They told us to put our thumbs in our ears and our fingers over our 
eyes. Before this (the bombing of Pohnpei), we used to joke about it. We 
used it to tease our friends. Now we realized what could happen--we could 
lose our eyes, even our lives. II 
Now the people of Pohnpei began to fear Japanese reprisals for their role 
in losing the war. Some Japanese soldiers, sympathetic to the plight of the 
people, warned them that the Japanese would allow no natives to be taken as 
prisoners. Should invasion occur, rumor had it, the Japanese planned to 
annihilate the natives as they huddled in their bomb shelters. While the men 
continued to build bomb shelters according to Japanese specifications, they 
secretly made plans to escape both sides. These plans were codified in song 
and transmitted through the gossip network. 
In the end, Japanese surrender of the island to the Allies was accom-
plished without incident (Momm 1945). However, according to Jack Fischer, 
who served as naval administrator of the island from 1950 to 1953, the people 
of Pohnpei considered the Americans to be just the latest in a series of 
conquerors. He wrote, "Moreover, some of our behavior (e.g., treatment of 
government land, caste and social barriers between Americans and natives) 
appears to the Ponapeans to confirm this view. We are considered as better 
conquerors than the Japanese mainly because we order people around less, 
do not slap them, and leave them to pursue their own ambitions" (Fischer 
1949-1954). 
Clearly then, the women and men of Pohnpei did playa significant role in 
World War II, and (at least at first) many did so willingly. But I believe that 
the people of Pohnpei became increasingly aware that their fate ultimately 
rested in the hands of Japanese and Allied forces. The wartime hardships 
endured by them, I believe, serve as the extreme example of the high price of 
foreign domination and dependency. And I believe wartime experiences have 
been a significant factor in their recent decisions to take a more direct and 
active role in defining their relations with their Pacific rim neighbors and in 
charting a new role for themselves in the modern world. Pohnpei involvement 
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in World Warn has also heightened their awareness of the strategic geo-
graphic position they hold in the world context. Some Pohnpei leaders now 
see this strategic position as a sigrtificant bargaining chip to be used in 
charting Pohnpei's future. Clearly the people of Pohnpei are no longer willing 
to place their fate so firIilly in the hands of foreigners. 
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Island in Agony: The War in Guam 
Tony Palomo 
Wben one reads the popular anthologies about World War II in the Pacific 
one is invariably impressed by the drama of the stealthy Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, the rape of Nanking, the humiliation of the French in Indo-
china, and the blustery cry of "I shall return!" from General Douglas 
MacArthur just before the fall of Bataan in the Philippines. As one leafs 
through the ultimate chapter of these chronologies one senses the heroics at 
Midway and the Coral Sea, the deathly battles at Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima, 
and finally, the Japanese surrender aboard the battleship Missouri on Tokyo 
Bay. These are, of course, all factual and quite appropriate in any recounting 
of the Pacific War. Invariably missing in all these anthologies are the roles 
played by the unwitting victims of the war and the effects the three-year 
conflict had on these people. 
Let me speak about Guam because I was there from beginning to end, 
although I was a bit too young to fight and a bit too old to forget. 
Guam is the southernmost island in the Mariana archipelago, a little over 
200 square miles at about 14 degrees north of the equator. During 1941 there 
were some 20,000 people living in Guam; no less than 90 percent were of 
Chamorro ancestry. The other 10 percent were Americans, mostly military 
personnel and their dependents, Filipinos, Japanese, Chinese, some Micro-
nesians, and a few persons of Spanish, German, and English ancestry. About 
half of the population was then living in the city of Agana. A good number 
were living in the seaport town of Sumay, and the villages of Agat, Umatac, 
Merizo, and Inarajan. Most people, including those in Agana, derived their 
livelihood from the farms, which were strewn throughout the 30-mile long 
island. 
In 1941 Guam had been under American naval administration for four 
decades, or since 1898 when naval Captain Henry Glass seized the Spanish-
owned island while en route to Manila to assist Admiral Dewey to subdue the 
Spaniards-.;and later the Filipinos--during the Spanish-American War. 
Believe it or not, not a drop of blood was spilled during the American take-
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over. In fact, the Spanish garrison of some fifty soldiers thought the booming 
sound coming from the uss Charleston's cannon was a salute rather than an 
act of war. Needless to say, the Spaniards surrendered meekly in the face of 
some two thousand armed troops aboard the American naval fleet close to 
the reef and bound for the Philippines. 
Several things must be understood before we dwell on the Pacific War 
itself. First of all, although they were mere wards of the United States, the 
Guamanians were very loyal to America. For more than thirty years, they 
sought US citizenship status, but they were consistently turned down. They 
remained loyal nonetheless. The Guamanians strongly believed in the great-
ness of America, both as a freedom-loving country and as a military power. 
Second, the neighboring islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota, the latter being 
only 45 miles north of Guam, were Japanese-mandated islands and were vir-
tually closed ports during the late 1930s and early 1940s. Native inhabitants of 
these islands were also Chamorros, all related to the Chamorros in Guam. 
Their loyalty, however, was to Japan. 
Preparations for the possibility of war were taking place. Military barracks 
and fuel tanks were under construction. Young local men were being 
recruited into the US Navy as mess attendants and as Insular Guards. Other 
local men were being recruited by Pan American World Airways for work at 
Midway, Wake, Canton, and other points in the Pacific. Late in November 
1941 the navy evacuated all its dependents to Hawai'i--except five nurses and 
a dependent awaiting the birth of a child. 
Then, early in December 1941, two Japanese envoys stopped in Guam 
while en route to Washington, DC, to talk peace. And while the Japanese 
emissaries were talking peace in Secretary of State Cordell Hull's office that 
fateful day on 7 December 1941 (8 December in Guam), the Japanese naval 
fleet and air armada struck Pearl Harbor. According to my clock, the Japa-
nese struck Guam four hours later, blasting the Marine Barracks and the Pan 
American Hotel in Sumay, and peppering other selected targets throughout 
the island. 
Two days later, in the early morning of Wednesday, 10 December 1941, 
some five thousand fully armed Japanese soldiers invaded Guam or, as the 
Japanese historian preferred, "advanced" into the island. The only resistance 
took place at the historic Plaza de Espana in Agana where about one hundred 
local defenders, mostly Insular Guardsmen, navyrnen and a few Marines 
fought the invaders for perhaps thirty minutes before accepting the inevi-
table. No one has ever established the number of people killed during the 
Japanese invasion. I would say one hundred, more or less. My father helped 
bury about thirty bodies in a mass grave along the beach in east Agana. And 
there were, of course, dead soldiers and sailors at the Plaza de Espana. No 
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one seems to know how many Japanese soldiers were killed during the brief 
encounter. My guess is few, if any. 
Guam thus became the first and only American territory conquered by a 
foreign power. Some people may argue that the Philippines also fell to the 
enemy, but it must be remembered that the US Congress passed legislation in 
1934 granting independence to the Philippines, and it was during a transi-
tional period that war broke out. Philippine independence was slated for 
1944. 
In surrendering Guam to the Japanese, Naval Governor George 
McMillin poignantly said: 
Captain George J. McMillin, United States Navy, Governor of Guam and 
Commandant, United States Naval Station, Guam, by authority of my 
commission from the President of the United States, do, as a result of 
superior military forces landed in Guam this date, as an act of war, 
surrender this post to you (Captain HayaShi) as the representative of the 
Imperial Japanese Government. 
The responsibility of the civil government of Guam becomes yours as of 
the time of signing of this document. 
I have been assured by you that the civil rights of the population of 
Guam will be respected and that the military forces surrendered to you will 
be accorded all the rights stipulated by international law and the laws of 
humanity. (Palomo 1984,31) 
Shortly afterward the Japanese commandant issued the following 
proclamation: 
We proclaim herewith that our Japanese Army has occupied this island of 
Guam by the order of the Great Emperor of Japan. It is for the purpose of 
restoring liberty and rescuing the whole Asiatic people and creating the 
permanent peace in Asia. Thus our intention is to establish the New Order 
of the World. 
You all good citizens need not worry anything under the regulations of 
our Japanese authorities and my [sic] enjoy your daily life as we guarantee 
your lives and never distress nor plunder your property. In case, however, 
when use demand you [sic] accommodations necessary for our quarters and 
lodgings, you shall meet promptly with our requirements. In that case our 
Army shall not fail to pay you in our currency. 
Those who conduct any defiance and who act spy [sic] against our 
enterprise, shall be court-martialled and the Army shall take strict care to 
execute said criminals by shooting! 
Dated this 10th day of December 2601 in Japanese calendar or by this 10th 
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day of December, 1941. By order of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief. 
(Palomo 1984,31) 
Thus began thirty months of Japanese occupation. 
Everyone was required to report and register with the Japanese 
authorities. The Japanese issued orders banning possession of firearms, 
radios, and cameras. Those found to possess any of these instruments were 
subject to stiff penalties, including death. To impress the local citizenry of 
their seriousness about criminal or treasonable behavior, the Japanese 
executed two young Chamorro men by firing squad early in 1942. Shot to 
death--before a captive audience of Chamorros near the Catholic cemetery--
were Francisco Won Pat for allegedly stealing goods at a warehouse owned by 
an Anlcrican company, and pJfred Flores for sneaking a message to an .A~'l1er­
ican friend being interned. The message allegedly sought the American's 
advice on what to do with a stack of dynamite at a worksite. 
All American personnel--except six navymen--were later shipped to 
prisoner of war camps in Japan. The six sailors fled into the jungles of Guam 
to await the return of American forces, which they confidently estimated 
would take no more than three months at the most. Only one--George 
Tweed--survived the war, thanks to the courageous and surreptitious assis-
tance of dozens of Guamanians, including Antonio Artero and his family who 
fed and kept him in hiding for eighteen months. The others were eventually 
tracked down and executed by Japanese search teams. None was given a 
chance to surrender. 
Agana became a virtual ghost town during the occupation period. Most of 
its residents left the city and eked out their living in the farming areas in the 
outlying districts. For hundreds of years Guam's economy had been agricul-
tural. So the people had no difficulty making the adjustment, including my 
father who was a carpenter by vocation and a part-time storekeeper. When 
our family moved to my maternal grandparents' ranch in Mogfog, some ten 
miles east of Agana, my father simply swapped the many cans of groceries and 
other goods in our small store for hogs, chickens, and a couple of heads of 
cattle, and we all became full-time farmers. We even purchased our first and 
only horse, Peggy by name. The soil and the farm animals became our 
salvation, as they did for hundreds of other city folk. 
Although there were no underground saboteurs as we see depicted in 
European cities and towns, we had some pretty brave and daring souls on our 
little island. During the first year of the war there were at least six radio 
receivers operating on the island, and information on the changing tides of 
war was passed on, secretly of course, to key island rcsidcnts--sometimes right 
under the noses of the Japanese. Those in-the-know learned of the fall of 
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Bataan, Singapore, and Malaysia. They later learned of the victories at 
Midway, the Coral Sea, and Guadalcanal. So by the time the last of the radio 
receivers burned itself out the outcome of the war was a certainty.· 
There were many heroes during the war, but I shall name only two 
because they were giants in their hearts and convictions--one was a man of 
God, the other a true earthly patriot. 
Father Jesus Baza Duenas was a constant thorn to the Japanese, includ-
ing the military and civil authorities as wen as the Japanese Catholic prelates 
who were brought to Guam to help sell the goodness of the Japanese Empire. 
Stubborn as a mule, Father Duenas refused to accept temporal orders and 
insisted that he was answerable only to God. "And the Japanese are not God," 
he asserted many times. At a meeting called by the Japanese, Father Duenas 
sat at the back of the meeting room and was heard to sing--quietly--"God 
Bless America." It is said that at one time a frustrated Japanese leader 
threatened to have the padre exiled to nearby Rota but decided not to do so 
for fear of an uprising by the natives. As is the destiny of most heroes, Father 
Duenas was executed nine days before American forces returned to Guam. 
The other hero was Joaquin Limtiaco, an unassuming man who operated 
a fleet of taxicabs prior to the war. Limty, as all persons by that name are 
called, was recruited by Japanese intelligence to track down the American 
fugitives. Limtiaco did such an excellent job that he pretty much knew where 
the Americans were most ofthe time and was able to forewarn them when-
ever the Japanese searchers planned a stake out at any of their many hiding 
places. Because of their frustrations the Japanese took it out on Limtiaco, 
torturing him on eight different occasions, and not once did Limty give away 
the Americans. 
The Japanese were, of course, aware of the need to convert the Cha-
morros, recognizing that they had been under the spell of the Americans for 
four decades. By the middle of 1942 elementary schools were reestablished 
throughout the island, manned by Japanese teachers brought in from Japan. 
Established also was a special school geared toward training local young men 
and women to become interpreters and teaching assistants. In other efforts to 
Japanize the island, the names of Guam as well as the various municipalities 
were changed. Guam became "Omiya Jima," which means "the Great Shrine 
Island." The city of Agana became" Akashi" or "Red City." The various 
villages were similarly renamed. 
Propagandists were also utilized. Among arguments used were the 
potential benefits that could be derived by the Chamorros as partners in the 
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, which, in effect, would be the 
Japanese Empire comprising Japan, a big chunk of China, Indochina, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, and the Marianas. The empire would 
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then be the greatest in the world, possessing everything needed to prevail, 
and would need nothing from outside these perimeters. 
In conversations with prominent Chamorros astute Japanese propa-
gandists would offer any or all of the following arguments in attempts to 
convert the natives: 
1 It is understandable for the Chamorros to prefer the Americans. After all, 
the Americans had been in Guam for forty years and sentimental feelings 
were bound to develop. However, if the Chamorros would give the Japanese 
the same length of time, forty years, the Chamorros would prefer Japanese 
to the Am~ricans. 
2 Unfortunate though it may have been historical facts indicated that 
Guam was the only known inhabited island to regress in population during 
the past three centuries. When the Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan 
docked in Guam in 1521 the estimated population of the Marianas was 
placed at anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000. When the Japanese arrived in 
1941 there were less than 20,000. All other areas in the world showed 
substantial increases in population. Something must have been wrong in 
Guam. 
3 Ever since Western colonizers stepped on the shores of Guam in the 
seventeenth century, the Chamorros never controlled their own destiny. 
"When the SpaniardS came, they controlled you, didn't they? When the 
Americans came, they ruled the island, didn't they? Now that we're here, we 
control you, don't we? And should the Americans return, they'll control 
you again, won't they?" 
To some extent, such propaganda worked. A story is told of a woman 
who, prior to the war, lived with an American navy man, and not long after 
the Japanese came, she commenced living with a Japanese officer. Some of 
her girlfriends began berating her for catering to the Japanese. Her friends, 
you see, had been either married to or living with Americans. The woman 
became so mad at her so-called friends that she lambasted them thus: 
Why is it that when I have an affair with a Chamorro, it's perfectly all right. 
If I have an affair with an American, it's also all right. But now that I'm 
having an affair with a Japanese, you people look down on me. I have read 
the Ten Commandments, and the Sixth Commandment said: "Thou shall 
not commit adultery." Period. It did not say "Thou shall not commit 
adultery with a Japanese!" They are winning the war. So they must be okay. 
Anyway, should the Americans return, I will have an affair with an 
American. (Palomo 1984, 88) 
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One of the most difficult things for the Chamorros to accept was the edict 
that the Japanese Emperor was both the temporal and spiritual leader of the 
empire. This was contrary to their religious upbringing because at least 95 
percent of the people of Guam were Christians, the great majority Catholics. 
During the initial occupation period the Japanese held several victory 
parades throughout the streets in Agana, especially after the fall of the 
Philippines and Singapore. Attendance by the residents of Agana was obliga-
tory. Most elderly Chamorros who witnessed these events remembered the 
galloping stallions, the weapons of war on display, and the inevitable float 
showing a young nisei boy wearing a Japanese military uniform and pointing a 
rifle at another boy dressed in American navy attire, with the nisei youngster 
stepping on an American flag. 
By the middle of 1942 parades ceased to be held. The tides of war had 
changed and Japanese authorities were then more concerned about the 
American fugitives who were hiding out in the jungles of Guam. Search 
parties comprising Japanese military personnel, Japanese-speaking Saipanese 
interpreters and investigators, and locally recruited police officers were con-
stantly on the prowl looking for the fugitives. 
The Chamorros, however, were determined not to help the Japanese in 
their pursuit. The Chamorros looked to the American fugitives as symbols of 
America and were willing to suffer any indignities to prevent their capture. As 
a consequence dozens of Chamorros--and perhaps hundreds--were beaten 
and generally brutalized by Japanese (and in some instances, Saipanese inves-
tigators) for refusing to divulge the whereabouts of the Americans. Unfortu-
nately, even those Chamorros who knew nothing about the Americans' hiding 
places were jailed and brutalized. 
At about dawn on 12 September 1942, three of the fugitives were tracked 
down and executed on the spot in the jungle of Togcha in south-central 
Guam. They were L L Krump, A Yablonski, and L. W. Jones. Six weeks 
later, on 22 October 1942, two others--Al Tyson and C. B. Jones--were found 
and executed at their hiding place in Machananao in northern Guam. 
George Tweed, the lone survivor, was at about this time hiding out near a 
ranch belonging to Juan (Male) Pangelinan, a retired navy man and veteran 
of World War I. Tweed subsequently moved to Urunao at the northwestern 
tip of the island and remained there for the rest of the war. Pangelinan was 
executed by the Japanese shortly before the end of the war. 
From late 1942 to early 1944 a semblance of peace reigned in Guam, if 
that is possible. Most of the Japanese soldiers were gone in pursuit of other 
island conquests, and only a handful of Japanese administrators were on the 
island. The young Chamorros were busy learning kanji and the mysteries of 
the oriental world. The adults were busy trying to survive and make do 
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without Dodge and Plymouth sedans, Lucky Strikes, Camels and Chester-
fields, the Lone Ranger and Tonto, Nelson Eddie and Jeanette MacDonald, 
Coca Cola and Van Camp's Pork and Beans. They had to make do with Japa-
nese cigarettes, soy sauce on rice, tea, zories, and a lot of locally grown farm 
products. My dad grew his own tobacco and fermented his own liquor, 
aguardiente, which beats Mexican tequila and Russian gin. 
If Guam was ever self-sufficient it was during the occupation period. Not 
only were we able to feed ourselves with natural food, but by late 1943 Guam 
began feeding thousands of Japanese troops who were returning from the war 
zones in the central Pacific--the MarshaUs, the Solomons, Gilbert and Ellice, 
Papua New Guinea, and other exotic places. 
By middle and late 1943 the Japanese demanded--and got--two things: 
laborers forced to help construct airstrips at several parts of the island, and 
more laborers forced to work at rice and vegetable plantations in various 
parts of the island. Thousands of people, from youngsters in their early teens 
to elders in their sixties and seventies, were required to toil under the hot sun 
at the airstrips and at the plantations. Compensation was nil. 
I remember one man who loved smoking cigarettes and didn't mind 
working at one of the airstrips, because at the end of the day the workers 
would be given a pack of cigarettes. Usually, however, the men would form a 
line and before each received his pack from the Japanese leader, each worker 
had to bow to the Japanese and say arigato (thank you). To impress the 
Japanese, this worker made a fanciful and elaborate bow but in his nervous-
ness forgot the Japanese word for "thank you." For showing off and for being 
forgetful the Japanese slapped him and denied him his pack of cigarettes. 
It was about this time that the animalistic nature of the Japanese soldiers 
began to emerge. The American forces were closing in, having taken the 
Marshalls, Gilbert and Ellice, the New Hebrides, the Solomons, and the 
eastern Caroline Islands. Reports from afar were all bad. Nazi Germany was 
on the verge of collapse. EI Duce, Benito Mussolini, was hanged by his own 
people. The war in China was turning from bad to worse, and the mighty 
Japanese Pacific fleet was in disarray. 
To the Japanese, life became meaningless and worthless in Guam, partic-
ularly when the American armada began bombarding the island early in June 
1944. People were killed without reason. A forty-year-old man found in a 
ranch in Agat was forced to kneel and slashed on the neck with a sword and 
. left for dead. A group of young people found in Agana during the height of 
the bombardment were forced to dig their own grave, beaten and stabbed, 
and buried alive. Rapes were frequent. Beheadings at Tai and Fonte and 
other places more so. 
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By then the .Chamorros were taking it from both sides. While the 
Japanese were brutalizing the people on land, the American bombardment 
was taking its toll from the sea. Bombardment commenced as early as 8 June 
but was sporadic. However, beginning on 8 July and continuing day and night 
for thirteen consecutive days, hundreds of ships blasted Guam. And on 20 
July 1944, the day preceding the landings, American carrier planes pummeled 
the island with 627 tons of bombs and 147 rocket shells, the most shattering 
weight of explosives expended in prelanding operations in the Pacific war up 
to that point. Of 3826 buildings throughout the island, 2631 were destroyed. 
And of 665 dwellings that escaped destruction, the great majority were 
located in the southern and south-central part of the island. 
Among bombardment casualties were Tomas DeGracia Santos, struck by 
shrapnel on 12 July, died; Rosalia Cruz Roberto, fatally struck by an Ameri-
can missile on 19 June (she was six months pregnant and hiding in a cave near 
Sumay); Magdalena Nora L G. Shimizu, a girl who died when her head was 
struck by shrapnel; Frank Brown, killed during bombardment on 11 July. 
Among casualties at the hands of the Japanese during the bombardment 
were Jose (Papa) Cruz, executed for attempting to save a downed American 
pilot; Gaily Camacho and Vicente Munoz Borja, among thirty victims of a 
massacre at Fena on 23 July; Asuncion and Maria Rabago Castro, sisters shot 
to death on 22 July; Diana and Josefina Sablan Leon Guerero, sisters, bayo-
neted to death on 18 July; Hannah Chance Torres, beaten to death on 15 
July. 
By late 1945 Guam was a veritable armed camp. More than 160 military 
installations, both large and small, were strewn throughout the 22-square-mile 
island. As of31 August 1945 there were 65,095 army troops, 77,911 navy men, 
and 58,712 Marines, or a total of 201,718 military personnel. There were 
21,838 Chamorros. More than 19,000 Guamanians were made homeless by 
the bombardment, and thediresituation was further aggravated by the need 
for land and accommodations by the troops being readied for the invasion of 
Iwo Jima, Chi Chi Jima, and eventually the Japanese homeland. In the 
farming district of Yona alone, about 33,000 Marines of the 3rd Division were 
in training for the conquest of Japan. 
In its report to Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, the Hopkins 
Committee, comprising three prominent Americans (Ernest M. Hopkins, 
retired president of Dartmouth College, Maurice G. Tobin, former governor 
of Massachusetts, and Knowles A Ryerson, dean of agriculture at the 
University of California), described the situation then existing in Guam: 
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There was constantly evidence (Of) an undercurrent of uncertainty and 
insecurity caused by the fact that great numbers of families had lost their 
homes and did not know what the future had in store for them. 
Agana, the capital and metropolis of the 'island with a prewar 
population of over 12,000, was laid completely waste by the war so that 
scarcely a house was left standing. Many smaller municipalities were 
severely damaged. In addition, with the reoccupation by American forces 
and the development of the island as a major base for the onslaught of 
Japan, thousands of others were forced to move from their homes and their 
sites taken for airfields,supply centers, ammunition dumps, housing areas, 
recreation spots and the like. 
None of the municipalities which have been projected to take the place 
o(those destroyed or preempted is yet ready for settlement or resettlement, 
and there is no clear indication when they will be. Also, many Guamanians 
find themselves still unable to go back to their small farms or ranches to live 
or even to farm in an effort to raise fresh foodstuffs to supplement that 
which is on sale in local stores. (Palomo 1984,234) 
The Hopkins Report went on to say: 
In our opinion, citizenship is long overdue and should be granted forthwith. 
Indeed, an apology is due the Guamanians for the long delay and they are 
also entitled to the nation's thanks and recognition for their heroic services 
rendered during the recent war. The people are in all respects worthy of 
being welcomed into the full brotherhood of the United States, with all 
rights and privileges, and the nation will be the gainer for it. (Palomo 1984, 
235-36) 
Looking back at the tumultuous period, and based on the knowledge of 
what has happened since then, I ask myself questions which perhaps only 
astrologers caQ. answer. Could the war in the Pacific have been avoided? I 
believe not. Although a relatively weak nation, Japan was suffering from lack 
of vital resources and needed to expand, particularly into China and Indo-
nesia to provide the goods necessary for its people's survival. Japan, then as 
now, had very limited natural resources. On the other hand the Western 
countries, particularly the United States, would not permit the Japanese to 
"advance" into China or any other country in the Far and Near East, and 
would not furnish needed goods, such as oil, steel, and the like. Japan's 
biggest mistake, of course, was her militaristic leaders' decision to strike at 
Pearl Harbor. In doing so, she awoke a sleeping giant. 
Could Guam have been spared had it been armed to the teeth, as some 
American leaders wanted? The answer is no. Guam was too far from the 
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continental United States and too isolated in the midst of the Japanese 
mandated islands to survive for any length of time. 
Was Guam important? Yes, but only as part of a frontline of defense and 
as a way station to the Orient and to the continental United States. 
Why were the Chamorros so patriotic to the United States? They were 
not United States citizens, and the government then in place was not demo-
cratic. For more than two centuries, Guam was under a Spanish regime that 
was dying a slow death. As a consequence its overseas possessions were either 
revolting or moving into stoic stagnancy. Times were miserable in Guam when 
Captain Henry Glass entered Apra Harbor in 1898. The Spanish garrison did 
not even have the means to return the captain's salute! The American naval 
administration was not outstanding by any means, but it offered high hopes of 
better things to come, in spite of itself. At least one naval governor, Willis 
Winter Bradley, proposed a "bill of rights" for the people of Guam. Unfortu-
nately, such altruistic behavior did not endear Bradley to his superiors in the 
Navy Department. It never came to be. 
I had wondered why the most popular song during the occupation was 
"Uncle Sam, Please Come Back to Guam." The little ditty went this way: "0 
Mr Sam, Sam, my dear Uncle Sam, won't you please comeback to Guam .... 
Eighth of December, 1941, the people went crazy, right here in Guam. a Mr 
Sam, Sam, my dear Uncle Sam, won't you please come back to Guam." It was 
sung, indeed, but not within earshot of a Japanese. To me it meant deep love 
for the values that America was known to espouse. I sometimes felt it was 
pnrequited love, but love nonetheless. 
Did the war do us any good? No and yes. 
No, for several reasons: First of all, we became pawns in an international 
conflict. We became victims of a war we had no part in causing. Second, we 
lost friends and relations dear to us, losses that can never be compensated. 
And finally, our life-styles have been changed completely--from a tranquil, 
parochial, and family-oriented existence to a fast-track, multicultural, and 
oftentimes cynical existence. 
But also, yes, the war did us some good: The abiding loyalty that the 
Chamorros displayed during the war gave America the only rationale it 
needed to grant the Guamanians US citizenship and a civil government. 
Unfortunately, the American Congress did not grant full rights of con-
gressional representation and voting participation in presidential elections. 
These latter rights would have completed the circle. America has yet to do so. 
And the war also made us aware of our own vulnerability in any Pacific 
conflict, then, now, and in the future. 
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War in Palau: Morikawa and the Palauans 
Wakako Higuchi 
The Pacific War was one of the most significant events in modern history. For 
most Micronesians, especially the Palauans, it provided a transition from rule 
by an Asian colonial power to rule by a Western colonial power. The story of 
"Morikawa" presented here illustrates this transition. The story traces the 
changes in the Palauans' views of the Japanese that accompanied the 
increasing severity of wartime conditions. First, however, I briefly describe the 
Japanese presence in Micronesia both before and during the war. 
Japan's Micronesia 
During its thirty-year administration of Micronesia (1914-1945), Japan's main 
center in Palau was a thriving Japanese town in Koror. The Nan'yocho (South 
Sea Bureau) settling in Koror in 1922 caused the town to become the center 
of commerce and administration for the whole of Micronesia. Evidence of 
this was the fact that the Japanese population in Koror in 1941 was 9408, out 
of a total island population of 9873. 
The Palauans had only a few roles to play in the Japanese political, social, 
and economic arenas, and they seldom had contact with the Japanese during 
their daily lives. Despite their talent or ability, job opportunities were limited 
for individual Palauans after graduation from kogakko (Islanders' public 
school). After three to five years of public schooling, some of them attended 
Mokko Totei Yoseijo (Carpentry Apprenticeship Training Center), later 
known as the Industrial Apprenticeship Training Center. Some also attended 
the Seinen Koshukai (Young Men's Night Classes). Despite this almost all of 
them, if hired, became "tea" boys in government offices, or workers for private 
companies in the Angaur phosphate mines. The only gateway to success for a 
young Palauan was to become ajunkei (Islander policeman) or hojo kyoin 
(assistant teacher). It was very desirable for Palauans to establish an 
economic niche in Japanese society because the cash income they received 
enabled them to experience the modern world. Simon Ramarui of Palau 
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remembered that the Palauans were very curious about what the Japanese 
had and what they did. At the same time the Islanders were reminded by their 
Japanese teachers to "learn from the Japanese behavior." That is, they were 
encouraged to emulate the cultural standards of Japan. 
Rapidly changing internal and external events, such as the political 
conditions on the Chinese continent, especially the "Manchurian incident" of 
1931, also ha~ a great effect on the islands. Japan's poljcy of slow Islander 
advancement; characterized by segregation of Islanders from Japanese, had to 
be altered to a rapid policy for the realization of komin (nation ofthe 
Emperor of Japan). This change resulted from national expansionism and the 
policy of the new Nan'yocho director, Hisao Hayashi, from the bureau of 
Kanto, China. 
In 1933 Japan gave notice of its intention ~o withdraw from the League of 
Nations and did so formally in 1935. This event provided just the impetus 
Director Hayashi needed to announce the "Ten Year Development Plan for 
. the South Sea Islands." According to the plan,based on the National 
Mobilization Law, the whole nation was to reform its mode of living in both 
matter and mind and would support government policy in the matter of 
conquest; in other words, a crusade. As a result Nan'yocho examined the 
concept of conferring Japanese nationality on Islanders because of the 
unification of the two peoples implied in the ten year plan. This plan, 
however, was not carried out because of the unexpected and continuous 
events of the Pacific War. Nevertheless, during the war between Japan and 
the United States Palauans inevitably came to fulfill their duties as komin. 
With the opening of hostilities on the Chinese mainland, both the Islanders 
and the Japanese in Micronesia were completely mobilized. The slogan "All 
Japanese nationals shall unite tightly" was propagated to persuade both the 
Japanese and the Islanders to form a single body for achieving the 
government's wartime goals. This change was dictated by the National 
Spiritual Mobilization Movement of 1938 which spread throughout 
Micronesia. Thus the earHer poHcy of comparative separatism for the two 
groups was reversed. ' 
In December 1940 Nan'yo Gunto Taisei Yokusan-kai (Imperial Rule 
Assistance Association in the South Sea Islands) organized. With direction 
from the Tokyo headquarters, fifty-eight branches of the association 
. established themselves throughout the small islands in Micronesia. This 
association sponsored the following daily activities for the purpose of raising 
the nationalistic consciousness of both the Japanese and the Islanders: 
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1 Emperor Day (anniversary of Emperor Jinmu's accession)--worship 
of the Emperor's photo, ceremony of worshipping from afar, and festival of 
supplication for winning the war. 
2 Day of Worship at the Shrine--to deepen people's respect for the 
gods and ancestors. 
3 Day of Upsurge of the Japanese Spirit and Clarification of the 
Fundamental Concept of Nation Policy--pamphlets and posters were 
distributed. 
4 Day of Knowledge of the War Situation--Iecture and movies. 
5 Day of Conservation of Resources--gathering of both useless and 
discarded articles for recycling and the protection of materials. 
6 Day to Reform the Nation's Life--stop smoking, stop drinking, eat 
simple foods, and donate extra money to the national defense fund. 
7 Day to Restrain National Enjoyment--restraining of play,leisure, 
and so on. 
8 Day of Physical and Mental Discipline and for Promotion of Health. 
9 Day of Emergency Precautiom--giving military training to preschool 
children and civilian adults, training maneuvers for air defense, fire defense, 
and searchlight use. 
10 Day of Economy for the Coming Emergency--stop drinking, 
dispense with unnecessary luxuries, and donate savings to the war relief 
fund. 
11 Day for Encouragement of Thrift and Diligence--abolish idleness 
with all one's might according to one's own occupation, the promotion of 
efficiency, good use of energy, curtailing of unnecessary expenses and saving 
money. 
12 Day of Patriotism--conduct marches and flag processions to inspire 
patriotism. 
13 Day for the Home Front to Support the Fighting Forces--house to 
house visiting, gathering donations for the soldiers. 
14 Day to Wake Up Early--waking up early, worshipping at the shrines, 
mountaineering, worshipping the Emperor's Palace from a distance. 
15 Day for Appreciation of the Imperial Favor--regularly paying silent 
tribute to the great Imperial favor with appreciation. 
Palauan knowledge of the national situation deepened through these 
spiritual days and common activities with the Japanese. Tomin Fujin Kinro 
Hoshi-kai (Island Women's Volunteer Group) led by the Japanese Women's 
Patriotic Society; Tomin Seinen-dan (Young Islanders' Association) which 
joined with the Japanese Shobo-dan (Fire Fighting Association); and Keibo-
dan (voluntary guards for the purpose of making preparations for US air 
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attacks) were typical examples of how the Islanders and Japanese mobilized 
themselves under the same purpose to win the war. 
As the war moved closer to Palau the Islanders themselves came to 
understand the war situation and made contributions to the various saving 
funds. In their support of the war effort the Islanders contributed 14,129 
times for a total of 131,815 yen. This generous amount was contributed during 
the period from April to December 1943. These amounts show clearly that 
the Palauans on a per person basis banked and contributed large sums of 
money according to the Japanese national policy for building the Greater 
East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Some Islanders, especially those in Saipan, 
asked the Nan'yocho to give them Japanese nationality. With this change in 
status the Islanders could be sent to the war front. The request was not 
approved. However, several small groups of Islanders were sent to New 
Guinea as civilian helpers assigned to the military (see chapter 14 by Ubal 
Tellei). 
The Japanese naval office in Palau started constructing fortifications in 
Micronesia in 1937. From the advent of the Pacific War to about mid-1943 
the Japanese military viewed Palau mainly as a rear base and supply depot 
between Japan, New Guinea, and Dutch Indonesia. Although personnel in 
military units passing through Palau were drafted to assist in the construction 
of airports, roads, bomb shelters, and the movement of war supplies, labor 
was still very much in short supply. All residents of the Palau Islands, 
including bothPalauan and Japanese women, and children in elementary 
schools, were made to work on the construction of military facilities. War 
supplies were stocked all over Koror town, and huge amounts were scattered 
throughout southern Babeldaob. During this time the Islanders labored with 
patriotic vigor. Their unflinching dedication surprised the Japanese who, in 
turn, reevaluated their conception that Palauans were lazy and did not realize 
the need for hard work. 
The first US attack on the island took place on 29 March 1944, when US 
carrier-based planes raided Palau. After these raids most residents in 
populated areas, including the military, evacuated to jungle sanctuaries on 
Babeldaob. On 6 July 1944 the Japanese military garrison on Saipan was 
captured. American troops landed on Guam on 21 July and on Tinian on 23 
July 1944. The situation for Japan's military forces in the Pacific War became 
serious, especially after the US invasion of Peleliu on 15 September and 
Angaur on 17 September 1944. The Japanese military, cut off from all com-
munication with the outside world, announced the "Principle of Self-Support" 
to all field troops on 3 November 1944. Furthermore, all navy, army, and 
civilian personnel not engaged in fighting became members of agricultural 
groups. Nan'yocho Director Vice Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya called for all 
148 
War in Palau 
general residents in the Palau Islands to "fight the war successfully through 
rearguard action." 
From late 1944 on, the "fight" for the Japanese became one of obtaining 
food rather than preventing an American invasion of Babeldaob and Koror. 
The Japanese commander in Palau, Lieutenant General Inoue, decided to 
hold Babeldaob no matter what the sacrifice, and to inflict maximum damage 
on the enemy. This "fight" continued until the end of the war even though US 
troops did not invade Koror or Babeldaob. 
On 15 August 1945 the war between Japan and the United States in 
Palau ended. The Japanese military in Palau and Yap signed the instrument 
of surrender aboard a US destroyer on 2 September 1945. Representing the 
two sides were Lieutenant General Inoue and Brigadier General Marshall. 
Approximately fotty-five thousand people formally surrendered that day. This 
included the Japanese military and all civilian personnel. After the war groups 
of Korean and Taiwanese laborers rioted against the Japanese, but a friendly 
relationship between the Japanese and the Palauans remained. 
Kanpei Taisha Nan'yo Jinja, the highest ranking Shinto shrine in Koror, 
was built in 1940 by the Japanese government to celebrate the 2600th year of 
the Imperial reign. It was considered one of the greatest symbols of Japan's 
expansionism overseas. This important shrine was set on fire by the Japanese 
military just before the US landing, because they believed it would have been 
desecrated by the Americans. In retrospect this act was symbolic of the end of 
the Japanese administration of the islands. 
Morikawa and the Palauans 
"Morikawa" is a fascinating story filled with both fact and fiction. It is a 
mixture of both the horrors of war and the unique human ability to 
psychologically explain the seemingly unexplainable. It is not known whether 
the Morikawa legend, which developed over a number of years, was started 
during or after the war. 
Even today nearly all olderPalauans recognize the name "Morikawa-san" 
or "Morikawa Taii" (Captain Morikawa). According to Palauan oral history 
Morikawa suddenly appeared in Palau. He would walk about resolutely 
without hiding in the jungles, even when US airplanes started strafing. These 
planes, local tradition holds, did not and could not attack Morikawa. Palauans 
who met Morikawa during the war period believe he was connected with the 
US military. There are many common Palauan beliefs about Morikawa that, 
taken together, form a powerful wartime legend. One story said that 
Morikawa had a wireless for communicating with the United States, and he 
sent his messenger, a Yapese, to Peleliu, which the United States had taken 
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from the Japanese in a fierce battle. The Palauans believed that Morikawa 
was an American spy who had succeeded in contacting the Americans in 
order to help thwart the Japanese. Some Palauans heard rumors that the 
Japanese planned to kill them all; others predicted this plan would be 
canceled because of the influence of Morikawa. 
The strength of these wartime legends probably prompted Timothy Ngitil 
of Ngeremengui to report on 7 January 1975 that 
Morikawa arrived in Palau without informing anybody as to which airport or 
seaport he would use. He urged Palauans to concentrate on enlarging their 
farms and growing many plants such as taro, tapioca, rice, and other foods. 
The increased production would help alleviate the food shortage and 
improve Palauan morale. Be.cause the Japanese military in Palau suffered 
from a scarcity of food, they had decided to kill all the Palauans. The 
Japanese were quite positive that this genocidal plan was the panacea that 
would end their suffering. Upon learning about the plan, Morikawa 
attempted to find a solution whereby Palauans could escape mass death and, 
at the same time, solve the Japanese food shortage problem. He suggested 
to the Japanese military officials in Palau that they postpone their 
extermination plans and use the natives to grow more food plants. 
Another Palau an, Yoshiko Ashio, echoes Ngitil's story. She remembers 
that Morikawa was a very handsome, likeable young man, probably a nisei 
from Hawai'i. She maintains that as the commanding officer responsible for 
Palauans he was, at the same time, a US spy. Japanese soldiers, according to 
Ashio, had prepared a huge bomb shelter and planned to kill the Palauans by 
herding them in and then detonating a bomb. As ordered by headquarters, 
Morikawa visited Ashio's village in Ngiwal. He told the villagers there that he 
would inform them in about a week of the date they should prepare food, 
clothes, and mats and come to Ngatpang. After Morikawa left Ngiwal he was 
not seen for a while. Palauans believed that during this time Morikawa 
climbed Todai-yama in Ollei, located in northern BabeJdaob, and sent signals 
to US ships located between Kayangel and Ngarchelong. The signals, they 
believed, probably meant he had finished visiting Palauan villages on the east 
coast of Babeldaob and was going to visit the west coast villages. The 
Islanders also believe military officials on the US ships already knew of the 
Japanese plans for genocide. After this work Morikawa returned to Ngatpang 
and asked Lieutenant General Inoue, the commander, "Please wait one more 
week before ordering the Palauans to assemble here." Within this same week 
Japan's surrender ended the Pacific War. Ashio maintains that the Palauans 
"commonly believe that Morikawa saved them from genocide." Moreover, 
because no one could find him after the war, Palauans believed that 
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Morikawa returned to Hawai'i or was killed in Palau by the Japanese on 
suspicion of being a spy. 
Other oral traditions in Palau support this testimony. They maintain that 
Morikawa knew the war would soon end and suggested to the Japanese 
military officials in Palau that young, athletic Palauans could be mobilized to 
form a new military group. The idea was accepted by the Japanese authori-
ties, and a training program was established. This was yet ~nother w,ay 
Morikawa found to save the Islanders from execution. Ngitil concluded, 
"Maybe our God in heaven did not agree with Japanese military plans, so he 
sent this powerful and intelligent man to us. Many Palauans thank him for the 
great job he performed in saving the entire population of Palau." 
The following Palauan chant song, titled "Meringel a Mekemedil Rubak" 
(Merciless War of the Rubak), composed by Buikispis, typifies the Palauan 
regard for Morikawa: 
So reckless was the way Isoroku [Admiral Yamamoto] handled the war that 
he irritated Roosevelt who sent out kidobutai [mobile troops]. 
He sent ourkidobutai to fill the whole Pacific. 
It filled the whole Pacific and turned its weapons on us. 
Wow--there are okabes, flying kusentei [submarine chaser] shooting ~t our 
lands. 
Wow--kusentei shooting. Hiding in the woods we were unaware that they 
[the Japanese] were preparing abokugo [air raid shelter] at Ngatbang 
in an attempt to exterminate us all. 
Were it not for our rescue by Morikawa, [president] Roosevelt's spy, we 
should have all perished at Ngatbang. 
Today Yoshiyasu Morikawa lives in Japan. Documents state that he was 
educated in the Japanese Army Officers School during the prewar period. 
Morikawa was trained as a field artillery man at the Tokyo Field Artillery 
Training School and after graduation was assigned to the 20th Regiment in 
Utsunomiya, Tochigi-ken, Japan. He served in the border guards along the 
Russian-Manchurian border in Chichiharu (Qiqihar). He received further 
training for six months in academic artillery study at the Science School in 
Tokyo, graduating in April 1944. His corps had been ordered to move from 
Manchuria to Palau while he underwent his training in Tokyo. Upon his 
graduation he was appointed to serve at the headquarters in Palau in early 
May. Currently, he is retired from Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force. 
Morikawa claims that the Palau an contention that he was a US spy is 
erroneous and is amazed at the myth. He also denies that the Japanese 
military planned to kill all of the Palauans. In reference to his arrival, 
Morikawa states he was the only passenger on a military flight destined for 
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the islands. He served directly under Lieutenant General Inoue, commander 
of the headquarters in Ngatpang. His duties involved studying strategic 
military topography; surveying times, places, and strategies of possible US 
landings on Babeldaob; and drafting plans to counter subversive activity on 
the part of the Islanders. 
According to Morikawa one great anxiety the Japanese military had 
during the war was the civilian unrest that prevailed throughout Babeldaob. 
The meaninglessness of the fight against the United States, food shortages, 
and the US strategy of surrounding Babeldaob with warships but not landing 
after the Peleliu and Angaur invasions, tempted not only Chamorros, but also 
Palauans to escape to Americari warships regularly anchored off 
Ngarchelong. In fact most of the two hundred Chamorros living there had 
escaped to US naval ships between late 1944 and early 1945. A Palauan 
named Oikawasang (Joseph Tellei) was tempted by these Chamorros to 
escape to an American ship in Kossaol Channel. In mid-December 1944 he 
fled with his wife, Josefa, to Peleliu via Angaur. The news of his escape gave 
Japanese headquarters a great shock because he was a former junkei-cho 
(head native policeman). This was the highest position an Islander could 
obtain in those days, and for many years he had enjoyed the confidence of the 
Japanese. Morikawa s~id Japanese headquarters regarded such escapes as a 
serious problem, and they feared strategic information would be leaked to the 
Americans. Therefore, the need to organize the Palauan society for united 
Japanese-Palauan action became pressing. 
Headquarters ordered Yoshiyasu Morikawa, then a twenty-four-year-old 
captain and intelligence officer, to organize all the Palauans in Babeldaob. 
Morikawa's assignments were to iron out the differences between the 
Palauans and the Japanese soldiers, to encourage the Palauans to cooperate 
with the military, and to prevent Palauan involvement in any acts serving the 
. interests of the enemy. Lieutenant General Inoue order~ all military officials 
to support Morikawa. The group of Palauans Morikawa organized came to be 
known as the Morikawa Butai (Morikawa Corps). The corps was comprised 
of a group of civilian, administrative, and military persons. In addition 
Japanese shidokan (leaders) who were former school teachers or policemen 
were stationed in some hinanba (places of refuge). Palauan chiefs and elders 
were to cooperate with the Morikawa Butai and the shidokan under the 
single authority of the Japanese military headquarters. 
Before the beginning of hostilities with the United States, the relationship 
between the Palauans and the Japanese was considered satisfactory, and the 
nan'yocho administration of Palau an affairs was benevolent. The Palauans 
began to understand the intricacies of a more sophisticated social order and 
gained the amenities of a modern society. The Japanese, for their part, 
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harvested the resources of the islands. The outbreak of war and the continual 
failures of the Japanese Imperial Forces caused a serious breakdown in this 
harmony. The cultured group that once flourished in Palau was supplanted by 
an increasingly haggard military, one forced to scavenge, often abusively, 
without regard to the Palauans' needs. 
Attempting to make amends, Captain Morikawa began survey trips twice 
a month to the twelve to thirteen Palauan hinanba. He investigated Palauan 
living conditions and learned that the Palauans resented Japanese soldiers 
stealing coconuts and potatoes, so he asked the leaders of the Japanese 
soldiers to stop such behavior. Morikawa urged the Palauans not to disturb 
military maneuvers and to obey orders. In order to help alleviate the food 
shortages the Morikawa Butai taught the Palauans how to enlarge their farms 
and especially how to cultivate tapioca and sweet potatoes. He also ordered 
troops to be stationed near the Palau an hinanba for its protection. He recalls 
that the Palauans had morning assemblies in each hinanba. The shidokan, the 
leader of the hinanba,delivered a patriotic speech and assigned the Palauans 
their daily work. The Japanese national anthem was sung and Palauans faced 
respectfully in the direction of the Emperor's palace in Tokyo. If the Palauans 
had any complaints to make, the military officials and kyoiku-shigaku (school 
inspector) would hear them. 
The role of the Morikawa Butai helped reduce the friction between the 
Palauans and the Japanese soldiers. These activities are remembered by older 
Palauans who have great respect for Morikawa, even now, some forty years 
after the war. 
Contradicting the Palauans' belief that Morikawa was an enemy spy, he 
said, "I was never a spy. I recommended to headquarters the idea of Giyu-
Kirikomi-tai (Patriotic Shock Corps) as a means of spiritual control of young, 
male Palauans." The Islanders confirmed that this name greatly encouraged 
young Palau an men because it was the name used for a special Japanese corps 
that counterattacked US forces in Peleliu in late September 1944. The name 
took on the aura of heroic suicide troops facing the enemy. 
Second Lieutenant Ichiro Hachisu recalled that he was ordered by Teru 
Shudan (Teru Group, veteran troops from Manchuria) at headquarters to be 
one of the trainers. A total of eighty Palauan men were enlisted on two 
separate occasions. The men were between eighteen and twenty-seven years 
old, physically strong, and of good character. They received six months of 
spiritual and technical combat training. 
Recent interviews with all the surviving Palau an members of the 
Kirikomi-tai reveal that they believe, even today, that their mission was to 
counterattack US troops on Peleliu. However, this wmlot the case. Hachisu 
said that the military training that Palauans received from the Japanese was 
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for the purpose of teaching rigid discipline, Japanese manner, and genuine 
courage culled from experience. He thought the Islanders would believe their 
duty would be equivalent to that of the Japanese. Both Morikawa and 
Hachisu contend that the Japanese high command in Palau did not envision 
Palauans as an actual fighting force. 
Corresponding to Morikawa's idea to create the group, Hachisu 
remembers that his efforts were admired by former Nan'yocho officials, who 
since the beginning of civilian rule felt there had not been a greater fruit in 
the education of Islanders than this training, even though Nan'yocho had 
made large budgetary outlays for over twenty years pursuing this type of 
policy. Morikawa said "the meaning of education in this case was to provide 
Palauans the ability to work with the Japanese, and to achieve capability on 
the Japanese level with which Islanders could fulfill their responsibilities." 
These words reflect Morikawa's national patriotism in those days as a man 
trained by the Japanese Military Officer School. 
According to Palauans, Japanese witnesses, and Morikawa's own 
statement, there are no substantiated facts to confirm he was an American 
spy. Morikawa stated the reality behind the Palauans' "Morikawa" fable. First, 
he was a military officer born in Ehime prefecture, Shikoku, Japan. He was 
not a nisei from Hawai'i. His father, who was a principal of a Japanese 
elementary school, always taught him that he must be benevolent to every-
body. Morika\ya also explained that he had studied but does not speak 
English. He insists he never contacted anyone from the US military during 
the war. Although Palauans said he suddenly disappeared after Japan's sur-
render and was either kill~d by the Japanese military or returned to Hawai'i, 
he was in fact repatriated to Japan with his troops in January 1946 after he 
received treatment for amoebic dysentery. Further verification of this is the 
registry of his name on the list of Japanese military pensioners in the Welfare 
Ministry of the Japanese government. Lieutenant Hachisu, Morikawa's sub-
ordinate, stated, "It was completely impossible for any military officer who 
worked for headquarters to conduct activities as an enemy spy." Morikawa 
acknowledged that he had attempted to send signals to US warships off 
northern Babeldaob in order to judge what the Islanders' signals to these 
ships had meant. He said, "I was ordered by Lieutenant General Inoue to 
investigate the meaning of light signals which the Islanders occasionally used 
to communicate with the U.S. warships." This was one of his missions as an 
intelligence officer. Morikawa also said he had never visited Peleliu during his 
one-and-a-half-year tour of duty in Palau. 
Morikawa and other former Japanese military officers and soldiers denied 
the existence of any plan to kill the Palauans. "The result of the American-
Japanese fight was readily obvious even for us when both Peleliu and Angaur 
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fell. US ships surrounding Babeldaob Island didn't attack us except on a few 
occasions, and it was completely unnecessary for us to kill the Islanders that 
late in the war. The Islanders didn't affect us," said Morikawa. He recalls that 
escapes to the US ships did not continue after early 1945 when the Morikawa 
corps established itself. Jiro Nakamura, a former Nan'yo military policeman 
who was sentenced to prison for his involvement in the 1944 shooting of an 
American pilot prisoner, stated, "While a few rebellious Korean laborers were 
captured by the military police, the simple and honest Palauans, who were 
below the standards set by the general Japanese population, were to be 
regarded as not dangerous. Genocide of the Islanders would have been 
planned if it took place on an island such as Saipan or Guam. But in the case 
of Babeldaob, it was not seriously atiacked by the Americans in the post-
Peleliu and Angaur days. Therefore, the idea that the Japanese military would 
have tried to kill the Islanders does not correspond with the facts. I personally 
never heard of the plan which was supposed to be our duty." 
Reflecting on his wartime experiences in Palau, Morikawa said, "That I 
was a military officer might be a reason why the Islanders paid special 
attention to me. Because of my officer education and training, I was naturally 
different from the non-professional soldiers with respect to behavior and 
language." These words remind us of Ashio's statement: "Morikawa always 
wore white clothes and walked dauntlessly in the jungle even while American 
airplanes attacked." 
Morikawa's story, or that of the "man" that was named Morikawa, was 
created piece-by-piece by the Islanders' fear, dissatisfaction, frustration, 
uneasiness, and anger associated with the extreme conditions of war 
experienced for the first time. The complex events of the story become 
understandable given the unique sociological and psychological pressures of 
wartime. 
One of the references that helps explain the Palauan view toward the 
Japanese in the prewar period was the Japanese educational policy stated in 
Nan yo Gunto Kyoiku-shi (History of Education in the South Sea Islands, 
1938). It said that "education for the Islanders will be given importance, 
especially educability of their spirit building, and they will be taught moral 
principles in accordance with the Imperial Wish of its Rescript." This 
historical document also stated that the Japanese on the islands were 
instructed to make supreme efforts to maintain and improve the dignity of 
being a Japanese and were encouraged to be models for the benefit of the 
Islanders. However, as recognition of the worsening war situation increased, 
the Japanese (mainly the military) began demonstrating their honne (instinc-
tive reaction to a situation). Although all soldiers were taught tatemae 
(character, as it exists in principle), the instinctive side of them became 
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prevalent. This behavioral change was caused mainly by food shortages and 
the unbelievable hardships of jungle life. Contrary to the norm, Morikawa, 
who served as a mediator between the Japanese and the Islanders, acted with 
fortitude and kindness. His attitude and behavior sparked the Islanders' 
imagination of the other power--"strong America" Morikawa drew a sharp 
distinction between himself and the other Japanese. Ashio, the Islander, was 
very disappointed in the troops' behavior. She related her experience by 
explaining, the people had been repeatedly told of Japan's immortality, but 
when they saw the soldiers' animalistic behavior they began to hope that the 
Japanese would be defeated by the Americans. The contrasting concepts of 
Japanese vs American, and the reality of the general Japanese soldier's 
behavior, as opposed to Morikawa's, mingled in the Islanders' mind. Born 
from within this paradox, was a light of hope--the mythical "Morikawa." 
A fitting conclusion to Morikawa's story comes from Morikawa himself: 
"It may be interesting to know whether I was a spy or not. However, the more 
important fact of the story is that this is how the Palauans psychologically 
interpreted their wartime history. They created a "story of a man' and have 
been believing it for over forty years." 
NOTE: This paper is based on two previous papers of mine: "Micronesians and the Pacific 
War: The Palauans," Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 1986; and 
"Micronesia Under the Japanese Administration: Interviews with Former South Sea Bureau and 
Military Officials," Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 1987. 
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Palauans and the Japanese Military Experience 
Ubal Tellei 
Translated by Patrick Tellei 
I am grateful for the opportunity to share my experiences and the experiences 
of the twenty-eight other young Palauans who went to work with the 
Japanese during World War II. 
I will begin by going back to the early days in grade school when we began 
in the morning by facing Japan and bowing down to the emperor. We were 
prepared to do that because we were told by the Japanese that Japan would 
be the dominant pbwer in the Pacific. We were prepared to accept that. We 
were able to read and we listened to the news, too, but the literature and the 
news were all Japanese oriented, so we only heard things about Japan. While 
going to school we heard that Japan had won in Beijing and Nanking, and this 
reinforced our belief that Japan was strong. In fact, they held celebrations to 
mark the victories. Then, of course, after that we heard about the victory at 
Pearl Harbor and nothing else. This further strengthened our belief that 
Japan was the power to follow. We came to believe Japan because everyday 
in the news we heard not only about the victory at Pearl Harbor but also in 
other places like Malaysia, the Philippines, and other countries in the Pacific 
that fell to the Japanese. When the time came to recruit our people into the 
Japanese Navy and Army bound for Dutch New Guinea (Irian Jaya), we were 
prepared to go because we were told that they were going to build a second 
Japan. The military administration in Koror sent word to all the chiefs from 
Palau to recruit the strongest and most able-bodied men. The opportunity 
was there, so they decided to go with it. 
When we twenty-nine arrived in New Guinea we heard that the 
Americans had landed in Wewak and in Guadalcanal. We were charged with 
the task of unloading fuel and bombs from the ship and transporting them to 
the airport. Some of the men that went with us got sick; and some decided to 
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stay behind with the indigenous people of Irian J aya. The rest of us got on a 
ship and went to different places. 
I and some of the other Palauan men got on a Japanese ship on its way to 
Celebes (Sulawesi). Unfortunately, the bombs that we helped unload were 
seized by the Allied forces who captured the place and later were the same 
bombs that were used against the Japanese. In Celebes, the place we stayed in 
was bombed out; everything on the ground was just wiped out. So we moved 
to Borneo. Immediately after we left ]3orneo the American Air Force 
bombed our previous base. From there we moved to Singapore. There all the 
transport ships were lost and only the military ships were left. Then we came 
under the jurisdiction of the military ships. 
Japanese ships equivalent to American cruisers, along with four 
destroyers, came to Singapore and transported all the people recruited from 
the islands to Japan. At Singapore our task had been to load thirty thousand 
bars of silver to be brought to Japan. When we left Singapore, American 
planes were already all over the place, but fortunately a typhoon developed 
and the task force decided to ride out the storm for three days to prevent the 
planes from attacking the ships. It was successful and avoided the planes, so 
we reached Taiwan. We then went to the port of Kure in Japan. Our task 
then as workers on the ship was to unload all the silver bars, to throw them 
into the bay. From Kure we went to Hiroshima and stayed for ten days. We 
were in Hiroshima on 2 August 1945. (The A-bomb was dropped on 6 August 
1945.] 
From Hiroshima we left with a task force of seven ships for Taiwan in 
order to defend it. Taiwan was the westernmost stepping-stone for the 
invasion of the motherland. On our way to Korea at night, American 
submarine forces found us; that night we saw two of the seven ships, the one 
immediately in front and the one right behind, cut in half. Each of the ships 
that was lost carried at least three thousand military personnel and civilians 
on their way to Taiwan. The trip normally takes three days, but it took us a 
week because at night we had to watch for Japanese submarines and during 
the day for American submarines and airplanes. 
There were many people aboard the ship and we ran out of food. They 
were not prepared to accommodate everybody. At that point we made up our 
minds we were ready to die. When we reached Taiwan the bombardment 
started, so we had to leave port again. When we finally made it to land we had 
to be transported by trains. 
From there we moved to Kaohsiung, one of the places in Taiwan. Then 
we moved to where the Japanese were. The day we arrived we put in 
machine-gun emplacements in preparation for the invasion. While we were 
defending the place we were told they were going to use the most ' 
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sophisticated anti-aircraft guns. Again it was ·proven" to us that the Japanese 
were very advanced, because the first two planes that approached were shot 
down. The next day an American plane flew beyond the range of the anti-
aircraft guns and then dropped either leaflets or some sort of metals that 
affected the guns. The guns couldn't work anymore. Right after the first plane 
came and dropped some of those things to block the guns, at least twenty 
planes came and bombed the place that we had worked so hard to put 
together. 
At that point, we, the people who were recruited to work, started 
doubting the Japanese, because their best weapons were no match against the 
Americans. We stayed there. The Chinese forces came in and then the US 
6th or 7th Fleet came in. That was the end of the war for us. All the Japanese 
soldiers were returned to their homeland. We stayed and were the last group 
to leave with the Japanese officers to go back. 
After they took over. the place the American forces asked us where we 
wanted to go. We told them we wanted to go back to Japan. When we got to 
Japan, they asked us where we wanted to go. We told them that we wanted to 
go back to Palau because that's where we were from. From Tokyo we went to 
three other cities and then to Saipan. Some of those who stayed behind went 
straight from there to Morotai and then to Palau, but we came later and then 
had to stop in Saipan. From Saipan we went to Guam for a while, and from 
Guam down to Peleliu; and from Peleliu we went to Koror, where we were 
from. 
Appendix: Audience Questions and Answers . 
Q What kinds of contacts did you have with the indigenous people in that 
section ofIrian Jaya? 
UT There were about five hundred labor corps members from Bia Island or 
state who worked side by side with the Japanese. 
Q Did the Japanese give you a special role as a supervisor, as somebody 
who knew the Japanese language, or did your group work the same as the 
Papuans? . 
UT We were assigned special roles to supervise the workers from those 
places: (1) because we spoke the language; (2) because we were rec~uited to 
work there; and (3) because we learned the indigenous language in those six 
months. 
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Q What about the wages of this group from Palau? How did they compare 
with prewar wages and working conditions? 
UT In Palau, when we were working building the communication station in 
Palau, we were paid 70 cents a day. But when we were recruited to work in 
the South Pacific we were paid the equivalent of $1.50 a day. 
Q I'd be interested in your impression of the Americans prior to having any 
contact with them, and then after. Being in a Japanese environment, what 
where your impressions of the Americans harming the soldiers? 
UT Originally we were told that the Americans were not very good and that 
they would do two things. Either they would byat us, or those who committed 
serious crimes would be tied to horses and the horses would split them. We 
believed that before we met them. But after the Americans came in, and after 
the surrender, we learned that they were different people. When we were in 
Taiwan two navy officers walked up while I was sitting with a Japanese and 
asked me if I was Filipino. I said no, I was Micronesian. They told me that I 
belonged to Americans, and then took me to their ship and gave me 
American clothes. 
Q Mter the war did the Japanese reward your group with any compen-
sation? 
UT No compensation. The money used was the money we were paid while in 
Taiwan. But after the war we didn't receive any compensation. 
Q Your account just now sounds as if it wasn't until you got to Taiwan and 
the American planes were bombing that you began to have doubts. It seems 
as if you and your friends worked willingly, voluntarily, that you were fairly 
devoted to the image you had of Japan. Was there any time before Taiwan 
that you began to question or began to regret leaving Palau? 
UT When we were still in Irian Jaya, that's when we started having doubts. 
But you couldn't make it show that you were having doubts. But from our 
contacts with the indigenous people there, some of whom had contact with 
the Allied forces, they told us that we were going to lose the war. And we 
started having doubts, but we wouldn't show it. 
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Nisei Military Experience during World War II 
Ted T. Tsukiyama 
That fateful moment in history, 7:55 AM, 7 December 1941, when the first 
Japanese bombs rained on Pearl Harbor, drastically transformed the lives of 
everyone in Hawai'i, particularly those of Japanese ancestry. 
I was awakened that morning by the constant rumbling of thunder. The 
sky toward Pearl Harbor was black with smoke, punctuated by puffs of white 
aerial bursts. "They're sure making this maneuver loolc real," I thought. 
Turning on the radio, I heard the announcer screaming, "Take cover, get off 
the streets I We are being attacked by Japanese enemy planes. This is the real 
McCoy! Take cover!" Those words pierced me like a piece of shrapnel. I was 
numb and uncomprehending. Then I heard the radio announcer say, "All 
members of the University ROTC, report to the campus immediately." I 
jumped into my ROTC uniform and rushed up to the ROTC barracks at the 
university campus. This was the first of three times that I was to volunteer my 
services during the first thirteen months of World War ll. 
Why did those of Japanese ancestry like myself volunteer for wartime 
service, one, two, and even three times during the war? To really understand 
why, you have to go back a hundred years to the beginning of Japanese 
immigration to Hawai'i. 
History of Japanese Immigration 
In 1885 the first boatload of Japanese immigrants landed in Hawai'i in 
response to the sugar industry'S need for field labor. Successful sugar culti-
vation required cheap labor, and the Hawaiian planters found the Japanese 
worker productive and industrious. Boatloads of imported immigrants from 
Japan followed, and by 1900 there were 60,000 Japanese in Hawai'i. 
Although their numbers grew, their wages were low and discriminatory. 
Portuguese and Puerto Rican workers got $22 per month, while the Japanese 
were paid only $18. A strike in 1909 was beaten down by force. Conditions 
were slow to improve. 
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Again in 1920 the Japanese sugar workers went out on a general strike 
that erupted into bitter racial hostility. The whole community was marshalled 
against the strikers. The strike for better labor conditions was pictured, not as 
an economic struggle, but as a conspiracy by Japan to take over Hawai'i. The 
sugar industry's dependence on Japanese labor notwithstanding, by sheer 
numbers--almost 40 percent of the population--the Japanese in Hawai'i had 
become an economic, politica~ and military threat to the community. 
Here's how Gavan Daws described the situation after 1900: 
The Japanese had a high birthrate, and a high birthrate meant more and 
more American citizens of Japanese ancestry. That prospect was enough to 
frighten a good many men who had a vested interest in keeping things as 
they were. Alien Japanese were manageable--,they could be prevented from 
taking out homesteads; they could be prohibited from working on territorial 
and federal construction projects; they could be barred from traveling to the 
American mainland; their language schools and their newspapers could be 
harassed; and their laborers' organizations could be beaten in any long 
strike. But what about the nisei, who might be on the verge of taking the 
advice of the Americanizers, and who would have the law behind them if 
they did? In 1920 only three voters in every hundred in the islands were 
Japanese; in 1926 it was eight in every hundred, and in 1936 it was one in 
every four. 
Was there any way to head off this apparently inexorable movement? 
The important thing was to prevent the Japanese from -taking over: 
whatever that might mean. The situation was variously described, but all the 
descriptions seemed to threaten evil. In 1920 the Japanese had to be 
controlled on the plantations; by the nineteen thirties they were loose in 
society at large, and that was a more formidable problem. If Americani-
zation did not take hold among the nisei the islands might become an 
extension of the Japanese political system in the Pacific, and that was 
unthinkable~ But if Americanization through education was successful, the 
Japanese--once Hawaii became a state--might vote together and elect a 
governor of their race, and that would be insupportable. (1974,315). 
That was a description of Hawai'i only fifty years ago. That's well within 
my lifetime! 
In the 1930s talk of statehood for Hawai'igrew, because the future of 
Hawai'i's agricultural economy depended on gaining voting representation in 
Congress. Yet Hawai'i was gripped in the schizophrenia of a Catch 22 situa-
tion because the biggest threat and obstacle to statehood was "the Japanese 
question in Hawaii": Would the Japanese in Hawai'i make good Americans? 
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The voice of opposition to statehood is well reflected by the testimony of 
one John Stokes before a Congressional joint committee in opposition to 
statehood for Hawai'i. He said: 
Ofthe original Japanese arrivals, 40,000 still remain and 110,000 oftheir 
descendants are American citizens, capable even now of dominating the 
local electorate. In view of their parents' training, characteristics, and 
background, how far may they be trUsted? 
To one who has studied Japanese and local backgrounds, it seems that 
statehood for Hawaii at the present time might become dangerous to the 
United States in the near future. At best it would be risky, so why place 
Hawaiian control in the hands of an unproven group, especially one 
descended from subjects of an aggressive and ambitious nation which at any 
moment may become an active enemy? (O~awa 1980, 262) 
That "moment" arrived most unexpectedly when the first Japanese bomb 
dropped on Pearl Harbor. That dreadful, too hortible-to-even-dream-about 
nightmare had come true. We were at war with Japan! 
That in brief is the picture of pre-Pearl Harbor Hawai'i. Now, the here-
tofore unknown, unproven, and highly doubted loyalty of the Japanese in 
Hawai'i became the BIG QUESTION MARK. Let me describe the question in 
words you can understand. In his prelude to Ambassadors mAnns (1954), a 
story of the 100th Battalion, Professor Thomas Murphy described two Amer-
ican soldiers sitting in a machine-gun pit on the north shore of O'ahu, one was 
Hawaiian and one was of Japanese ancestry. After a long silence the 
Hawaiian finally blurted out the question almost every other non-Japanese in 
Hawai'i had been burdened with. He asked: "Eh, if they come, who you going 
shoot? Dem or me?" To which the nisei soldier indignantly replied, "Who you 
think, stupid? Me just as good American as you!" This was the big question 
mark: Could those of Japanese ancestry be good loyal Americans? Professor 
Murphy wrote: "To answer and prove the question, deeds would be necessary, 
not mere words." 
The Hawai'i Terntorial Guard 
On that morning of7 December 1941, when we reported to our ROTC unit, 
there was no registration or signup, no swearing in, nor any formalities. No 
one questioned us; there were no doubts, hesitancy, or distrust. We were 
ROTC cadets responding to the call in defense of our country, just like any 
other American soldiers or sailors reporting to their battle stations. Rifles and 
real bullets were inssued. Our first mission was to deploy across Manoa 
Stream and repel Japanese paratroopers who had reportedly landed on St 
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Louis Heights. The enemy never came. This was just one of many groundless 
rumors that spread across Honolulu that day. 
That afternoon we were converted into the Hawaii Territorial Guard 
(lITG) and trucked to the National Guard Armory, where our state capitol 
building now stands. We were issued those round pie-shaped tin helmets and 
gas masks and were assigned immediately to guard the palace, the courthouse, 
the electric and telephone companies, Board of Water Supply stations and 
reselVoirs, and other utility installations around the city. Our Company B was 
stationed in the Dole cannery warehouse, where we guarded the industrial 
factories, gasoline tanks, and Honolulu harbor, armed only with puny Spring-
field .03 rifles. Fortunately no bombs dropped on the lwilei area. The enemy 
never landed. The important thing was that we had responded to our coun-
try's call to arms, we were accepted, we were proud to be in uniform, we were 
selVing our country in its hour of need~ 
Of the 500 of us in the lITG, 80 percent were of Japanese ancestry. Six 
weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, the War Department discovered to its 
horror that O'ahu was being guarded by "hundreds of Japanese" in American 
uniforms. Everyone of Japanese ancestry was discharged from the HTG on the 
morning of 19 January 1942. That discharge order was more devastating than 
if a bomb had exploded in our midst. This blow was worse than Pearl Harbor. 
To have our own country, in its danger and time of need, reject and repudiate 
our services was more than we could take. No words could ever adequately 
describe the feelings of complete rejection and repudiation we experienced 
when we were dismissed from the service of our own country, just because 
our faces and names resembled those of the enemy. The very bottom had 
dropped out of our lives. 
But that was not all. More humiliation followed. Hawai'i was gripped by a 
fear of a Japanese invasion. Other Japanese Americans already in uniform 
had their rifles taken away, and they were transferred to noncombat engineer 
units. The Draft Board reclassified all Japanese Americans from I-A draft 
status to 4-C (enemy alien) so that we were precluded from military service. 
John Balch, president of the Hawaiian Telephone Company, wrote a pam-
phlet, "Shall the Japanese Be Allowed to Dominate Hawaii?" and proposed 
all Japanese be moved to the island of Moloka'i. Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox pleaded with President Roosevelt for the wholesale evacuation of all 
Japanese from Hawai'i because "the military defense of Hawaii is now being 
carried out in the presence of a population predominantly with enemy sympa-
thies and affiliation." On 19 February 1942 President Roosevelt signed Execu-
tive Order 9066, which called for the evacuation of 110,000 men, women, and 
children of Japanese ancestry from the west coast and their confinement to 
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barbed-wired detention centers in inland United States. This was the situation 
facing Japanese Americans in February 1942. 
We had nothing to do but go back to the university. But education 
became meaningless. Nothing made sense. Our nation was crying for workers 
and servicemen, and yet we were deemed useless and unwanted. 
The Varsity Victory Volunteers 
One day in late January 1942, Hung Wai Ching, secretary of the university 
YMCA, talked.to a group ofHTG dischargees and persuaded them that there 
were other ways besides shooting a gun to serve their country and they ought 
to petition the military governor and ofTer themselves as a noncombat labor 
battalion. One hundred sixty-nine university boys signed a petition that was 
accepted by General Emmons. I was among those volunteers. This group was 
given the name Varsity Victory Volunteers (vvv), and we were assigned to 
the 34th Army Engineers at Schofield Barracks. We were armed, not with 
rifles, but with picks and shovels, hammers and saws, crowbars and sledge-
hammers and performed much needed defense work on O'ahu for the next 
eleven months. 
Hung Wai Ching was very proud of his VVV boys. He bragged about how 
these boys gave up their education and other lucrative defense jobs to serve 
as common laborers. One day in late December, the quarry gang breaking 
rocks up at the Kolekole Pass quarry saw Hung Wai Ching with some impor-
tant looking brass. The visitor was Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. 
Was it mere coincidence that just a few weeks later, in January 1943, the War 
Department announced the formation of an all-nisei combat team, changed 
the nisei draft status from 4-C back to I-A, and called for volunteers? 
The Triple V boys voted to disband so they could volunteer for the 442nd 
Combat Team. The Triple V had served its purpose. It had stemmed the 
rising tide of hysteria, panic, and prejudice against Hawai'i's Japanese at a 
most strategic time, and had answered the big question mark with bold, 
dramatic, and positive action, not mere words. 
The 442nd Combat Team 
The 442nd carried on where the Triple V left ofT. A call for 1500 volunteers 
from Hawai'i was made. Ten thousand Japanese Americans in Hawai'i 
responded. On the mainland more nisei volunteered from behind the barbed 
wire of detention camps. For the third time in the war I volunteered and was 
accepted to serve in the 442nd. The looth Battalion had already been sent to 
the mainland and had finished training with a distinguished record. 
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The story of the 100th and 442nd has been told and retold many times. It 
will not be retold here. The 100th and 442nd became the most decorated and 
probably the best publicized American fighting unit in World War n. Per-
sonnel of this single battle unit were awarded one Congressional Medal of 
Honor, 52 Distinguished Service Crosses, 560 Silver Stars, 5200 Bronze Stars, 
and 9486 Purple Hearts, and earned 7 Distinguished Unit citations. 
The most renowned feat of the 100th and 442nd was the heroic rescue of 
the 211 men of "The Lost Battalion," which happened in the hills of Belle-
fontaine, France, in late October 1944, at a terrible cost of 161 dead, 43 miss-
ing, and 2000 wounded. Mter the battle, on 12 November 1944, General John 
Dahlquist, commander of the 36th Division, who had ordered the rescue mis-
sion, called an assembly to honor the 100th and 442nd for their achievements. 
Seeing only a few hundred men assembled of,a regiment which normally num-
bered over 4000, General Dahlquist asked Colonel Virgil Miller with some 
irritation, "I thought I ordered the whole regiment to assemble. Where are 
the rest of the men?" To which Colonel Miller, with tears streaming down his 
cheeks, replied, "You're looking at the entire regiment, Sir. That's all that's 
left" (Stein 1985, 32; Duus 1987,217). 
The incomparable combat record of the 100th and 442nd, underscored by 
over 800 headstones for fallen comrades scattered from Italy to France, gave 
dramatic and irrefutable response to the big question mark and established 
for all time the truth of President Roosevelt's statement to the 442nd: "Amer-
icanism is not a matter of race or ancestry. Americanism is a matter of mind 
and the heart." 
The Military Intelligence Service 
A larger question still remained to be answered: "Would Americans of 
Japanese ancestry be willing to fight against the Japanese, to fight against 
those of their' own race and blood?" 
Early in the war the American military forces discovered the need for 
effective military intelligence against the Japanese. The Japanese Americans 
provided the best source of trained intelligence language specialists in the 
numbers that were needed. A military intelligence school for teaching military 
Japanese was established at Camp Savage, Minnesota, in 1942, and nisei with 
some Japanese language background were recruited from the detention 
centers, Hawai'i, the 100th Battalion, and the 442nd Combat Team. I was 
included in a group of one hundred men recruited from the 442nd in training 
at Camp Shelby. 
Mter completing a six-month crash course in military Japanese, my unit 
was assigned to the 10th Air Force in the India-Burma theater to perform 
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radio intelligence work intercepting radio transmissions of the Japanese Air 
Force in Burma. Other military intelligence graduates were assigned to the 
US Infantry, Mars Task Force, the Air Force, Marines, Navy, Paratroopers, 
ass, and OWl, and to the British, Australian, New Zealand, and Chinese 
forces operating in the Aleutian Islands, Guadalcanal, Buna, New Georgia, 
Tarawa, Leyte, the Burma Road, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima, over the entire 
Asian-Pacific theater. They translated captured documents, intercepted and 
deciphered coded messages, deciphered and translated maps, battle plans, 
military orders, diaries, and letters, and interrogated captured Japanese 
prisoners. They were the eyes and ears of Allied forces fighting the Japanese 
in the Pacific War. After the peace they served with the Japan Occupation 
Forces and the \Var Crimes Tribunals. 
In 1944 nisei interpreters translated the captured Operation Z, a Japa-
nese Navy plan for the defense of the Marianas and the Philippines. When 
the American fleet steamed into the Marianas, Admiral Spruance already 
knew the exact number and location of Japanese ships and planes, resulting in 
a decisive American victory in the battle of the Philippine Sea and Leyte 
Gulf. Nisei interpreters were instrumental in determining the location of 
Admiral Yamamoto's whereabouts, which led to the ambush of his airplane 
and his resulting death. Back in the Pentagon, Kazuo Yamane was leafing 
through some captured Japanese documents that Navy Intelligence had 
classified as "routine" (of no military value). He discovered a thick book that 
turned out to be the Imperial Army Ordinance Inventory listing the numbers 
of every type of Japanese weapon. This discovery led to new targets for B-29 
raids over Japan. 
The Japanese-American military intelligence linguist faced an added 
danger--being mistaken for the enemy and being shot at by their own troops. 
Most of them had Caucasian bodyguards. Yet some were killed by mistake. 
Sergeant Frank Hachiya of Hood River, Oregon, volunteered to parachute 
behind enemy lines in the Philippines, but as he made his way back to Ameri-
can lines, he was mistakenly shot by Americans as an enemy infiltrator. On his 
body they found maps of the complete Japanese defenses for Leyte. He was 
awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously. Yet his name was 
one of the fourteen Japanese-American names removed from the War 
Memorial Honor Roll by "patriots" of the Hood River American Legion Post. 
Following a nationwide outcry the names were restored. A memorial to Frank 
Hachiya now reads: 
The life of Sgt. Hachiya symbolizes well the story of the Japanese-American 
soldiers of WW II. Unwanted by the Army, he could not be drafted. Sus-
pected by his own Government. he was confined in a relocation camp. Given 
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the most trying of assignments, to fight against those of his own ancestry and 
culture, he was mistakenly shot and killed by his own comrades. Though he 
died, his courage resulted in the saving of lives of thousands of his 
countrymen. 
During the War, over six thousand nisei served in the US Military 
Intelligence Service against the Japanese enemy, but little is known oftheir 
identity and exploits because their services were confidential and kept secret 
until their recent declassification. The nisei of the Military Intelligence Ser-
vice were the Allies' "secret weapon" in the war against Japan. General Doug-
las MacArthur stated that "Never in military history did any Army know so 
much about the enemy prior to actual engagement." General Willoughby, 
head of US Army Intelligence in the Pacific theater stated: "The nisei saved a 
million lives and shortened the war by two years." Theirs was a ringing and 
undeniable response to the question: "Who you going shoot, me or them?" 
Conclusion 
When the 100th Battalion and 442nd Combat Team returned from the 
European battlefields they were awarded a special Presidential Unit Citation 
on the White House lawn, the only American military unit to be so honored. 
Speaking for the whole nation President Harry Truman rendered the final 
verdict on the loyalty of Americans of Japanese ancestry when he said: "I 
can't tell you how much I appreciate the privilege of being able to show you 
how much the United States thinks of what you have done .... (Y]ou fougJlt 
for the free nations of the world .... (Y]ou fought not only the enemy, but 
you fought prejudice, and you won!" . 
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Samoans, World War II, and Military Work 
Robert W. Franco 
\\'hen Commander Benjamin F. Tilley auived at Tutuila in August 1899 he 
marvelled at Pago Pago harbor, "a perfect fortress ... stronger for defense 
than Gibraltar." Eight months later eastern Samoa was ceded to the United 
States, and Tilley set out to establish a naval administration for the territory. 
He created a government that included only two new institutions, a judicial 
system and the Fitafita Guard, who were to enforce court decisions and 
generally maintain order. Tilley formed the Fitafita in order to attract "the 
elite young men and thus bring them under the influence of the government" 
(quoted in Olsen 1976, 9-10, 21). During the 1920s and 1930s, employment 
with the naval administration brought a great deal of prestige to the Fitafita 
guardsmen. Darden states that the Fitafita were an important source of cash 
for their extended families taiga), and that guardsmen were "accruing 
prestige vastly out of proportion to their traditional status" (1952, 13). 
In the early 1940s World War II came to American and Western Samoa. 
When Samoans speak of this period they talk of the abundant wage labor 
opportunities and the continuities of their military service to the United 
States. In the 1940s large numbers of Samoans, not just Fitafita guardsmen, 
gained access to wage labor opportunities, military enlistment opportunities, 
and a chance to redefine their status in relation to their traditional chiefs 
matai. Hundreds of American and Western Samoans developed transporta-
tion, communication, and supply skills, and with the end of the war they were 
eager to succeed in overseas labor markets. In this way World War II 
provided a major stimulus to international Samoan migration, a migration 
that now encompasses a wide geographic expanse from New Zealand through 
Samoa to Hawai'i and the US mainland. For Samoans, as for other Islanders 
discussed in this conference, the aftereffects of World War II have been as 
disruptive as the war itself. 
During World War II in Samoa, for the first time hundreds of Samoans 
were allowed to volunteer for the US military, either as Fitafita guardsmen or 
as members of the US Navy or Marine Corps Reserve. When the naval 
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station at Tutuila was closed in 1951, these recruits and their dependents, 
nearly a thousand people in all, were relocated to Hawai'i. From the 1940s to 
the present Samoans have been volunteering to serve in the US armed forces, 
and as they have traveled to military bases in Hawai'i, California, and 
Washington they have have found kin who have preceded them and estab-
lished Samoan enclaves near these military bases. From World War II to the 
present military enlistment has been a significant catalyst to migration, and a 
major strategy for adapting to American urban environments. 
In 1940 Pago Pago was only a minor naval station lacking "the facilities 
necessary to handle wartime logistical problems" (Olsen 1976, 175-176). In 
the spring of 1940 Captain A R. Pefley went to American Samoa to draw up 
plans for the development of defense capabilities on Tutuila. Pefley's 
development plan included the following points: 
1 Additional quarters for officers and enlisted men mustbe constructed; 
2 Expand commissary, storage, and refrigeration; 
3 A new dispensary and additional generators needed; 
4 Increase light and heavy machinery and equipment; 
5 Purchase additional land at Fagotogo and Utulei; 
6 Build garage, machine shop, and recreation facilities; 
7 Improve sanitation in Pago Pago and other areas; 
8 Develop a thorough agricultural program to feed the men. 
In November 1940 expansion of the naval station began. Later this 
expansion program was part of a contract, The Pacific Air Bases Program, 
which included construction work at Pearl Harbor (Burke 1972b, 25). 
Much of this initial expansion on Tutuila was conducted under the 
administration of G. K. Brodie, director of the Public Works Department. 
From the naval records there appears to have been a great urgency to this 
expansion. For example, the records refer to "war clouds brewing," and "the 
clouds of war descending." Brodie felt that the necessary speed of the work 
was unfortunate and that there would be problems going from a "decrepit, 
minor Naval Station" to a "Pacific Air Base" in a short period of time (Burke 
1972b). Brodie, in a memorandum to Lieutenant Commander W. L. Richards, 
wrote: 
The labor situation is most unique .... In general, the native labor will be 
sufficient and satisfactory. However, there are several points that require 
special mention: a) Native Food supplies have to be maintained. The natives 
have one great fault; they have little foresight. As long as they have 
sufficient food in the ground for their needs, they are satisfied. They do not 
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entirely grasp the fact that when we take most of their men for labor they 
will have to rely on the women, old men, and children for plantation work. 
We are making every attempt to encourage or force them to keep planting 
in excess so that there will always be adequate food to supply the men 
working. If their food supply fails, we will have to take over the task of 
feeding the island by the importation of rice and by fishing with dynamite. 
At regular intervals, native Public Works employees who have high standing 
with the natives are being sent out to check the plantation and put pressure 
on the chiefs to keep the planting going. This is an odd and perhaps illegal 
expenditure, but it is almost mandatory under the circumstances; b) The 
natives can do a good 8 or 10 hours work a day, but when worked beyond 
that, they cannot keep up the pace. They desire to work as much as possible 
to get the money, but trials have proved that they cannot physically stand up 
under long working hours. (Burke 1972b, 25) 
By October, 1942 the US military was preparing for a possible attack on 
Tutuila and for a protracted engagement. The role of the Fitafita Guard in 
any defensive action was clearly specified: 
Fitafita section 1 -- Take the enemy forces under fire approaching 
within the east sector of the Naval facility. Control the spread of fire during 
lulls in the battle. 
Fitafita section 3 -- Take enemy forces under fire approaching within 
the malae area. Control fire ... safeguard essential material and records as 
directed. Be prepared to carry out Naval Station Logistic Plan One on 
order. 
Fitafita section 4 -- Take enemy forces under fire approaching within 
the west sector ... control fire during lulls in the battle. 
Fitafita section 5 -- Take enemy forces under fire approaching within 
the malae area. Be prepared to man fire truck on order. Power house detail 
control damage to Naval Station power supply. (Burke 19720) 
Samoans were also active within the Supply Division at Pago Pago. This 
division was viewed as one of the most important because it was necessary to 
"keep the logistics train functioning smoothly" (Burke 1972b, 129). The 
Supply Division consisted of 2500 civilian employees, and it is assumed that 
most or all of these were Samoans. 
Mter the attack on Pearl Harbor many ships were directed to Pago Pago. 
According to Burke, "Ship arrivals jumped from three in December, 1941 to 
fifty-six in December, 1942. Shipping activity was intensive throughout 1943. 
In March, 1943, 121 vessels passed through Pago Pago harbor. Shipping 
arrivals declined after February, 1944, from fifty per month to less than 
twenty" (1972b, 135). 
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A great deal of military activity occurred in Samoa between January 1942 
and March 1944. In October 1942 there were 14,371 American servicemen on 
Tutuila and Upolu. During the following twelve months this military force 
decreased to 9491, and by February of 1944 only 2080 American servicemen 
remained in Samoa (Burke 1972a, 75). The "Marine Era" on Tutuila ended 
on 1 March 1944, when the base reverted to a naval station. The naval 
commandant was then responsible for the "roll up" of the base, that is, he 
made available supplies and building materials to be sent to the forward bases 
in the Northern and Central Pacific. The naval station was given a new, less 
urgent "mission" (Burke 1972a, 7). The station then provided: 
1 Limited anchorage facility 
2 Permanent fueling facilities 
3 Minor naval repair depot 
4 Supply facilities 
5 Communication facilities 
6 Weather observation station 
7 Limited aviation facilities 
8 Hospital facilities 
9 Internal security using any personnel available 
Even into 1945 more than seven hundred Samoans were working as 
stevedoring personnel using cargo handling equipment, cranes, trucks, and 
trailers, and reports from Tutuila remark: "Ships are promptly discharged to 
full limit of labor and equipment available" (Burke 1972a, 13). 
In general the US military presented positive assessments of the Samoan 
labor force, especially during the period of intense military activity, 1942-
1944. Burke states: "Throughout the entire war period Samoan personnel 
were used wherever possible releasing the Navy personnel for more vital jobs. 
The Samoans performed very satisfactorily. Although the Samoan did not 
have the stamina of a Caucasian, he could work for about ten hours a day 
without losing efficiency" (1972b, 131). 
The US military was also present on Upolu and Savai'i after 27 March 
1942. The greatest concentration of American troops was on Upolu, as Savai'i 
was considered too rough and mountainous for airfields, and there were no 
anchorages for larger ships. Through negotiations with A C. Turnbull, acting 
administrator in Western Samoa, and with other representatives of the New 
Zealand government, the United States was able to secure tenure over 5000 
acres of land for the period of the war. The land was to be developed into an 
airstrip using US military personnel and Samoan workers. The Samoans were 
paid 5 shillings per eight-hour day if they were laborers and 8 to 16 shillings 
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per eight-hour day if they were foremen or specialists. It appears that the 
Western Samoans were also eager to work, as one report states that 
"sufficient labor is available at all times" (Burke 1972b, 46). In addition to 
assisting military personnel with the construction of an airstrip, Western 
Samoans also worked in roadbuilding. As the war moved westward beyond 
Samoa, Western Samoans worked to maintain the airstrip as an emergency 
facility. 
Olsen, (1976, 177-179), in his fine history of the American naval 
administration in Samoa, summarizes some of the beneficial and disruptive 
effects of Samoan participation in World War H: 
One of the most important benefits that Samoans would derive ... was the 
experience and training Samoan mechanics and craftsmen gained working 
alongside American civilian contract employees and the Seabees. As a result 
after the war, Samoans were competent to construct, maintain and operate 
the Island Government facilities. With the exception of the Public Works 
officer and his assistant ... all the employees of the Public Works 
Department were Samoan, including draftsmen, surveyors, foremen, 
machinists, heavy equipment operators, plumbers, electricians, refrigeration 
mechanics, welders, and clerks. Also, during and after the war, Samoans 
working for the naval station learned valuable trades that allowed them to 
open their own small businesses, such as small auto repair shops, paint 
shops, and carpentry services. Other Samoans who had enlisted received 
veteran's benefits allowing them to further their education. (1976, 177-179) 
However, Olsen goes on to argue: 
On the whole the impact of World War II was disruptive despite the benefits 
Samoa gained as a result of the war. The very foundation of Samoan society 
--the malai system--was threatened ... The replacement of Samoa's 
plantation economy by a wage economy gave the young men ... a feeling of 
independence gained from having money in their pockets rather than being 
dependent on their malai who controlled the family's lands. (1976, 179) 
In 1945 Governor Hauser addressed the American Samoa Fono in these 
words: "We have much to do, as native industry, agriculture, education, and 
the like suffered greatly when you made your all-out effort for the U.S. and 
our allies" (quoted in Olsen 1979, 186). Governor Hauser warned the Fono 
that the wartime prosperity would soon be over. This prosperity is probably 
best reflected in the growth of the assets of the Bank of American Samoa 
during the period. Between 30 June 1941 and 30 June 1945 this bank's assets 
grew from $309,768 to $1,804,281 (Olsen 1976, 178). 
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In the period 1945 to 1950, the American'Samoa Fono addressed three 
major issues to the naval administration. First, a request was made to give all 
Fitafita guardsmen and Samoan Marines American citizenship. This request 
was withdrawn when questions about citizenship and land ownership were 
raised. Second, Chief Tuiasosopo complained from his position within the 
Fono that during the war years the military administration had inappro-
priately selected lower ranking chiefs for government positions. Third, in the 
discussion over a constitution for American Samoa, it was decided to remove 
a clause prohibiting "involuntary servitude" because the Fono was afraid that 
such a clause might restrict the authority of malai. These issues show quite 
clearly that American Samoa political leaders, even after the disruptions of 
World War II, still placed great value in their malai system and its 
prerogatives in economic decision making. Further, the ciiizenship issue 
foreshadowed an ongoing concern over citizenship status and land tenure 
questions. 
The period 1940 to 1950 was a decade of rapid population growth in 
American Samoa, no doubt partly due to the presence of the US military (see 
Keesing 1973). By 1951 the wartime prosperity was ending, and Samoans 
were finding it difficult to readjust to a lowered standard of living. Lew-
thwaite, Mainzer, and Holland vividly describe the diaspora that accompanied 
the closing of the US Naval base in American Samoa in 1951: 
The General R. L. Howze, the last scheduled naval transport sailed on 25 
June, 1951. It carried many members of the disbanded Fitafita Guard north 
to Hawaii ... and when, in 1952, the President Jackson called on short notice 
to pick up dependents, the authorities were faced with something of a rush. 
For many claimed relatives in Hawaii and seized the opportunity for free or 
low cost naval transportation, and though the hastiness of the medical and 
financial screening was to provoke protest--almost 1,000 Samoans embarked 
for Honolulu. (1973, 135) 
Conclusion 
During the 1940s a rapid increase in the number of wage-labor opportunities 
stimulated large-scale rural-urban migration to Pago Pago. Job skills acquired 
during World War II gave Samoans the confidence to begin moving inter-
nationally--American Samoans to Hawai'i and the US mainland, Western 
Samoans to New Zealand--in the early 1950s. These early international 
movers were probably more highly skilled than any later wave of Samoan 
migrants. The initial migrants to Hawai'i and the US mainland established 
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Samoan communities around military bases, and these "ethnic enclaves" have 
provided, and continue to provide, points of entry for new Samoan migrants. 
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The Fitafita Guard and Samoan Military Experience 
Tuala Sevaaetasi 
Dr Fra!lCO has mentioned most qf the things that happened in Satnoa during 
World War II, but I was there. I was in the service, in this outfit he men-
tioned, called the Fitafita Guard. I believe there are a lot of you who have 
heard of that name, and maybe have even been in Samoa during that time to 
see what those people did. But there are some who do not understand what 
the wordfitafita means. The wordjitafita is a Samoan word for "soldier," the 
people who are ready to fight for their country, who are ready to render their 
service when their country needs it the most. 
I was surprised when World War II came to Samoa. Fitafita is a unit of 
the regular navy. They received the same salary that regular navy received. 
Only in those days there was not much money, but the value of the money was 
there. The private or the seaman drew $21 a month. So did the Fitafita. In 
1900 President McKinley gave the authority to Commander Tilley to establish 
the navy authority in Samoa. That lasted until 30 June 1951, when by execu-
tive order the administration of the island was transferred to the Department 
of Interior. Franco also said that during that time, those people, the Fitafita 
Guard, were relocated here in Hawai'i, stationed at Barbers Point. That was 
the beginning of the big migration from Samoa, because of those people. 
Let me speak about what the Fitafita did for their country and for the 
military. After Commander Tilley first formed the Fitafita Guard in 1900 
some people were assigned to sea duty. At that time there was only one navy 
ship in Samoa. It was not a destroyer, it was not a cruiser, but a tug boat. 
Some Samoans from the Fitafita Guard were assigned sea duty on that ship. 
Now, what did they do for their country? The navy at that time was not 
too strict about the Fitafita purchasing things from the commissary and pXs, 
the post exchanges. So in that way most of the Islanders depended on the 
Fitafita. The Fitafita bought things from the navy commissary. So most of 
these people depended greatly on the Fitafita Guard. And because these 
guards are Samoans, the native people of American Samoa respected them. 
In Samoa during World War II, there were changes everywhere the war came. 
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One of the big changes in Samoa was population. Everywhere you went after 
the war, you saw some haole (Caucasian) kids, most of them haole. That 
increased the population of Samoa. 
Bob Franco also mentioned the work. I've seen those things. Some of the 
reports Franco gets from these other Samoans-if they were here, I would tell 
them--they just didn't know what they were talking about. Some guys said that 
the Samoans were forced to work. No, it was not that way. I go along with 
somebody who says that when Samoa heard that the US government was at 
war with Japan, the call came around and they offered their hands to help. 
I was enlisted in the navy through the Fitafita Guard in 1932. One of the 
reasons I wanted to go there was that I love music. In 1902 the navy sent to 
Samoa two navy musicians to teach the Fitafita Guard so they could organize 
a band. That band helped to bring up the name of the Fitafita 'Guard. So I 
love music and I thought I'd better join the navy, not only for the pay--the pay 
was there; the Fitafita Guard was about the best paid job in Samoa at that 
time--but I went there to be a musician, a better musician. 
After I joined I found out that there was no vacancy; all the band posi-
tions were filled. So they used me as the governor's orderly. In 1933 I accom-
panied the governor of American Samoa and the assistant administrator from 
Western Samoa on a trip to Suva for a visit to the Rockefeller Foundation. 
When we came back, I had a chance. All this time I wanted to come out, to 
attend a music school to improve my music knowledge. But during that time 
the war started in Europe and then the navy stopped the transfer. They told 
me that I'd better stay in Samoa. So I did until 1948 when I left the Fitafita 
Guard and band. I was proud to serve in the outfit, not only for the US 
government, but also for my people. 
I came here and reenlisted in the army band at Fort Shafter. What 
happened? When I came to that band there were nothing but local boys, just 
Filipino. And then their allocation was filled too. There were only two 
sergeant first class and five second class, and then I reenlisted in the second 
class. I had no chance to move out, and then all of a sudden the Korean War 
broke out. Then I saw the memo from the commanding general, "People who 
have experience in the infantry, we are going to put up an infantry training 
center at Schofield." So I thought, this is my chance. This is what I learned 
from Samoa in the Fitafita Guard and band. 
When they started that outfit, I was surprised. We were trained like 
soldiers. Instead of Commander Tilley to bring the Marines to guard the navy 
installation, Commander Tilley suggested that it would be better to use the 
Samoan people for the job. Then he found out that the Samoan people are 
very trustworthy. They served faithfully, and there was no problem with them. 
The reason for that is the culture. We people know such things as courtesy 
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and discipline. A child in Samoa is disciplined from a very young age. Now 
when I accepted, or was accepted for the training center at Schofield, I was 
one of the teachers to teach discipline and courtesy. Then I found out that 
was the most hated subject in the army. 
If only the good Lord would make me young again, I would reenlist again 
to serve in the army. 
Appendix: Audience Questions and Answers 
TS Tuala Sevaaetasi IC John Charlot 
IF Ionathan Fifi'i 
IC One of the things I heard about the army presence or navy presence 
during the war was that the navy men would disrupt the Samoan ceremonies 
because they'd be sort of flirting with the girls or trying to get girls away from 
the ceremony. I was wondering if you'd run across this? 
TS I have never heard of anything like that. The people of Samoa during the 
navy administration served with full heart. We even welcomed them to come. 
Some of the navy personnel even came and slept in our homes, but nothing 
happened. I have never heard of one rape case during all the fifty years the 
navy was in Samoa. The people respect the navy, and their personnel respect 
the Samoan culture, too. I didn't hear anything about that. 
IC I was wondering, were there a number of navy officers who were offered 
Samoan titles? Was there any mixing of those? 
TS Yes, there were some Samoans, even our Senator Inouye. Inouye, when 
he came to Samoa, the Samoans asked him to be their spokesman in 
Congress. So Inouye accepted that, even now he has been helping the 
Samoans. So the Samoans named him the Fofoga 0 Samoa. In other words, 
the one who represents Samoa. His word is above all the chiefs' words of 
Samoa. He speaks for all the chiefs of Samoa. There are other people who 
.came back, and I heard that they were given titles in Samoa. 
IF I've got another question, my friend. You've been talking a lot about 
Samoa, but here we talk about World War II and you didn't touch anything 
about how World War II affected Samoa, Pago Pago .. 
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TS Well, there were not any encounters during World War II in Samoa, but I 
heard someone earlier mention propaganda or rumors. After the Japanese 
bombed Pearl Harbor there were rumors in Samoa that the Japanese said, 
"Well, we missed you this time, but we'll see you New Years." You know that 
thing came true. In January 1942 the Japanese shelled American Samoa, 
Tutuila. This harbor, even though it's small, it's deep enough for big ships, 
and it's well surrounded by mountains. So it is very hard, there is no place for 
a plane to land. When the Japanese shelled the place, there were already for-
tifications put up on the other side of the island by the 7th Marine who first 
came there to fortify the place. But the trouble was they put up four six-inch 
guns, two on one side of the mouth of the harbor, and two on the other side, 
all facing the entrance. And they also mounted the antiaircraft batteries. 
During the war that was another part of the Fitafita Guard's duty. Like 
myself, I was assigned to those antiaircraft batteries. My duty, I was one of the 
gunmen with the Marines, with the 7th Defense. So that was part of the 
Fitafita Guard's duty. 
As I said, nobody knew how in the world Commander Tilley and the old 
Samoans called this unit, this regular navy unit, the Fitafita, the soldiers. But 
when they organized that outfit we were trained to be ready for actions like 
this. I've been in the Fitafita rifle team. Every once in a while the British 
would come and then ask permission to use the rifle range. We competed 
with all the teams that passed through Samoa, and none of them could beat 
us. When they gave me the chance to be an instructor up at Schofield for 
individual weapons, they asked me, "Have you given any classes before?" I 
told them, "No." "And what are you going to teach the trainees?" I told them, 
"You give me any individual weapon and I'll fire against the best you have. 
And if I can shoot that good, then I know how to teach these people how to 
shoot." And I've been a competitive shooter for the army all this time, even 
during my time in the band. I have traveled to Camp Perry, Ohio, where the 
national comPrtition is held every year. I usually shot rifles, but then age 
crept in, so I turned to the pistol. My permanent classification is master. I 
shoot against the best. I am not the best, but so far as training goes, I once 
started teaching a kid in the band here in Honolulu to shoot the pistol. We 
started from the arms rule. The pistol is not too accurate; they're not made 
. for competition. But when I left for three years and came back, that boy had 
won the championship of this island. He was the best. And then from here, 
the army called him for the army team stationed at Fort Benning. He held the 
national record for more years than anyone who has won the national record. 
Those are some of the things we did during World War II. 
,. 
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Villages without People: A Preliminary Analysis of 
American Views of Melanesians during World War II 
as Seen through Popular Histories 
Marty Zelenietz 
When I visited my parents in April 1988, my father showed me the travel 
supplement of a local paper, thinking that I'd enjoy the feature article on 
Papua New Guinea. From the title alone, "Welcome to the Stone Age," I 
could imagine the contents, the usual stereotyped images of Papua New 
Guinea: jungles, headhunters, cannibals. The author fulfilled my expectations, 
conjuring up the image par excellence of Melanesia: "The natives are friendly, 
despite their well-deserved reputation as headhunters, a practice that is only a 
few generations in the past" (Handley 1988,1). 
Can we escape this image, this myth? I doubt it. Myths give particular 
meaning to events, "transforming complex affairs into simple but crystal-clear 
'realities' that explain and justify how things are now" (Horne 1986, 57). They 
guide our vision and ftx our perspective. Probably, two centuries hence, travel 
writers will still write of "friendly New Guinea natives, only a couple of hun-
dred years removed from headhunting and cannibalism." Myths and images, 
having frozen our vision, possess a self-perpetuating ability to live on long 
after reality changes. Ghosts of the past influence our perceptions of the 
present as the travel supplement stereotype of Papua New Guinea demon-
strates. 
In this paper I talk about myths, images of the past, shadows of a war that 
ended more than four decades ago. The ghosts of the World War II live on, as 
the National Geographic knows (Benchley 1988). Images of the war still 
command our attention: witness the number of new books about the war (eg, 
Toland 1982; Terke11984; Spector 1985; Dower 1986), and the reprinting of 
old books (Smith and Finch 1987 [originally 1948]; MacDonald 1978 [origi-
nally 1947]). This flood of printed pages reflects the continuing importance of 
the war in American thought, history, and mythology. 
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History and Images 
With rare exception the expanding literature replicates and perpetuates a 
stereotype of indigenous Melanesians that is as inaccurate as the stereotype 
of Americans that many Melanesians hold (see eg, Gegeo, chapter 3). The 
people of Melanesia found themselves caught in the crossfire of a foreign 
war, a war that generated for them images and myths of powerful, generous, 
and egalitarian ,Americans. With my colleague, Hisafumi Saito, I've described 
the images held by one group of people, the Kilenge of West New Britain 
(Zelenietz and Saito 1986). The Kilenge experienced the war firsthand; they 
provided labor to build an airstrip, first for the Australians and later for the 
Japanese; they hid from the bombs and shells as the First Marine Division 
invaded Cape Gloucester on 24 December 1943; and they seIVed as carriers 
for MacArthur's forces on Bougainville and New Guinea. From such experi-
ences the Kilenge fabricated indelible images of the combatants. To this day 
the images provide local stereotypes to guide Kilenge interactions with 
foreigners. 
In trying to put the Kilenge view into a broader context, to ground the 
Kilenge images and memories in the larger events of the Pacific, and to see 
how the combatants felt about the indigenous peoples of the region, I 
thumbed through several readily available popular histories of the war. What 
I did not find in them struck me as being far more revealing than what I did. 
What was missing? Two lacunae captured my attention. First, I discov-
ered, historians almost totally ignore the battle for Cape Gloucester. 
Although the War Department released a film in 1944 called Attack: The 
Battle for Cape Gloucester, that battle never captured the public's imagina-
tion, never spawned the images and press copy generated by battles like Gua-
dalcanal (eg, Tregaskis 1943; Kent 1972; Hoyt 1983) or Buna (Mayo 1974}.1 
At best, Gloucester rates a few paragraphs (Spector 1985, 247) or pages 
(Davis 1962,168-188; Berry 1982, 64-65,84-85,102-105) in books that deal 
mainly with other events and campaigns. 
The second thing I couldn't find was local people. The Americans were 
important to the Kilenge; the Kilenge, as far as I could see, did not exist for 
the Americans. The more I read about the Pacific War, the more it struck me: 
references to the indigenous peoples of Melanesia were few and far between. 
When mentioned at all, Melanesians usually fit a particular Western stereo-
typical image of "the native." Soldiers and historians recalled the mud, the 
malaria, the mountains, and the monsoons, but not the Melanesians. Writers 
make abundant reference to places and villages, but rarely to the inhabitants. 
In my search for Melanesians, I was chasing images of invisible people, 
shadows of nonentities. 
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The invisible Melanesian contrasts sharply with the .flesh-and-blood 
civilian in the European theater of the war (see eg, Mauldin 1945; Mac-
Donald 1978). Americans came out of the war with a clear image of a Europe 
brought to its knees by the war's devastation, a land teeming with dispos-
sessed, destitute refugees. Ultimately America responded to this image with 
the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction. No such plan benefited the 
war-ravaged people of Melanesia. Why, I asked myself, should one group 
leave such a visible and memorable image, and the other group fade into 
oblivion like a photograph left in the sun? 
That question forms the basis of this presentation. Although I deal with 
matters of what we call history here, I am not a historian. Rather I am an 
anthropologist. As such, I'm accustomed to gathering my information by iiving 
with people, participating in their lives, talking with them, and learning from 
them. Their views, after all, reflect their culture. This is how I learned the 
meaning of World War II for the Kilenge. For this paper, however, I have had 
neither the resources nor the time to travel and interview survivors of the 
war, to explore the images they hold of the people of Melanesia. But these 
images are not inaccessible: literate people generate and record their myths in 
writing. Trade paperback books, written primarily by Americans for an 
American audience, became my informants. These books represent American 
myth-making, and because they sell successfully and continually in the popu-
lar market, I presume they reflect, at least in part, the American worldview. 
Undoubtedly there is something of a dialectical process at work here. These 
books not only mirror the values of the culture that spawns them, they also 
shape the images that culture holds. I want to show how they feed our stereo-
types of Melanesians. I make no claim to have examined the popular and 
scholarly literature thoroughly and exhaustively. My research, really in its 
infancy, has only scratched the surface of a wealth of written material. My aim 
is to examine how American fighting forces, and those who record their 
deeds, their mythmakers, saw or failed to see the indigenous people of 
Melanesia during World War II, to explore American images of the Mela-
nesians, and in contrasting those images with images held of Europeans, to 
account for why those images exist. . 
But before I talk of the people of Melanesia, I must first talk of the land 
itself, because before they saw the people, the Americans saw the land, and 
the land etched indelible images on the American psyche. American percep-
tions of, and experiences with, the Melanesian landscape profoundly 
influenced what and how they later saw the people. 
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Images of Melanesia 
American forces went into the Southwest Pacific not knowing what to expect, 
or for that matter where they were going. For the most part they never under-
stood the geography of that vast oceanic area. "To this day, few GIS and 
Marines have the remotest idea of where they fought" (Manchester 1980, 94). 
We may understand civilian and enlisted personnel's bewilderment over the 
North and South Pacific (Manchester 1980, 94; TerkeI1984, 527), but Mac-
Arthur's apparent confusion between New Guinea and Papua (1964, 164), 
and Spector's inappropriate description of Lae as a "village" and Buna a 
"town" (1985, 216) reveal the underlying and persistent depth of American 
ignorance of Melanesia. 
Unlike the Philippines, or Guam, or Hawai'i, Melanesia did not form part 
of the American colonial experience in the Pacific. Here was a world most· 
Americans had never before seen, never before experienced. A landscape 
totally alien, its awesome beauty overwhelmed their senses; its hidden dangers 
could cost them their lives. Their first long look at this land impregnated their 
senses with ambivalent and contradictory responses: 
O,lost tropic beauty of sea and cocopalm and sand. 
It is scarcely believable that I can remember it with pleasure, and 
affection, and a sense of beauty .... The pervasive mud, and jungle gloom 
and tropical sun, when they are not all around you smothering you, can have 
a haunting beauty at a far remove .... 
But, God help me, it was beautiful. I remember exactly the way it looked 
the day we came up on deck to go ashore: the delicious sparkling tropiC sea, 
the long beautiful beach, the minute palms of the copra plantation waving in 
the sea breeze, the dark green band of jungle, and the dun mass and power 
of the mountains rising behind it to rocky peaks .... The jungle stillnesses 
and slimes in the gloom inside the rain forest could make you catch your 
breath with awe. From the mountain slopes in mid-afternoon with the sun at 
your back you could look back down to the beach and off across the straits 
to Florida Island and one of the most beautiful views of tropiC scenery on 
the planet. None of it looked like the pestilential hellhole that it was. 
(Jones 1975,31-38) 
In 1976, as a neophyte fieldworker in IGlenge, I went on a tour of local 
"war sites" (mainly bomb craters and shell holes) with a friend. We scrambled 
up and down slippery slopes, following a track barely six inches wide. 
Hemmed in by dense green foliage, I couldn't see eighteen inches beyond my 
nose. As the sweat poured off me, my soaking shirt clinging to my back, I 
knew I couldn't get any wetter than this. I was wrong, as a cloudburst soon 
190 
Villages without People 
taught me. Gasping for breath, wrapped in the bosom of the jungle, I thought 
"How the hell could anyone fight a war here?" 
It isn't the action that stands out the most to me about Cape Gloucester 
though, it is the awful weather. Rain, rain, rain, every day and night ... 2 
You'd be trying to move through the jungle when you'd find yourself up 
to your knees, or deeper, in a mudpit. There was a joke floating around that 
went like this: 
This captain is looking at one of those mud pies when a helmet appears 
moving through the mud. Then it comes up a little higher and. the captain 
sees a head. 
"Jeez," the captain says, "you must be in real deep." 
"Real deep," the Marine replies. "Wait 'till you see the bulldozer I'm 
driving'" 
Thenthere was jungle rot. You couldn't possibly keep your socks dry, 
much less your boondockers. This knocked the devil out of your feet. By the 
time we left New Britain many of our men could hardly walk. 
Another menace was those big trees. They were rotten. The shelling and 
the lightning were always knocking them over. Our division actually had 
several men killed from either lightning or falling trees. (Berry 1982, 64-65) 
Melanesia surprised the Americans; they were ill-prepared for the 
landscape, climate, and conditions. At Buna the camouflage dye in their 
uniforms reacted with the tropical heat and sweat, causing great discomfort 
and skin rashes, and the infantry never seemed to have the right weapons at 
the right time (Mayo 1974). Guadalcanal was a "vision of beauty, but of evil 
beauty" (Manchester 1980, 192), a "loathsome, lethal island where the 
malarial mosquito became as great a danger as the machine gun and the 
mortar" (Winton 1978, 71). In this first tropical battlefront, "[while] battle 
causalties [by September 1942] had not yet reached 1000, twice that number 
were suffering from malnutrition, the aftereffects of dysentery, virulent fungal 
infections, and exhaustion. Malaria, shortly to strike down so many, was just 
beginning to appear" (Griffith 1963, 159). And at Cape Gloucester, "the damn 
diseases ran rampant. Malaria came back, and so did dysentery--just think 
what happened to your bowels in weather like that. Even our ponchos began 
to disintegrate" (Berry 1982,54-55). 
Melanesia, for the Americans fighting there, was a world full of contra-
dictions. A fecund, verdant land teeming with lush growth and abundant life, 
it was also a shadowy world with the stench of ever present death and rot. 
What Mayo said for Buna applies to Melanesia as a whole: ''The battleground 
had been a vast, primitive, almost unknown wilderness of towering mountains 
and steaming coastal jungles, burned by the equatorial sun and drenched by 
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tropical downpours" (1974, 171). As the land was alien, primitive, and 
unknown, so too were its people. 
Images of Melanesians 
What kind of people did the hundreds of thousands of American troops who 
served in Melanesia expect to find there? Understandably, but regrettably, 
few authors delve into the troops' expectations: men going into combat would 
hardly spend their last hours of peace philosophically discussing the nature of 
the inhabitants of their battleground. Most likely they hit the beaches in 
blissful ignorance, as unknowing about the people as about the land. 
Manchester wrote: "In the view of World War II GIS and Marines, most of 
what they had heard·about the South Seas w~ applesauce. They had 
expected an exotic world where hustlers like Sadie Thompson seduced 
missionaries ... and wild men pranced on Borneo ... and lovely native girls 
dived for pearls wearing fitted sarongs, like Dorothy Lamour" (1980, 101). 
At best, their expectations were parodies of reality. Tregaskis recorded 
this story: "In the hours before the first wave landed on Guadalcanal, Dr 
Malcolm V. Pratt, the senior medical officer aboard, who won distinction in 
the First World War, told me an amusing story this afternoon. 'I went below 
to look around last night,' he said 'expecting to find the kids praying, and 
instead I found 'em doing a native war dance. One of them had a towel for a 
loin cloth and a blacked face, and he was doing a cancan while another beat a 
tomtom'" (1943, 32). At worst, their ignorance was absolute. "Nobody had 
ever heard of it [Guadalcanal] ... the guys had a thousand queries for their 
officers. What was the target island like? Any bars? Any tail?" (Manchester 
1980,204). 
The few images of Islanders readily available to the Americans came 
mainly from two sources, both cut from the same cloth. Missionary tales and 
explorer exploits formed the raw material, the basic myth, for American 
preconceptions of Melanesians. Book titles such as Cannibal Land (Johnson 
1929), Cannibal Caravan (Miller 1939), The Heart of Black Papua (Taylor 
1926), John G. Paton, Hero of the South Seas (Byrum 1924), E"omanga, the 
Martyr Isle (Robertson 1902), The Savage Solomons . .. (Knibbs 1929), and 
The Isle of Vanishing Men (Alder 1922) indicate the readY'· made stereotype of 
Islanders as savage, headhunting cannibals that pervaded the thoughts of 
those in the know. Thus an American correspondent commented that he flew 
"over Malaita Island, home of cannibals and of a few hardy missionaries" (Lee 
1943, 350), and a popular historian records the tribulations of a downed flier 
who feared his would-be rescuers would put him in a cannibal pot (Lord 1977, 
192). Griffith, who fought on Guadalcanal as a Marine officer, found this use 
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for the quintessential stereotype: "Henderson-based aircraft had their own 
troubles. They were kept operable by maintenance crews who cannibalized a 
badly shot-up plane with the same loving care the Solomon Islanders had a 
century previously bestowed on dismembering a plump missionary" (1963, 
123-124). 
Many Melanesian societies did practice headhunting and cannibalism in 
the past, but most societies had abandoned those practices long before World 
War II. Read's (1986) recent reflective study of Susuroka shows us the pos-
sible speed, depth, and impact of cultural and social change: what people did 
a generation before may not relate in the slightest to their contemporary 
actions. We cannot impute behavior to a people based solely on what their 
ancestors did. But myths live on. 
Perhaps, from a historical and relativistic position, we can understand the 
use, during the war, of the cannibal image. Cannibals are, after all, everything 
that civilization is not, and the war was (among other things) a war for civili-
zation. What becomes hard to excuse is the historical perpetuation of the 
cannibal image, the almost pornographic and voyeuristic fascination with the 
savage. Do we really benefit from Mayo's passing description of the Oro-
kaiva? ''They were only fifty years removed from cannibalism, and that in a 
peculiarly revolting form--the practice of 'living meat', in which they tied their 
prisoners to a tree and as meat was needed cut slices from buttocks or legs, 
plaster pandanus leaves over the wounds ... " (1974, 15). But the prurient 
interest in cannibalism lingers: Horton (a former district officer and coast-
watcher in the Solomons) captions one of his photos "Former cannibals train 
hard to defend their island against the invading Japanese" (1971, 16) and 
notes that "exploits such as these [coastwatcher Kennedy's] soon stirred up 
the warlike spirit of the local people which was never far below the surface. 
They had been famed in the not so distant past as headhunters" (Kennedy 
1971, 39). Kent meanwhile reminds readers that the vicious fighting on Gua-
dalcanal "made the headhunting exploits of the old days seem tame by com-
parison" (1972, 9). Ultimately the savage image carries into the present and 
we encounter the inexcusable remark, "Stealthy cannibals still flourish in 
Papua" (Manchester 1980, 115). 
Within this context, what kinds of images and myths emerged from Amer-
ican wartime contact with Melanesians? How did the Americans see and 
describe the Islanders? 
Some accounts suggest that the Americans did not even see Melanesians 
as being distinct peoples, different from other Pacific Islanders. American 
servicemen appeared uninformed about or indifferent to distinctions between 
various Pacific peoples (cf Saito, chapter 19). Americans, by labeling various 
island people "gooks" (TerkeI1984, 60; Berry 1982, 36; Manchester 1980, 
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101) imposed a generic nativehood on the people of the Pacific.3 Cultural 
distinctions mattered little: natives were natives. 
Americans rarely saw Melanesians as whole human beings, people with 
houses, families, beliefs, and day-to-day concerns. Detailed American depic-
tions of Melanesians are few and far between. Fahey's firsthand account uses 
relatively neutral language in a bare-bones description of people and a village 
in the Solomons, and of Islanders on Efate and New Caledonia (1963,86, 23, 
32). Manchester comes close to depicting Melanesians as Rousseauean 
"noble savages," innocents ofthe jungle (1980,101-102). Tregaskis supplies a 
lengthy passage about Savo Islanders, their appearance, their villages and 
churches (1943, 191-194). He describes his scouting party's guide as "typical 
native pattern: stumpy, dirty teeth, red hair, childish manners" (192). Later 
writers, if they even describe the "natives" at all, evoke similar images of short, 
childlike people. Melanesians were "wiry little men" (Hoyt 1980, 113), "small, 
black natives ... afflicted with malaria, dengue fever and fungus infections," 
"stocky, muscular black men with six-inch shocks of dirty red hair" (Davis 
1962, 109, 129) who could barely count past ten (Hoyt 1983, 105). Some 
authors use more neutral terms, such as "local inhabitants" (Hess 1974,88) or 
"tribesmen" (Cortesi 1985, 45). For the most part, though, information on the 
island people and their way of life is sadly lacking, with only a few writers 
providing even minimal historical and anthropological background (see 
Horton 1971,8-11; Kent 1972, 9-10; Manchester 1980, 110-111). 
American writers, if they acknowledge the Melanesians at all, tend to see 
them primarily in terms of how they helped or hindered the war effort. 
MacArthur cited "friendly co-operation from the New Guinea natives" as an 
important contributing factor in his Southwest Pacific campaign (1964, 165). 
From the first day Americans landed on Guadalcanal and recruited Melane-
sian guides, Melanesians made substantial contributions to the Allied cause 
(Manchester 1980, 206). They served as carriers and bearers on the Kokoda 
trail (Mayo 1974), in New Britain (Davis 1962, 129, 180), and in many other 
combat areas. As part of the Australian coastwatching service, they were 
scouts and guerrillas, gathering vital intelligence, harassing and misleading the 
Japanese (see eg, Lord 1977; Horton 1971; Kent 1972; Tregaskis 1943). They 
guided American patrols into enemy controlled territory and safely extricated 
them (eg, Griffith 1963; Hoyt 1980, 73, 98; Horton 1971,47,51). Villagers 
flocked to join the coastwatchers and aid the war effort (Lord 1977, 245; 
Horton 1971, 39). Manchester even reports that tribesmen in Papua walked 
200 miles to Port Moresby to aid that town's Australian defenders (1980, 
103). Whether as part of the organized coastwatching service or simply as 
villagers, they rescued dozens of downed American airmen (eg, Hoyt 1983, 
125; Horton 1971,52; Hess 1974,56,88). Even in the New Guinea Highlands, 
194 
~lageswuhoutPeopk 
far removed from battlefield action, Melanesians "did their bit" for Allied 
success: Cortesi relates Chimbu contributions in locating a site for, and then 
constructing, an advanced aircraft base at Tsili Tsili (1985). 
The saga of Sergeant Major Jacob Vouza epitomizes American respect 
for Melanesian aid and loyalty during the war. Vouza, who was tortured, 
stabbed, and left for dead by the Japanese as punishment for carrying an 
American flag, dragged himself back to American lines on Guadalcanal and 
insisted on giving his report before being hospitalized. His courage, bravery, 
and devotion earned him an undying place in American war lore (see Berry 
1982, 132-133; Griffith 1963, 107-111; Horton 1971, 19; Hoyt 1983,96; Kent 
1972,61; Lord 1977,69-73; Manchester 1980, 221ff; Tregaskis 1943, 149-50). 
Vouza, for the Americans, symbolizes the best of their stalwart Melanesian 
allies, sorely mistreated by the Japanese. The exploits ofVouza and his island 
compatriots, their indomitable will and loyalty in the face of Japanese oppres-
sion, earned high praise. Those exploits also served as a moral tale, a legend 
demonstrating the "rightness" of the American way (Horne 1986, 59). The 
emergent image and myth shows people who were "loyal soldiers for the 
allies" (Hoyt 1980, 113). ''The natives avoided them [the Japanese) as they 
would men stricken with the plague"; "[t]he natives, all of them, were loyal to 
the Allied cause" (Griffith 1963,41, 127). "There was no love lost between the 
natives of the Solomons and the Japanese" (Berry 1982, 119). "The Allied 
forces could count on the complete co-operation of the Solomon Islanders 
whereas the Japanese were detested" (Horton 1971, 17).4 
Despite these testimonials to their fortitude, and despite the obvious role 
they played in the war, Melanesians are often overlooked by those comment-
ing on the war. Spector slights both the war's impact on Islanders and their 
participation in the hostilities. Although he examines the effect of American 
servicemen on states and colonies of the Pacific rim, he chooses to concen-
trate on Australia and India, dismissing Melanesia in a single sentence: "In 
remote parts of New Guinea and the New Hebrides, they [GIs] inspired 
bizarre "cargo cults" among the local inhabitants, some of which have 
continued to the present day" (1985, 400). He mentions a number of cam-
paigns, such as Kokoda-Buna (189), the fighting on Guadalcanal (192), and 
the construction of the Tsili Tsili air base (240), all without acknowledging 
the presence let alone contribution of the Melanesians involved (in contrast, 
see Mayo 1974 for Buna; Griffith 1963 for Guadalcanal; and Cortesi 1985 for 
Tsili Tsili). Spector is not unique: a pattern emerges from the literature, a 
pattern of vi IJ ages without people, natives without substance. Americans 
portray unidimensional Melanesians--allies in war, but nothing else. If the 
Islanders were not actively assisting the Americans, they were not "there." 
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Two oral histories of American recollections of the war are nearly devoid 
of mention of Pacific Islanders. Berry's book (1982) on the Marines contains 
infrequent references to indigenous peoples, while Melanesians are totally 
absent from Terkel (1984). Winton's book (1978) has one photograph of an 
Islander as its sc::sle Melanesian content. Numerous other accounts of the war 
cite many village names, but usually fail to mention the inhabitants of those 
places (eg, Mayo 1984; Hoyt 1980; Hoyt 1983; Griffith 1963; Lee 1943; Jones 
1975). Melanesian villages were targets, objectives, or landmarks but not 
places where people lived. Accounts of the air war also ignore Islanders. 
Morrison's book (1986) contains one mention of Melanesians, and Hess 
(1974), in his history of Pacific aerial combat, only twice mentions them, both 
times in connection with rescuing downed airmen. Apart from that, Melane-
sians seem absent. Where were they? 
Many, no doubt, fled the contlict and hid in the bush. In the Solomons 
district officers ordered the villagers to leave the coast and make their homes 
and gardens in the mountainous island interiors (Horton 1971, 34; Kent 1972, 
29). Mayo describes Papuans fleeing as the Japanese came ashore at Buna 
(1974,16), and Lord takes us into a village deserted after American shelling 
(1977,139). In Europe too people fled at the first sign of battle, but returned 
shortly after (MacDonald 1978). The Kilenge I studied remembered going 
back down to the coast to meet the Americans after the shooting stopped, 
and the legendary Marine, "Chesty" Puller, returned "1700 natives" to their 
villages on New Britain (Davis 1962, 182). Somehow, though, the return of 
Melanesians never made the impression on Americans that the return of 
Europeans did: it did not leave an image, it did not contribute to a myth. 
Careful reading of the various accounts shows that, in truth, the Melane-
sians were there, on the spot, seeing and being seen by Americans. We 
already know from Manchester that Islanders met the Americans the first day 
the latter were on Guadalcanal. Tregaskis' firsthand account of Guadalcanal 
is notable for its lack of reference to Melanesians, excluding his description of 
Savo Islanders .. Why, then, does he relate the incident of a patrol that found 
the raped and mutilated body of a young girl by the side of a trail (1943, 172), 
and then pass on without further remarks? Were Melanesian women that 
common a sight that only a hacked torso called for comment'!s Again, if 
Melanesians weren't there, why does Tregaskis, on his way back to civiliza-
tion, rejoice at seeing "dusky maidens swimming in the surf," a welcome relief 
"after looking at marines, Japs and betel-chewing Melanesian men" (1943, 
262), unless, of course, he'd seen (but never mentioned) his fill of Melanesian 
men on Guadalcanal? 
Were American servicemen barred from contacting Melanesians'! Non-
fraternization rules were certainly in place (eg, Fahey 1963, 57, 86), but the 
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Kilenge fondly remember many American visitors to their villages, and the 
nonfratemization rules did not pose any barrier to soldier-civilian interaction 
in Europe (eg, MacDonald 1978, 347). 
From the air it seems Melanesians were as invisible as they were at 
ground level. Thus Cortesi (1985), who praises Chimbu contributions to the 
TsiIi TsiIi air base, never even suggests that Melanesians could have been the 
victims of American bombing attacks at Wewak. Jablonski (1971) too never 
mentions the possibility of Melanesian casualties of the air war. This starkly 
contrasts with his frequent mention of European civilian casualties of 
American and British bombing attacks.6 
Perhaps we don't hear.more of Melanesians because the Islanders inter-
acted more with garrison and service troops than with actual combat troops. 
As soon as the combat units secured their objectives, garrison units and ser-
vice outfits relieved and replaced them. The overwhelming trend in popular 
histories of the war favors either command personalities or combat units and 
conflict situations. Life in garrison or service units paled in comparison, and 
similarly would probably make for dull reading. Books on noncombatant 
units, in other words, wouldn't sell; hence, they aren't published. The same 
situation holds true, of course, for Europe. Yet civilians on that continent 
figure prominently in the war literature. 
American servicemen viscerally understood the differences between the 
European theater of operations and the Pacific theater. "In the Pacific, there 
were none of the European diversions. What you tended to see were miser-
able natives and piles of dead Japanese and dead Americans" (TerkeI1984, 
64). "Our jungle rot waS the equivalent of their trench foot. But we didn't 
have much in the way of female civilian population, or wine cellars" (Jones 
1975,121). Americans "liberated" European towns and cities (eg, Mauldin 
1945; MacDonald 1978; TerkeI1984), but only once did I encounter the term 
"liberated" used in connection with Melanesian communities (Davis 1962, 
182). 
For the 01, the Pacific had "natives," while Europe had "civilians." The 
images of Melanesians that Americans carried into the islands, and the images 
they subsequently formed there, differ sharply from their images of Europe 
and Europeans. The wild, savage land and its wild, savage people stood a 
world apart from the cathedrals and civilians of Europe. The 01 could barely 
understand or comprehend the land and people of Melanesia: they were a 
foreign, alien enigma. But the 01 could empathize with the plight of the Euro-
peans caught in a war-tom continent. With very little difficulty American 
soldiers could see themselves mirrored in the wretched, miserable, displaced 
continental civilians. 
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It would take a pretty tough guy not to feel his heart go out to a shivering, 
little six-year-old squeaker who stands barefoot in the mud, holding a big tin 
bucket so the dogface can empty his mess kit into it .... 
It chills a man to see a young girl. with a haunted hopeless expression in 
her eyes and a squalling baby which must go on squalling because she is 
hungry and has no milk for it. Not only does he pity her, but he thinks that 
this could possibly have happened to his own sister or his wife. 
(Mauldin 1945.66.69; see also MacDonald 1978,220-221) 
The GI ability to empathize with Europeans, to insert himself into the role 
of the civilian other, and the inability to similarly empathize with or absorb 
the role of Melanesian villager. is not terribly hard to comprehend. In part the 
explanation lie-s in the American orientation toward Europe. an orientation 
based in bonds of blood and culture. "Virtually all Americans were descended 
from European immigrants. They had studied Continental geography in 
school. When commentators told them that the Nazi spearheads were knifing 
here and there. they needed no maps: they all had maps in their minds" (Man-
chester 1980. 49). Their cognitive maps of the world, in which the "Old 
Country" loomed large, told many Americans as they crossed the Atlantic that 
they were headed "home." "I was in Fulda [Germany]. where my namesake, 
Saint Winfrid, converted the tree-worshipping Germans to Christianity. My 
family came from this area" (TerkeI1984, 158). The roots of American cul-
tural values stretched across the ocean to Europe. Americans identified 
strongly with their Old World origins, but felt no such affinity toward Melane-
sians, whose land, cultures, and customs were totally alien. 
Understanding the American ties to Europe. and the lack of similar 
feelings toward Melanesia, helps us to explain the different images of those 
parts of the world conveyed in and by the war literature. This understanding, 
however. provides us with only a partial explanation of the differences. Ifwe 
look into mainstream American society itself, into then-prevalent American 
beliefs and attitudes, we can more fully account for why Americans saw Euro-
peans one way, and Melanesians another way. I contend that Americans 
failed to identify with Melanesians, failed to see them as whole human beings, 
because Melanesians have black skin. The issue is a matter of race. 
Images of Black and White 
Racial discrimination, racial segregation. and white supremacist attitudes 
were all well-entrenched in society in general, and the military in particular. as 
America entered World War II. A nation supposedly united to win the war 
systematically excluded black citizens from participating in a labor force 
crying out for workers: only one black worked at the General Motors plant in 
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La Grange, Illinois, and only nine blacks worked for Lockheed in Los 
Angeles, all as sweepers. Eventually, under threat of a march on Washington 
led by A Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters, the Roosevelt government issued Executive Order 8802, authorizing 
the Fair Employment Practices Commission (Terkel 1984, 9, 33-38). 
The military, a microcosm of American life, reflected general social 
feelings. Racist attitudes dictated that blacks could only make mediocre 
soldiers (Spector 1985, 386), that "blacks were not to be trusted in combat" 
(TerkeI1984, 9; see also MacDonald 1978, 200, 333, 337). Thus on the eve of 
, the war only four thousand blacks served in the US military, less than in 1900 
(Spector 1985, 386). Rac~t belief so pervaded society that, even in the face of 
a growing need for troops and a nondiscrimination clause in the Selective 
Service Act, local draft boards chose married whites and white fathers over 
eligible single blacks (Spector 1985, 387). 
Once in the military, blacks confronted a system little changed from the 
prewar Jim Crow days. For all intents and purposes they lived in a world 
separate from their white brothers-in-arms. "I think of two armies, one black, 
one white. I saw German prisoners free to move around the camp, unlike 
black soldiers, who were restricted" (Terkel 1984, 149). Black servicemen 
rode in separate railway cars and were excluded from white PXS and service-
men's clubs without having their own comparable facilities (Terkel 1984, 
150). They formed separate units, mainly labor battalions "with dressed-up 
names like engineer, quartermaster, what have you" (TerkeI1984, 365), and 
their camps were strictly segregated on military bases, out of sight to most 
base visitors and personnel (TerkelI984, 263; Williams 1983). The Red Cross 
even segregated blood from black and white donors (TerkeI1984, 566). 
Segregation ran so deep that one black air unit, the 332nd Fighter Group, 
isolated on their air base, had to take off in the wrong direction down the 
runway. When blacks did form combat units their training was often so 
prolonged and so intense that they ended up being elite units (Terkel 1984, 
344). Williams' fascinating book, Hit Hard (1983), documents the trials and 
tribulations faced by one black tank outfit. The 761st Tank Battalion faced 
racism and discrimination at home, abroad, and after the war; it took them 
thirty-five years to get a Presidential Unit Citation (Terkel 1984,231; 
Williams 1983). 
Just as blacks fought to join the civilian war effort, so too did they fight 
the discrimination and racism in the military. A race riot broke out at Camp 
Shenango, Pennsylvania, over separate but unequal facilities. Only after the 
deaths of soldiers did the situation improve (TerkeI1984, 150). Similar riots 
were barely avoided at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana (Williams 1983,80-83) 
and Camp Lucky Strike, France (Terkel 1984, 369), but naval personnel did 
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riot in Guam (Spector 1985,391-393). Naval stevedores at Port Chicago, 
California, mutinied after two hundred black ammunition loaders died·in an 
explosion (TerkeI1984, 392-401). In most of these incidents inquiries white-
washed the military, concluding that the blacks were too sensitive. They 
. consistently failed to recognize the racism inherent in the structure of the 
services (Spector 1985, 393). 
Blacks recognized the irony of their situation. They were fighting a "race 
war" (Dower 1986, 4) against America's enemies, while America stilI system-
aticalIy exploited and discriminated against its own black citizens. "The 
struggle against both the Germans and the Japanese was accompanied by 
attacks on master-race theories in general, arid thus cut at the roots of white 
supremacism and discriminatory laws and institutions in the United States" 
(Dower 1986, 175). Dower, in his provocative book, argues that the Pacific 
War was, for both sides, a race war. He maintains that Americans judged their 
German and Japanese enemies by different standards. While authorities 
incarcerated Japanese Americans, they were Jar less systematic in incar-
cerating German and Italian Americans. The "bad guys" in Europe were not 
the German people as a whole, but ratherjust the Nazis. The entire Japanese 
nation, in contrast, served as the vilIain in the Pacific. The press played up the 
difference between the war against Germany ("a family fight ... between 
white nations"), and the war against Japan (a war of Occidental and Oriental 
ideals and civilizations) (Dower 1986,165). 
America bad long feared the "yelIow horde" across the Pacific Ocean, and 
American colonial policy in the Pacific contained more than a tinge of racism 
(see eg, Lee 1943, 24; Dower 1986, 148ft). Colonized peoples, like domestic 
Blacks, lived under the burden of such labels as primitive, monkey, savage, and 
wild, terms meant to dehumanize them (Dower 1986, 149). Propagandists 
revived these terms for the war against Japan. The rhetoric of the Pacific War 
"calIed for 'the almost total elimination of the Japanese as a race', on the 
grounds that this 'was a question of which race was to survive, and white 
civilization was at stake' " (Dower 1986, 55). The American propaganda 
machine depicted the Japanese as either superhuman or subhuman, but not 
as human. 
Here lies the final clue to understanding American attitudes toward 
Melanesians. Domestic racism not only pervaded American society and the 
US military establishment; a virulent, xenophobic, and patriotic racism domi-
nated the Pacific battlegrounds. Many Americans saw themselves fighting a 
race war, a "war without mercy," against a savage, primitive foe. They fought 
their first land engagements in the islands of Melanesia, a land already 
stereotyped in myth as wild, savage, alien. Fighting and horrendous conditions 
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of heat, mud, rain, and insects, as well as a merciless foe, reinforced the image 
of Melanesia as a savage land. 
In this latter-day version of hell, the Americans encountered people with 
alien and savage customs, strange cultures, and black skins. Not all, perhaps 
not even most, Americans held strongly racist views: many individual Ameri-
cans came to know and respect Melanesians as whole people. But insofar as 
the American mythmakers, those who recorded the war and generated our 
images of the war, saw those Melanesian people at all, they identified the 
indigenous inhabitants with the land, saw them through the lens of racial 
prejudice, and connected them with the death and destruction of a racial war. 
Rightly or wrongly, Americans associated the Melanesians with the Japanese 
enemy. Although the two differed from one another, both were foreign 
people: strange, alien, primitive, and savage. American commentators did not 
see Melanesians as whole people, as human beings. At best, Melanesians 
became curious, primitive, and cannibalistic allies. At worst, being not quite 
human and not the enemy, Melanesians were not even there. Innocent vic-
tims of a foreign war, Melanesians became caught in the trap of historical 
oblivion. 
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Notes 
1 As a rule of thumb, the early ground battles in Melanesia drew more attention than the 
later battles. Progress in the Central Pacific, North Africa, and Europe tended to overshadow 
the Southwest Pacific campaign. 
2 The First Marine Division invaded Cape Gloucester during the height of the monsoon 
season. "Sixteen inches of rain fell in a single day" (Manchester 1980, 98). 
3 This phenomenon is similar to that of European settlers creating the category of "Indian" 
when they lumped together the various indigenous peoples of North and South America. 
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4 Reality in Melanesia, of course, differed from the.preceding hyperbolic rhetoric, which 
serves as myth-reinforcing legend. Local people in the Buna-Gona region turned over Australian 
and American civilians and soldiers to the Japanese (Mayo 1974,25-26). Some Solomon 
Islanders displayed active hostility to Australians hiding from the Japanese, "betraying" their 
former colonial masters, and the Japanese made some headway in winning Islander loyalty 
(Lord 1977, eg, 223-224). 
5 Perhaps they were, perhaps they weren't. By the time Manchester arrived at Guadal-
canal, he could record the parenthetical comment: "(The only native woman I saw on 
Guadalcanal had a figure like a seabag. She was suffering from an advanced case of elephan-
tiasis. Hubba Hubba.)" (1980,22). 
6 There are just two references to Melanesians in his entire volume on the Pacific air war, 
while the first fifty pages of the companion volume on the European air war contain no less than 
six references to civilians and civilian casualties. 
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Barefoot Benefactors: 
A Study of Japanese Views of Melanesians 
Hisafwni Saito 
This paper discusses the experiences of Japanese soldiers in Melanesia with 
special reference to their relationship with and their views of Melanesians. 
Contrary to my original expectations, Japanese were very interested in 
Melanesians. This is reflected in the considerable number of documents I 
have collected that refer to Melanesians during the war. In this paper I draw 
from twenty-three of those documents. These materials are listed in 
chronological order in appendix A Each' particular source in the list is then 
designated by 'letters from a to w in the tables in appendix B. 
Inhabitants Referred to by Materials 
Records pertaining to the people living in the Wewak area of Papua New 
Guinea, including Kairiru and Mushu islands off Wewak, Prince Alexander 
Range, and the basin of the middle and lower Sepik River, are the most 
abundant (Table 1). This is because many Japanese, after failing to attack 
Aitape in July 1944, survived the war by depending on food supplied by 
villagers, mainly in the southern slopes of the Prince Alexander Range. 
Though Japanese troops survived the war in Rabaul (at the eastern tip of 
New Britain) and in Bougainville (in the northern Solomons chain), only five 
sources refer to the people in and around Rabaul, and just four to those in 
the Solomon Islands. There do not seem to be as many Japanese who had 
close contact with inhabitants in both of those areas. In Rabaul the Japanese 
had established a "self-supporting system," which made it possible for them to 
survive without commandeering villagers' harvests. In Bougainville, Japanese 
could find few friendly inhabitants (except on Buka), largely because of the 
successful campaigns by the Allied forces. 
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Terms Referring to Melanesians 
Although village names often appear in the materials the proper names of 
ethnic groups are never referred to. Tanaka (1975), who records the names of 
some ethnic groups in Western New Guinea (Irian Jaya), is the only 
exception. Tables 2-4 display the various terms that are used to refer to 
Melanesians. Those terms are classified into three categories: terms used to 
refer to Melanesians in general (Table 2), terms meaning a specific category 
of Melanesians (Table 3), and terms for Melanesian soldiers (Table 4). A 
word marked with + is that used in a particular source, and that marked by 
+ + is that used most frequently. The symbol- means that the term is used 
just to indicate the inappropriateness of its usage. 
Terms Referring to Melanesians in General 
Many words are used to refer to Melanesians in general (Table 2). This is 
because the Japanese language did not and does not have any appropriate 
terms to designate the inhabitants of developing areas such as Melanesia. 
Among these terms, gen-ju-min, do-jin, and do-min are most frequently used. 
Each of these terms means "native" in English. Haneda (1985) used do-jin just 
once to tell that it was a discriminatory word. I think that the word do-min 
carried the same connotation. These words are rarely used by Japanese born 
after the war. 
The materials offer sufficient evidence that Japanese soldiers usually 
called Melanesians do-jin or do-min, but these terms cOuld not be used 
officially, for example in news items, even during the Pacific War. 
Specific Category Terms for Melanesians 
These words are also many in number (Table 3). Among these, kanaka, 
kanaka-zoku, and papua-zoku are used frequently. As Yamamoto points out, 
kanaka is a discriminatory term today, and it is not always clear how Japanese 
soldiers classified Melanesians by the terms kanaka and papua (cf Yamamoto 
1985, 254-255). 
Terms for Melanesian Soldiers 
These terms are comparatively few (Table 4). Predominantly, they are used to 
designate Melanesians hostile to Japanese troops. Only two materials, 
Watanabe (1982, 142) and Kitamoto (1970, 54, 59-62, 64), use them to refer 
to Melanesians fighting for the Japanese. 
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Manners and Customs 
There is abundant information concerning the manners and customs of 
people living in the Wewak area of Papua New Guinea (Table 5). Of all the 
materials with substantial descriptions on this theme, only Haneda (1985) 
mentions the customs in another area--Rabaul. Table 5 shows what kinds of 
manners and customs are described in the materials, giving the relevant pages 
in which each topic is mentioned. 
The materials depict various kinds of customs. Generally speaking, 
however, their descriptions are too superficial to have ethnographic value. 
Nor do they pay much attention to the differences in customs between ethnic 
groups. 
Japanese soldiers were sent to the battlefields without any knowledge of 
Melanesians (cf Yamanaka 1982, 177-178), and obviously did not stay in 
Melanesia for the purposes of research. Therefore they should not be 
criticized for the low ethnographic value of their records. Although a few 
descriptions include apparently improper conjectures, the materials laudably 
report the customs of Melanesians without a taste for the bizarre and racial 
prejudice. 
Estimation 
The materials assess Melanesians in terms of their personality, appearance, 
intelligence, mode of life, physical prowess and sense, laziness, and timidness 
(Table 6). In their estimation, "primitiveness" is often emphasized: primitive 
appearance, primitive lifestyles, laziness and timidness as traits of primitive 
people, and so on. Melanesian personalities are admired as honest and 
obedient. Even in this respect, however, the image of primitive Melanesians is 
expressed. For example, in a chapter introducing their "primitive" culture, 
Yamamoto writes, "Though they are said to be savage, Papuans understand 
affection, debt, and obligation" (Yamamoto 1985,244). 
Cooperation 
The row in Table 7 labeled "cooperator" shows the page number where the 
personal name of a particular cooperative Melanesian appears first in a 
material. Fifteen names of Melanesians who worked for the Japanese troops 
are recorded in total. All of them were "chiefs." Among them, "Manga" 
appears in three materials. 
The other rows are the same il,l character as those in Tables 5 and 6. For 
each way of cooperation, the sources are listed. "Food offering" includes some 
accidental gifts made by the Melanesians who happened on Japanese soldiers. 
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It also tells about serious relations between Melanesians and Japanese. For 
example some materials point out that it was very hard for inhabitants to 
deliver an allocated amount of their harvest. Among others Melanesians 
worked as carriers, laborers for constructing roads and buildings, orderlies for 
mail delivery and other services~ guides, and rescuers. The row "canoe" refers 
to cases where Melanesians offered their canoes for transporting goods and 
sold.iers. Then it is similar to "carrier" and "guide" in the way of cooperation. 
Including "hospitality," the reception of soldiers who called at villages, all 
kinds of cooperation mentioned above are activities to support Japanese 
soldiers from the rear. Table 7 shows that an ovelWhelming majority of 
cooperative activities is included in this categqry. In contrast, the records of 
activities directly relating to military operations, "battle" and "watch'" are small 
in number. Tne only incident in "testimony" is that a Melanesian gave 
favorable testimony for an accused Japanese after the war. 
Intimacy 
In the materials there are a number of episodes which speak of the intimate 
terms between Melanesians and Japanese soldiers. The authors are proud 
that they were good friends of Melanesians, and think that Japanese soldiers 
were fundamentally different from white men in this respect. "While white 
men discriminated against Melanesians and exploited them, Japanese were 
kind to and worked together with Melanesians." This is the view repeatedly 
written in the materials, sometimes as the words of Mel~nesians (cf Izumi 
1943, 190-192, 194,206-207; Suzuki 1982,61; Ochi 1983, 121; Mitsukawa 
1984, 331-332; Murosaki 1984, 177; Yamada 1985, 165-166; Yamamoto 1985, 
252-253). Some of the materials insist that because the islands in the South 
Pacific are the birthplace of remote Japanese ancestors, the Melanesians are 
physically similar to the Japanese, and the Japanese have sympathy with the 
Melanesians (cflzumi 1943, 193; Ocm 1983,223; Yamamoto 1985,252). 
On the other hand, Japanese thought, "We should not spoil Melanesians. 
We have to cure their characters stained by laziness, and raise them up to the 
point where they willingly obey Japanese. This is one of the aims of this war" 
(cflzumi 1943,193-197). The efforts for enlightenment and their positive 
results are recorded in some of the materials (cf eg, Kitamoto 1970, 60; Arao 
1975,208; Watanabe 1982, 163; Yamanaka 1982, 190). However, I have 
found no evidence that the Japanese army made enthusiastic and systematic 
efforts to make Melanesians "the Emperor's loyal subjects." For example 
there are som~ episodes in which Japanese soldiers persuaded inhabitants to 
cooperate with them, but they appear only to have made irresponsible 
remarks to suit the occasion (cflzumi 1943,200-201; Kitamoto 1970,32,41, 
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45; Mitsukawa 1984, 330-332, 356-357). The only feature common to most of 
their remarks is the desire to stimulate Melanesians' rebellious attitudes 
toward white men. 
Hostility 
The Japanese troops gave Melanesians many things, such as rice, tinned food, 
sugar, cloth, and so on, to win their favor. But these goods were rapidly 
drained and never resupplied. Starving Japanese soldiers gave inhabitants 
everything and did anything to get food. 
Out of their small community the Japanese troops were relatively free 
from their own conscience and the military discipiine that did not directly 
concern action and class system (cfKawamura 1988,26-27). Contrary to 
military orders soldiers frequently used their arms for hunting (cf eg, Yamada 
1953,63-64,87,126, 192; Kitamoto 1970,30; Hirao 1980, 70; Hoshino 1982, 
114). It was also frequent to expropriate Melanesian villagers' crops (cf eg, 
Yamada 1953',72,'86,122; Kitamoto 1970,88; Fukuyama 1980, 155). Even 
some conscientious soldiers thought that hunger was an adequate excuse for 
pillage (cfHoshino 1982, 139-140). Although the headquarters in Wewak, in 
order to regulate food supply, prohibited barter with individual Melanesians 
(cf Suzuki 1982, 266-267; Murosaki 1984, 167), starving soldierS continued 
adding bandages, watch chains, razor blades, tweezers, and grenades to their 
list of merchandise (cf Ueki 1982, 180; Mitsukawa 1984, 248, 290; Murosaki 
1984,147). 
Plunder caused dispute in every corner of Melanesia under Japanese 
occupation (cfKitamoto 1970,70; Fukuyama 1980, 145; Kitamoto 1984, 158-
159; Haneda 1985, 205). Some Melanesians defended their gardens with arms 
(Ueki 1982,202; Murosaki 1984,52; Matsutani 1985,240) and many 
ultimately revolted against the Japanese (cfFukuyama 1980, 179-180; Fuke 
1982,16; Hoshino 1982, 156-157, 168, 170; Suzuki 1982,271). For example at 
the close of the war it was too dangerous for Japanese troops to approach 
Melanesian villages in the Wewak area (cfHoshino 1982, 138, 177; 
Yamanaka 1982,221). 
Conclusion 
All the materials used in this paper were written by the Japanese who 
experienced the Pacific War in Melanesia. As a result the information offered 
by them is biased. For example they do not mention the facts that some 
starving soldiers ate Melanesians as well as soldiers of the Allied forces (cf 
Hara 1987, 151-152, 157-158; Miyakawa 1985,55-66; Nakazono 1986,43-46, 
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51-72; Tuzin 1983), though some cases where Japanese soldiers ate Japanese 
soldiers are recorded (cfKitamoto 1970, 71; Suzuki 1982,242; Watanabe 
1982, 177, 192; Ochi 1983, 160-131). 
However, I think these materials represent their views of Melanesians 
well. Though Japanese soldiers used discriminatory terms to refer to 
Melanesians, and thought Melanesians primitive and lazy, they had not always 
despised Melanesians. They found many good characteristics in Melanesians 
and thought Melanesians similar to Japanese in some respects. I think that for 
the Japanese soldiers who believed the ideology of the Japanese Empire, 
Melanesians had to be worth saving from "evil" white men and enlightening by 
Japanese. 
Japanese were urged to the war by the dogma, "You should expel white 
men, and enlighten the people in Asia and Oceania." Contrary to their 
intention the soldiers in Melanesia ended up relying on local inhabitants for 
food. In the materials they repeatedly expressed their regret and thanks to 
Melanesians (cfKitamoto 1970,46,70,102,104; Fuke 1982, 17; Watanabe 
1982, 196; Mitsukawa 1984, 308, 369, 394, 400, 433; Yamada 1985, 172). 
Melanesians were generous benefactors as well as barefoot primitives for 
Japanese soldiers. 
212 
Japanese VieWS of Melanesians 
Appendix A: List of Materials 
a Fuke, Takashi 
1943 Letter from the South Seas. Unpublished letter, 12 pp. 
b Izumi, Kiichi 
1943 Battles in Solomon. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha. 
c Yamada, Eizo 
1953 Solomon Landing Force. Tokyo: Nihon Shuppan Kyodo Co. 
d Kitamoto, Masamichi 
197,0(1969) Kitamoto Reconnoitering Party. Tokyo: Konnichi No Wadai 
. Sha. 
e Arao, Tatsuo 
1975 Rabaul. In History of the Pacific War l· Pacific Islands1 Tokyo: Fuji 
Shoen. ' 
f Tanaka, Magohei 
1975 Battles in New Guinea. In History of the Pacific War l· Pacific 
Islands. Tokyo: Fuji Shoen. 
g Yamazaki, Hidesuke 
1975 Mole War. In History of the Pacific War l· Pacific Islands. Tokyo: 
Fuji Shoen. 
h Fukuyama, Takayuki 
198,0 Battles in Solomons. Tokyo: Tosho Shuppan Sha. 
Hirao, Masaharu 
198,0 Record of a Naval Doctor. Tokyo: Tosho Shuppan Sha. 
j Fuke, Takashi 
1982 Throwing a Beneficent Chief Over. Kaiko Shi (August). 
k Hoshino, Kazuo 
1982 Memory of the New Guinea War. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai. 
Suzuki, Masami 
1982 East New Guinea Front. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai. 
m Ueki, Toshimasa 
1982 New Guinea. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai. 
n Watanabe, Tetsuo 
1982 Landing Forces Disappearing in the Jungle. Tokyo: Sensbi Kanko 
Kai. 
213 
HISAFUMI SAITO 
o Yamanaka, Hideaki 
1982 A Reed from Naniwa. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai. 
p Ochi, Harumi 
1983 Record of New Guinea War. Tokyo: Tosho Shuppan Sha. 
q Kitamoto, Masamichi (main interviewee) 
1984 Marathon Troops in New Guinea. In My Experience During the 
Showa Era 4. Tokyo: Ohbun Sha. 
r Mitsukawa, Motoyuki 
1984 Salt. Tokyo: Sensi Kanko Kai. 
s Murosaki, Naonori 
1984 Recollection of an Anti-Aircraft Artillery Unit. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko 
Kai.' 
t Haneda, Masami 
1985 The Southern Cross Seen Dimly in the War Fire. Tokyo: Senshi 
Kanko Kai. 
u Matsutani, Miyoko, editor 
1985 Folktales, Today IL· Troops. Tokyo: Rippu Shobo. 
v Yamada, Tasuku 
1985 New Guinea War. Tokyo: Ohshi Sha. 
w Yamamoto, Katsue 
1985 A Dunce of Mountain Artillery Units. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai. 
214 
Appendix B: Tables 
Table 1 Inhabitants Referred to by Materials 
area Index 
Japanese Views of Melanesians 
1. 5o10IOn II. 2. aabaul. Nel Brltalll I. 3. Northeastern Part of Nel Guinea 4. In and around 
lent. Nel Guinea 6. lestern Nel Guinea 6. U.bol I. 
a b c d e f W h i J k I m n 0 P q r s t u v w 
1 + + + + 
2 + + + + + 
3 + + + + + + + + + + 
4 + + + + + + + + + + + + 
6 + + 
6 + 
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Table 2 TerIilS Referring to Melanesians in (jeneral 
ladex 
1. aaCJI-III. lahabltaatl> 2 ••• Rcbufata-II •• vllla,era> S ••• (tRcbufaku JU-Iln. 
vllla,.lnhabltantl> 4 •• Rc •• I .... I •• I .. ,.0,1.> 5. tf.Clon-lll. vlllllen> 6. a. 
ct.-Ila.llianderl> 7. ±.AccIo-ellakrJI •• nathea> 8. ± •• ccIo-chaku-ala. naUv .. > 9. *A 
clt .. -Ua. lava"I> 10 •• a.C'.I-Ju-III. naUv.I> 11 •• aR.c ... -Ja II_u. natlva race> 
12 ••• Ac ... -~I-JII ... Uvea> 13 ••• a.c ..... u J .... I •• local people> 14 •• (t.c ... JU-Iln. 
'r •••• t Inhabltantl> 16. ±Acdo-JI •• nat Iv •• > 18. ±.cdo-II •• natlv.,> 17. IIAckoku-Jln. 
bllCk people> 
• b c d • f Ir h i J k I m n 0 P 
q r 8 t u v w 
1 + ... i- + + + + + 
2 + + + + + 
S + 
, + 
5 + 
6 + 
7 + 
8 + + 
9 + 
10 ++ + + + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + 
II + 
12 + + + 
18 + + 
14 + ++ + 
15 + ++ ++ + ++ ++ + + ++ + - + ++ 
18 + + + + ++ ++ + + 
17 + 
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Table 3 Specific Category Terms for Melanesians 
Index 
1. '1,.t :b<!lanaka. Mn!U> 2. 111" II A<kuaka-J I •• U!!!U people> 3. 'Il"t :b±~<hll&lta do-IIII • 
.k!.D.t.kl nat IY •• > ". :11 1" :b ±A <kal.ka •• -J II. D.!!.U! nat lYe.> 5. :b 1" 1I11<kuaka-zoku. kanaka 
tr Iba> 6. :b 1" Illtf-.., <!Ia.ata 1101. ni. hnah> 7. 1I1":b;)' I) -<kuaka .. rl. feule kanaka> 
8. ,f;f,..< ...... Papu.n.> 9. ,f;f,.. A<pa,.-JlI. Puuans> 10 .... f;f"'.<papua-zoku. Papua tribe> 
11 .... f ;f"'.l!~<papua ,en JI-II •• present Inhabitants In Papua> 12. ;).,;t. V "'.<aerane.la-zoku. 
Melannlan tribe> 13. ;).,;t. v "'.l!~<leraae.la ,.a JU-Ila. present Inhabitants In .elanesla> 
14 ••• <bu-zoku. tribe> 16 ••• <abu-zoku. race> 18. *AtI<.hoku-Jla-ahu. cannibals> 17. Ali'" 
A.<hlto-kul Jla-ahu. cannibal .. 
• b c d e t I' h I J k I m n 0 P q r s t u v w 
1 + + + ++ ++ 
2 + 
3 + + + 
4 ++ 
5 ++ + + + + + + + + + 
6 + 
7 + + 
8 + + 
9 + + + 
10 + + + + + + + + + 
11 + 
12 + 
13 + 
14 + + + 
16 + + 
18 + + 
17 + 
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Table 4 Terms for Melanesian Soldiers 
Index 
1. If., "1 ~ (JlA.:Ii.) <,erakku(koku-Jln-llen. l.!tIll!l(black "Idlers» 2 •• A.:Ii.<koku-J In-bel. 
black soldlen> S. JlA.IJ<koku-Jln-,un. black troops> 4. ±~:Ii.<do-IIln-hel. nathe soldiers> 
6. ±~.<do-.ln-lUn. native troops> 6. ±A.:Ii.<do-Jln-hel. nathe soldiers> 7. ±A..<do-Jln-
,UD. native troops> 8. ±A.A<do-Jln ken-pel. nathe liP> 9. JlHt~.A<len-Ju-lln ken-pel. 
native KP> 
a b c d e f If h 1 J k I m n 0 P q r s t u v w 
1 + 
2 + 
3 + 
4 + + + + 
6 + + + 
6 + 
7 + 
8 + 
9 + 
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Table 5 Manners and Customs 
cloth In, (a)(b:188-9)(d:46-8)(f:278.288)(,:81S)(1:269.278)(1:182)(n:97)(s:49.52) 
(t:S9-91. 122)(v: 169)(,:248-4) 
lan,ua.e (c: 187)(,:31S-9)(1:88)(k: 147-S)(1:298)(0:IS0)(r:2S6-7) (t:90-1)(v:16S)(r:247) 
IUllc a dancln, (a)(d:44)(f:278)(k: 160)(I:280)(p:228)(s: 186. 172. 174-6)(v: 187-S)(,:261) 
food (f:27S)(k: 183-4)(1:280)(1: 180)(n: 148-9)(t:9S-4)(v: 160-4)( r:133.24S-9) 
vllla,e a bulldln. (d:48.61)(f:278.283)(k:160-1)(1:272)(t:93-4.122)(v:160)(,: 247-S) 
office (a)(h: 179)(p:212.246)(s: 164. 173)(t:94)(v: 166)(,:244-8) 
betel che,ln, (d:S2)(k:161)(1:132)(s:49)(t:90)(v:164)(,:249) 
urr I a,e I sex (d:61)(p:223)(s: 173. 17S)(t:91-2.96)(v: 16S)(,: 134.246. 2 49-50) 
hunt In, I flshln, (k:18S)(s:176-7)(t:SS.122)(v:163)(,:249) 
slit ,on, (d:32-3)(k: 14S-9)(r:347)(v: 16S)(,:24S) 
pi, (a)(1:269)(s:17S)(v:182-3) 
hortlcu I ture (r:319)(v:160)(w:261-2) 
status of ,olen (s: 173)(,:248) 
loner (t:82-3) 
education (t:94-6) 
sln,-out (k: 149-60) 
bush knife (v: 169) 
art (,:246) 
cure (,:246-6) 
fire (,:248) 
rell,lon (1:81) 
trade (k:I80) 
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Table 6 Estimation 
personallh (a)(c:153)(d:S8)(n:97)(0:190)(p:224)(r:2S1.337.383-4) 
(s:172.179)(u:158)(v:183)(,:244) 
appearance (a)(b:186-9)(c:127-8)(d:33.45)(e:208)(1:20)(r:247)(,:130) 
Inte lligence (b: 18S-S0)(e:208)(0: 190)(r:288-7)(t:Sl)(u: 172)(,:247) 
lode of life (a)(c:113)(1:61)(s:40-1.173)(,:250) 
phvslcal prowess I sense (n: IS4)(p:223)(r:Z91.308.310)(s:5Z-3. 165. 178) 
laziness (a)(b:193-4)(n:31Z)(r:337) 
tilidness (a)(s:5Z)(u:17Z) 
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Table 7 Cooperation 
100d (d:69-80)(h:186. 179)(J: 17)(k: 180. 144. 182-3)(1:24S.276)( n:92. 147. 149-60. 176) 
011erln, (0: ISS-81.226-&)(p:260)(r:7S. 247. 304. 316. 317-9. 336-8. 343 .382) 
(a:62. 120. 182-3. 188. 189-71)(v: 172)(.: 130-2. 134. 170-1. I 73) 
carrier (b:217)(d:33-4.38.39-49.62-3.80.83.72-3)(e:20S)(1:278.281)(k:144.186-6) 
(1:67.277)(n:142)(p:211.247-8)(r:306.318.369.386)(s:17 2)(t:124)(v:177) 
laborer (d:80)(e:208)(1:278.280)(h:179)(n:142.194.310-2.328)(0:180)(r:243.312.318) 
(s:62)(.: 130 
,ulde (b:217)(d:47)(k:144. 184)(1:266.277-80)(n:183-6)(s: 120. 1 84-6. 187-S. 173. 17S) 
hospital It, (d:33)(1:269-80.288.273)(n:281.316~8)(r:291.333)(s:189-70)(v:186-8) 
orderb (d:39.68)(e:208)(k:164)(1:277)(r:316.318.337)(s:186) 
canoe (b:208.26S)(k: 166)(1:276.278)(n: 172-4)(.: 130) 
rescuer (e:227)(h: 128)(1: 189)(u: 167) 
battle (d:67.80-2.76-7.S4-6.92-6.97-8.100)(I:II0-4)(n:142-3) 
watch (b:200)(d:30 
test lion, (v:t82) 
cooperator (d:33)(k: 162)(1: 1 10.264.268.280)(r:284.290-1.31 l)(a: 174. 178)(t:94)(.:134.244) 
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Yukio Shibata and Michael Somare: Lives in Contact 
Basil Shaw 
The Japanese invasion of New Guinea in 1942 brought unprecedented 
change to the lives of the local people of Papua New Guinea. Besides the 
havoc and destruction associated with the fighting, there were also cultural 
encounters by local people with massive numbers of Japanese, American, and 
Australian service personnel. Some of these encounters proved disastrous 
and destructive for one or both of the parties; others provided inspiration and 
long-lasting relationships. The paper explores the relationship between 
Michael Somare, former prime minister of Papua New Guinea, and Yukio 
Shibata, a commissioned officer in the Japanese occupation forces in New 
Guinea during the period 1943 to 1945. It is tentatively proposed that Shibata 
was an inspiration to Somare, providing him with a role model that enriched 
and informed Somare's later behavior as a politician and statesman. 
The Japanese Occupation of Northern New Guinea 
Japanese armed forces occupied parts of both the Mandated Territory of 
New Guinea and the Territory of Papua during the period January 1942 until 
August 1945 when all Japanese forces in both territories were called on to 
surrender by the emperor. The surrender was formally effected on 6 Septem-
ber 1945. Because the Japanese influence on Michael Somare is the issue to 
be investigated in this paper, it is necessary to know the details of the 
Japanese occupation of the Wewak-Lower Sepik River areas, which include 
the villages of the Murik Lakes to which the Somare family returned from 
Rabaul in January 1942. 
The facts are drawn from the following sources: volumes of the official 
Australian war history by Wigmore (1957), McCarthy (1959), and Long 
(1963); from the volume by Miller (1959) in the official military history of the 
United States Armed Forces in the Pacific Ocean; and from an English-
language account of the occupation of New Guinea by Tanaka (1980). Two 
Japanese-language memoirs by officers who were in the Wewak area provide 
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personal observations about relations between villagers and Japanese 
soldiers. These works are by Yoshiwara (1955) and Ishizuka (1981). This 
information has been supplemented by personal interviews with exservicemen 
who served in this part of New Guinea: Y. Goto, S. Shozawa, and K Yoshi-
zawa (1983) and Y. Shibata and K Kajizuka (1986). 
Although population centers such as Lae and Salamaua were bombed by 
Japanese aircraft operating from Rabaul in January 1942, it was not until 
8 March that year that these towns were occupied by the Japanese as part of a 
two-pronged attack on Port Moresby. Later Aitape, Wewak, Madang, and 
surrounding coastal areas were also occupied. In 1944 Wewak became a 
major Japanese defensive position as it became the headquarters of the 18th 
Army. The Japanese 6th Air Division occupied airstrips in and around 
Wewak as well, and there were naval installations on the islands off the coast 
of Wewak. These positions became the targets for both US and Australian 
bomber raids. Miller cites one raid on Wewak on 17 August 1943 in which 
over one hundred American planes attacked Japanese installations and then 
flew eastward along the coast attacking secondary targets as opportunities 
presented themselves (Miller 1959, 198). The coastline from Wewak to 
Madang became a major air lane during 1944-1945 and natural features such 
as the Sepik River mouth were used as navigational landmarks. Somare 
describes the destruction of the village of Karau during one of these raids, 
which he attributes to the Australians (1957, 3). 
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As far as can be established from the war records, the Murik Lakes 
villages were never bombed by the Japanese after the initial capture of 
Wewakin June 1942. No Australian military or administration targets existed 
there as they did in Wewak. The fact that all bombing of the Murik villages 
was by American and Australian planes provided the Japanese with a propa-
ganda opportunity which they exploited and which has stayed in Somare's 
mind. The sight of the Japanese (thought to be the ancestors of the Murik 
people) defending themselves and the villagers from air attacks established a 
bond between Japanese and Murik people that still exists. Somare refers to 
visits to Wewak of Japanese veterans during 1969 and 1970 (1975, 76-77). 
Y. Goto, a participant in those visits and president of the Japan-PNG 
Goodwill Society, confirms the visits and refers to the warmth of the 
reunions.1 Filmed scenes of the visits occur in the filmAngeb of War. 
Miller concludes that General McArthur',s d~ision to bypass Wewak and 
to make large-scale landings at Aitape and Hollandia on 27 April 1944 meant 
that Wewak was never the site oC a major military confrontation, and the local 
people were Cortunate that such battles never occurred there. The coastal 
lowlands oC the Sepik River area, including Somare's home village in the 
Murik Lakes, were thereCore the scene of spasmodic fighting as the Japanese 
forces gradually retreated to the diminishing perimeter around Wewak that 
the Australian 6th Division entered from the west on 11 May 1945. The 
Murik Lakes villagers were spared the worst oC the destruction and inter-
ruption caused by the war, but they did have significant contact with the 
Japanese during the war as will be shown. 
Wewak in 1942 was the administrative center Cor the Sepik District, which 
was peopled by villagers whom McCarthy described as follows: "The sago-
eating people who lived along the river were oC a smouldering temperament 
and oppressed with witchcraft and superstitious Cears. Traditionally they were 
headhunters" (1959, 48). Contact with the people oC the Lower Sepik swamps 
had not been on a great scale by the forties, and the Murik people were 
practically inaccessible in those days except by boat or canoe along the coast, 
usually Crom Wewak. The most frequent visitors were missionaries Crom the 
Society ofthe Divine Word at Wewak or Marienburg, one of whom, Joseph 
Schmidt, spent most of his working liCe in this part oC New Guinea. His 
descriptions of the Murik people indicate that they were friendly and 
considerably acculturated to Western ways (Schmidt 1923-1924). McCarthfs 
description, which conflicts with Schmidt's, may be explained by the Cact that 
it was obtained from Australian military sources who were not generally 
welcomed by the Murik at the end of the war. 
In describing the European evacuation of the Sepik area McCarthy 
indicates that in March 1942 there were only thirty or Corty Europeans in the 
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Wewak area, and that in Angoram, to cite one instance, local people 
including native police rebelled against administration officers. As late as 
April 1942 the district officer, later Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Jones of 
ANGAU, was involved "in bringing the renegade police to book and restoring 
order among the natives2 who had become disaffected" (McCarthy 1959, 49). 
Some of these district officers in their capacity as NGVR/ANGAU officers at 
the time of the occupation took to the bush where their local knowledge, 
particularly of individual villagers, was used in monitoring Japanese military 
activities. Of particular interest were acts of collaboration with the Japanese 
by villagers who seemed sympathetic or actively aiding the Japanese military 
effort. 
It is, however, not difficult to see the local people's point of view and to 
understand friendships formed with individual Japanese, such as that between 
Somare and the Japanese officer Shibata, whom Somare remembers as Sivata 
(1975, 3ft). Tanaka (1980, 99ft) devotes a lengthy section of his history of the 
war to describing relations with the local people whom he claims the Japanese 
were not out to colonize or subdue. Tanaka's view is that it was policy to deal 
with the locals firmly so that they would eventually be able to share in the 
achievements and rewards of the "co-prosperity sphere" which was to be 
established in the Southwest Pacific. The Japanese had appealed to the 
peoples of the far-eastern British colonies such as India, Burma, and Malaya 
as well as their Netherlands and French counterparts to join in an anticolonial 
revolt against their patronizing and exploitative white rulers. While this 
antiadministration feeling lacked any sort of unified base or political identity 
in New Guinea, local groups at the village level did support the Japanese. 
Details of what from an Australian point of view was "betrayal" can be found 
in McCarthy (1959, index 649). The Japanese viewpoint is summarized by 
Tanaka: 
Papua New Guinea people also gave a very good impression to the Japanese 
soldiers and sailors .... (TJhe contacts with the local residents were mainly 
aiming at asking them for their cooperation concerning the supply of 
proviSiOns and some labour .... [T]hey were good-natured, cooperative 
people. In some places, many great favours were granted to the Japanese .... 
[L]ocal residents kindly supplied the Japanese soldiers with all the food they 
required. They did this by going without their own food under the orders of 
the Great Chieftains around Wewak. (1980, 1(0) 
The official Australian attitude to this collaboration was that it was 
somewhere between disloyalty and treason. The punishment was summary, 
because the native ordinances did not canvass such "crimes," and was carried 
out publicly. To be fair, however, McCarthy is evenhanded in his description 
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of the quandary the locals found themselves in. McCarthy's judgment of 
circumstances in 1942 was: 
It must have been difficult for the natives to decide whom they should 
help .... [T]he Japanese did not merely ask but demanded cooperation from 
the villages and the consequences of refusal were harsh, the burning, or air 
bombing and strafing of a reluctant village being routine procedures .•.. 
Many natives indeed went beyond an attitude of sympathy and friendliness 
and passed on information at considerable risk to themselves, or patrolled 
deep into Japanese territory as guides or on other missions. Some, however, 
were prepared to. aid the Japanese whether from feelings of resentment 
dating from pre-war times, from hope of gain or for personal reasons of 
various kinds it is hard to say. (1959, 88) 
The foregoing descriptions, both Japanese and Australian, demonstrate 
that history is mostly self-serving, and that in war histories winners usually get 
to write the authorized version. In general terms it can be said that the local 
people suffered at the hands of both Japanese and Australian-American 
forces and paradoxically benefited from both groups in individual and dif.; 
ferent ways. The contention in this paper is that Michael Somare was one of 
the Papua New Guineans who benefited from contact with the Japanese, and 
while this is implicit in his autobiography (1975), it needs to be shown 
explicitly how the Japanese occupation challenged prevailing local attitudes 
to the white authorities and to record some ofthe advances and improve-
ments they brought to village life. 
The Murik Lakes villages were occupied by soldiers from the Maritime 
and Engineering Transport Division of the Akazuki Regiment, part of Gen-
eral Adachi's 18th Army, during the period from late 1942 until the end of the 
war (Jehne 1983, personal communication). When not actually involved in 
hostilities the life of the individual soldier under such circumstances is 
inclined to boredom unless garrison duty is supplemented by creative and 
productive undertakings. What follows is drawn from Jehne's interview with 
Ooto; the accounts of Tanaka (1980), Yoshiwara (1981), and Ishizuka (1985); 
and my interview with Shibata and Kajizuka in 1986. 
Tanaka explains that during the latter part of 1944, when supplies of rice 
were no longer available from Southeast Asia, this staple food would have to 
be grown locally in paddy fields as is customary in Southeast Asia and Japan. 
The Japanese introduced the flooded rice-field to villagers living in the wet-
lands, and Japanese and locals worked side by side both in the establishment 
of the paddies and in the husbandry of the crop. They also grew a wide variety 
of vegetable and fruit crops alienating village land, thus (according to 
Australian historians) adding to the hardships of the local people (Long 1963, 
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292). In some situations, however, the locals were compensated for their land 
at the time by the Japanese who also readily adapted to the age-old processes 
of bartering and trading. Illustrations both from Yoshiwara (1981) and 
Ishizuka (1955) confirm these shared activities, which challenge the com-
monly held local view of villagers working/or foreigners, but not with them. 
There were other value systems concerning personal relationships that the 
Japanese held and that presented a contrast to those held by Europeans or 
Australians in 1942. Mrs M. Jehne, the interviewer and interpreter for the 
conversation with ex-servicemen recorded in 1983, asked the Japanese group 
a question about the identity of the Japanese as perceived by the locals when 
they arrived at Murik in 1942. 
JEHNE Please comment on the statement that the local people thought the 
Japanese were "our dead forefathers coming to rescue us" (Somare 1985, 5). 
YOSHlZAWA When the "white" men gave things to the natives they threw 
the things down in front of the natives, but the Japanese handed these small 
gifts (cigarettes etc) over to them quite formally with their hands. The 
natives appreciated this treatment very much. 
GOTO There are other reasons why the natives felt closer to the Japanese 
than to the Europeans. The Japanese, whether winning or losing, generally 
adopted an attitude of "equality" to the natives and would live and eat 
together with them. There was none of the master-servant relationship with 
them--thatcharacterised European-Papua New Guinean interaction. For 
example, such as eating separately and punishing natives if they should 
observe white women changing their clothes. Also we do not have any 
reports that Japanese troops seduced the native women whereas it is 
reported that many were seduced by the Allied forces. The Japanese main-
tained a strict code of behaviour and the natives respected the Japanese for 
this. 
To understand the significance of Goto's remark it is necessary to 
recreate briefly the relationships between master and servant in both terri-
tories prior to the war and to refer to analysis and commentary available on 
colonial racial relationships. At the time he left Rabaul in 1942 the young 
Somare was five, six in April, old enough to be forming his first values and 
attitudes toward white men and women. 
Prewar Rabaul was still the Mandated Territory's administration center--a 
town whose expatriate population was dominated by government and church 
officials. (Following disruption caused by the eruption of the volcano, Matupi, 
in 1937, plans were proceeding to transfer the government administrative 
functions to Lae.) Many of these officials were the c1ass- and race-conscious 
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employers described by Nelson, who never seemed to work for the money 
they obviously had and certainly never worked in a fraternal sense with their 
Tolai laborers or selVants (1982, 165ft). Underpinning this behavior was the 
belief, generally held by white people, that Papua New Guineans were 
inferior, less intelligent, and, with any encouragement, given to arrogance. 
The status of local people was determined by the native ordinances of 
both territories that proscribed the behavior and dress of villagers when mix-
ing with white people, particularly women. Oliver in his personal reflections 
on life in Bougainville summed up the expatriate view of local people: "In so 
far as the area's indigenous peoples figured in their objectives, they were 
looked upon mainly as private producers of raw materials, as labourers in 
European enterprises, as consumers of European manufactures and as acces-
sories in the civilisation and development of the colony" (Oliver 1973, 78). 
The young Somare, who spent his first five years growing up in the 
married native police quarters at Vunamami in Rabaul, would have been in 
awe, perhaps fear, of white officials and would have been in the process of 
establishing a servant mentality. As far as white women were concerned, he 
may have been aware of their helping and caring roles in hospital, missionary, 
and charity work, and perhaps conscious of the isolation they also endured at 
the wishes of the white male population. H he had not developed these atti-
tudes in Rabaul prior to the war, he would certainly have learned them in 
Wewak five years later when the war was over. The ambiguities white women 
faced in their relationships with male indigenous workers, including their per-
sonal selVants, are explored by Inglis (1974) in an examination of the White 
Women's Protection Ordinance (1926) of the Territory of Papua. Inglis' argu-
ment is that the white male perception was that Melanesian men were sexu-
ally overactive (that is, more active than whites) and unrestrained in their 
sexual behavior, which matured in their early teens. This perception by white 
men led to fear and resentment of black men and boys and eventually to prej-
udice and discrimination against them. For Inglis this piece of legislation is 
the extreme ofPapuan caste legislation (Inglis 1973, ix). The legislation was 
male instigated, and charges heard under it were sensation-alized by the 
expatriate press. There is no reason to believe that these attitudes were any 
different in Rabaul than in Port Moresby. Inglis cites reports in the Rabaul 
Times similar to those in the Papuan Courier, the principal expatriate news-
papers in New Guinea and Papua prior to the war. 
According to Goto's claim, the Japanese behaved in markedly different 
ways from the Australian or European norm, exhibiting behavior that would 
have challenged the assumptions forming in young Somare's mind about 
equality and the master-servant relationship. For example, some private 
Japanese soldiers used to labor alongside the Papua New Guineans, demon-
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strating ways of planting crops. In doing so they would also rest, share food, 
and eat together. That a brotherhood of shared purpose was established 
between villagers and the Japanese is demonstrated by the strenuous ANGAU 
efforts to rehabilitate locals after the Australian troops reoccupied areas of 
Japanese influence (Gash and Whittaker 1975, plate 665). Ooto also claims 
that Japanese soldiers respected village women and made no sexual demands 
on them, a point confirmed by Somare (1975, 5). Although officially frowned 
on, there is no doubt that the Australian or European male population sexu-
ally exploited 19'=al women in the tradition of the double standard in sexual 
behavior founq widely in Bntish and Australian colonial possessions. 
Somare and Shibata 
Yukio Shibata was born in Kamogawa, Chiba Prefecture, in 1920. After 
completing his middle schooling he went to a military engineering college 
where he studied among other subjects metallurgy and ethnology. He was 
working in the nickel mines and the associated refinery in Chiba Prefecture 
when the war commenced, and he was commissioned as a lieutenant after 
attending officer training school. He was sent to New Guinea in 1943 where 
he was attached to the 9th Boat Engineering Regiment, a logistics unit 
responsible for the transport of supplies along the north coast of New 
Guinea. Shibata was the judicial affairs officer or administrator of a part of 
this unit. After service in Lae and Finschhafen he was assigned on 12 March 
1943 to the Murik Lakes, a major location for Japanese small ships and 
landing craft. 
Small ships transported all sorts of goods from major harbors along the 
coast to Japanese troops. As the war closed in on the Japanese, supplies of 
food from Southeast Asia diminished, and the Japanese were forced to grow 
increased amounts of vegetables and to trade for fresh and dried fish, pork, 
and sago with the local people. The Murik Lakes were chosen as the site to 
produce salt fot the 18th Army, and it was Shibata's job to manufacture the 
salt by boiling and evaporating sea water. The salt was then distributed by 
boats, one of which was commanded by Shibata. To the local people he was 
the boat captain or "Kepten" (Pidgin), and this is why Somare remembers him 
as Captain Sivata. Shiba~a's headquarters were in the village of Karau, 
Somare's home village. 
The Karau children were intrigued by the boats the Japanese used, which 
were different from the canoes they were accustomed to, and Shibata remem-
bers this as the common interest that brought him and the children together. 
In addition, Shibata shows a natural fondness for young people. The need to 
communicate with both children and elders forced Shibata to learn New 
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Guinea Pidgin (Tok Pisin) in which he soon became fluent. (He had some 
knowledge of English from his schooling in Japan.) He says he learned Pidgin 
from a Bible which he found in a deserted church. Shibata remembers how 
lonely he and his fellow soldiers were, and how the children played with them 
and "brought some joy into their lives." Children and soldiers taught each 
other games and dances, stories and songs. Shibata was concerned that the 
war had interrupted the mission schooling provided by the SVD and sought 
the permission of his superiors to set up a village school in Karau early in 
1944. Somare was one of about twenty children who attended the school. At 
that time he was eight years old. Shibata does not specifically remember 
Somare as Somare remembers Shibata, but he does remember one boy as 
very intelligent, quick, and outgoing':-a boy who produced a clever piece of 
writing called "Kaup is Japan." Kaup is one of the Murik villages, and Shibata 
has speculated that Somare might have been this clever boy. 
The village big men agreed to build a school, which Shibata sketched. In 
his spare time Shibata started an ethnography of the Murik villages and 
produced genealogies of the families which were complemented by sketches 
and descriptions recording different aspects of village life. Shibata managed 
to retain this ethnographic material, returned to him by Australian prisoner-
of-war authorities when he was repatriated to Japan in early 1946. He worked 
on his ethnography during the six months he spent recovering from malaria in 
a hospital, and presented some of the material to General MacArthur, whose 
military history staff were collecting primary documents from the Pacific 
campaign. 
Shibata still has this material, a copy of which he gave to me. His recol-
lection of what was taught in the school is therefore based upon written 
record. School started early in the morning and with an assembly in which 
ritual recognition was made of the sun, the winds, and other natural pheno-
mena. Respect for elders, particularly the village big men, was als.o a feature 
of this ritual, which included traditional Japanese greetings and obeisances. 
Shibata, who is not a Christian, was establishing his school curriculum in the 
Shinto tradition which, at that time, lent support to Japanese militarism and 
enforced ideas, such as order and respect for the emperor or for those who 
had his delegated authority. 
Rote learning of factual material, where students repeat information 
written on a blackboard or spoken by a teacher, establishes the authority of 
the teacher and the political system represented by the teacher because the 
recitation of memorized facts reduces the need to think. This method of 
instruction was, and for younger children in Japan still is, the traditional way 
of learning. Shibata used the ground as his blackboard, inscribing ideograms 
from the kanji syllabary that Somare and the other children were asked to 
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Murik salt processing. Sketch by Yukio Shibata 
recognize an<f recite, finishing off with names and honorifics to show respect 
for the teacher. Shozawa, who ran a similar school in the next village, remem-
bers being disconcerted at the Murik way of counting, which he remembers as 
"one, two, many," although this view is wrong, according to Schmidt, who 
identified several different numbering systems using base four and base five, 
depending on the purpose of the counting (1923-1924, 725ff). Shibata and 
Shozawa decided that they would teach the Murik children the Japanese 
number system so that when they wanted four boys, for example, to run an 
errand, that would be the number who responded. Number sequence natu-
rally led to siPlple calculation made concrete by using natural materials such 
as pebbles and sheI1s. Games also were used to reinforce number concepts, 
and there are drawings among Shibata's ethnography of children in lines and 
groups exchanging places or obeying instructions that would allow them to 
conceptualize abstract numbers and facts. 
Shibata taught the children Japanese classic stories such as "Momotaro" 
and songs such as "Akatombo." When they met again in Tokyo in 1985 and in 
Wewak in 1986 both Shibata and Somare showed that neither had forgotten 
the words of these traditional songs, even though the meanings had been lost 
over the forty-year period. Shibata believed that Kendo, one of the Japanese 
martial arts, disciplined the body, so he added formal exercises to each day. 
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Shibata, Shozawa, and the other officers who taught the children of the 
Murik villages believed that the daily regimen they imposed on the children's 
lives would bring about a more purposeful existence that would fit them to 
share in the prosperous coexistence the Japanese envisioned in Papua New 
Guinea. Older men and women were also subjected to a certain amount of 
learning, and the Japanese used the children to communicate with the elders. 
Women were urged to cook food for recuperating servicemen and were 
encouraged to visit the makeshift hospitals and to perform simple tasks. 
Cigarettes, tinned goods, articles of clothing, implements, and other artifacts 
were bartered for both children's and adults' services. 
As Allied control of the north coast of New Guinea increased, Shibata 
said, the Murik villages were subjected to increased aerial bombardment, 
particularly because the smoke from the fires of the salt works pinpointed 
their positions. Shibata and the local big men decided in July 1945 to move 
the women and children into the mangrove swamps, and the school closed 
down. Shibata came out of hiding in September 1945 when the war ended and 
was repatriated in January 1946. 
Both Shibata and Somare have testified to the inspirational nature of 
their shared experience (Somare 1970, 1975; Shibata 1986; Minakami 1986), 
and proof of this mutual regard is to be found in the reunions of Somare and 
Shibata in 1985 and 1986. Because both men have recorded their versions of 
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this period it is possible to draw attention to some minor discrepancies in the 
accounts. Somare believes the Japanese were not only educating young 
people but also training them as future soldiers. The Japanese interviewees 
dismiss this idea, but there is evidence in the Australian war histories that 
New Guineans fought both with Australian and Japanese military forces. 
Somare also wrote that Shibata was a Japanese-American who made his way 
to Japan at the outbreak of war and enlisted in the Japanese army. This is. 
incorrect. Shibata did not visit the United States before the war. Somare was 
also misinformed about the "Kempeitai," which he believed was Japanese for 
"captain" (1970,31), while actually it refers to the Japanese military police. 
These small differences aside, Somare has acknowledged it was the Japanese 
who provided him with his first formal education, and that he appreciated the 
experiences he had with Shibata and the Japanese, who were favorably differ-
ent from the white men he had seen in Rabaul. 
Implicit in Somare's recollections of this time is the inference that he was 
excited at the prospect of learning something from another culture. Because 
Shibata was sensitive ab()ut acculturation and wanted to build on Somare's 
own culture, the experience for Somare was a happy one, and one which was 
to encourage him when the opportunity arose in 1947 to enroll at Boram 
. Primary School, part of the government school system in Wewak. Shibata 
therefore must be recognized as providing the first major nonindigenous 
influence on Somare's life, during the period between his eighth and ninth 
birthdays. 
When Shibata was asked what he hoped the outcome of his village school 
would be, he said that he hoped it would help young people, particularly 
those with leadership abilities, develop attitudes that would suit them for self-
determination. Perhaps Shibata is being idealistic after the event, because it is 
difficult to assume that the Japanese would not have replaced one form of 
colonial administration with another. But it is worth noting that Somare in 
later years was motivated by a desire for self-determination, which would lead 
eventually to the realization of self-government and independence achieved 
through political means. 
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Notes 
1 A Japanese-speaking friend of the author, aaus Jehne, arranged to interview the ex-
officers on a trip to Japan in 1982-1983. Through the help of the Japan-Papua New Guinea 
Goodwill Society, Jehne made contact with the Japanese New Guinean veterans and audiotaped 
an interview. 
2 The term native is not used in this paper unless it occurs in direct quotation or in the 
context of the prewar period. The term was used by anthropologists and administrators prior to 
the war to designate indigenous Papua New Guineans and occurs in the titles of regulations and 
ordinances. For example, offences under the Native Administration Regulations (1924) of the 
Mandated Territory were heard in the Courts for Native Affairs (Mair 1970:67). Not all prewar 
anthropologists were satisfied with the term native, however, and Ian Hogbin as early as 1934 
at Wogeo referred to "the Wogeo people" or the "islanders" or "villagers" or used a similar 
synonym, rather than the word native. 
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